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Resumen
¿Qué hemos aprendido de la crisis ocurrida durante el periodo 2006-2012, que incluye eventos como la crisis
“subprime” la bancarrota de Lehman Brothers, o la crisis de deuda soberana europea?
Normalmente, se asume que en las empresas que tienen CDS, éste es el factor clave para determinar la
prima de riesgo de un nuevo activo. Por tanto, el CDS es un elemento fundamental para un inversor para tomar
oportunidades relativas a través de la estructura de capital de la empresa. En el primer capítulo estudiamos los
aspectos más relevantes de la microestructura del mercado de los CDS, en términos de precios, para tener una
idea precisa del funcionamiento de este mercado. Consideramos que este tipo de análisis es fundamental para
establecer una base sólida para el resto de los estudios empíricos que realizamos en los siguientes capítulos.
En su documento “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”,
Basilea establece los requerimientos de capital por el riesgo de CVA en la cartera de negociación y la metod-
ología para la determinación de dicho capital. Este requerimiento regulatorio añade una presión extra para
el profundo conocimiento del mercado de los CDS y motiva el análisis llevado a cabo en esta tesis. El prob-
lema surge cuando tenemos que estimar la prima de riesgo de crédito de contrapartidas que no tienen CDS
en el mercado. ¿Cómo podemos estimar el spread de crédito de un emisor sin CDS? Adicionalmente, a raíz del
default de Lehman Brothers el 15 de septiembre de 2008, observamos la presencia de grandes “outliers” en la
distribución de spread de crédito en las distintas combinaciones de rating, industria y región. Después de un
exhaustivo análisis de los modelos estudiados, llegamos a las siguientes conclusiones. Es claro que la regresión
jerárquica se ajusta mucho mejor que los modelos no jerárquicos. Adicionalmente, preferimos en general la
estimación de los modelos en mediana que en media para asignar un spread a un emisor sin CDS, debido a
la robustez de la mediana, que minimiza el problema de inversión. Por último, preferimos la mediana dada la
presencia de asimetría a la derecha que suele mostrar la distribución de los spread de crédito.
En el tercer capítulo establecemos una metodología para el análisis de riesgo de crédito que puede ser in-
tegrado dentro del marco del apetito por riesgo de las entidades financieras. Comenzamos estableciendo un
factor global de riesgo usando los datos de los CDS, y analizamos la información contenida en un amplio con-
junto de variables financieras para el factor global de riesgo así como para el riesgo de crédito de los sectores.
El factor global de riesgo que hemos estimado es utilizado para evaluar el riesgo sistémico e idiosincrático de
los índices de crédito sectoriales. Nuestros resultados muestran que el sector más sistémico fue el sector fin-
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anciero. De acuerdo con nuestra metodología, el sector industrial fue el segundo sector más sistémico durante
este periodo de tiempo. Por otro lado, siguiendo con la misma línea de razonamiento, los dos sectores menos
correlacionados con el resto de sectores han sido el sector de la salud y el tecnológico. Adicionalmente, se
presenta una descomposición similar para los CDS de los emisores de los sectores financieros e industrial en
Norte América y Europa. Dicha descomposición puede ser una importante herramienta para evaluar las pos-
ibilidades de diversificación de las carteras de crédito, así como para diseñar las estrategias de cobertura de las
mismas. Este tipo de descomposición puede ser usado por las entidades financieras para fijar sus límites de
riesgo cuando establecen su política de asignación de activos (“asset allocation”) así como por los supervisores
ocupados en la búsqueda de potenciales problemas de riesgo sistémico.
En el siguiente capítulo estudiamos la preocupación incesante de que la cobertura del ajuste de valora-
ción crediticia (CVA) llegue a ser extremadamente difícil porque la correlación de largo plazo existente entre
los CDS individuales y los índices de crédito deje de existir. Por lo tanto, en el capítulo 4 hemos analizado el
riesgo empírico en una cartera de CDS, definiendo el riesgo de base que se induce de la correlación imperfecta
entre el CDS individual y el índice de crédito (por ejemplo, Itraxx) involucrado en una estrategia de cobertura
dinámica. Las instituciones financieras normalmente prefieren cubrir sus carteras de CDS o CVA con índices a
causa de la alta liquidez de dichos índices. Si los cambios en los precios de los CDS y los índices estuvieran per-
fectamente correlacionados, no introduciríamos riesgos adicionales, y podríamos perfectamente compensar
cualquier pérdida o ganancia tomando dinámicamente la posición contraria en el índice correspondiente. Pero
hemos mostrado que dicho riesgo de base existe, incluso para carteras altamente diversificadas, con más de
setecientos emisores, lo que significa que no podemos inmunizar completamente el valor de la cartera basán-
donos en índices para su cobertura, y asumiendo implícitamente que el riesgo idiosincrático se compensa
entre los distintos emisores de una cartera.
Finalmente, en el último capítulo nos centramos en la correlación entre activos. La correlación entre los act-
ivos de las empresas es uno de los factores más determinantes cuando calculamos el capital que necesitamos
para hacer frente a las pérdidas inesperadas de una cartera bajo el enfoque de modelos internos avanzados de
Basilea, Basilea II, así que bajo muchos de los modelos de crédito de la industria financiera. Desafortunada-
mente, la correlación de activos no es directamente observable en el mercado, por lo que nos vemos forzados
a usar diferente métodos para estimar dicha correlación de activos. En este capítulo argumentamos que la
principal razón para el incremento del valor de riesgo crediticio durante este periodo fue el aumento de las
correlaciones intrasectoriales e intersectoriales en los mercados de crédito, aunque también tuvo su relevancia
el incremento de la probabilidad de default asignada por las agencias de ratings. Adicionalmente, mostramos
que había señales en el mercado de crédito que el sector financiero probablemente no introdujo en sus mode-
los internos de crédito para gestionar sus riesgos durante la crisis.
Abstract
¿What have we learnt from the 2006-2012 crisis, including events such as the subprime crisis, the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers or the European sovereign debt crisis, among others?
It is usually assumed that in firms that have a CDS quotation, this CDS is the key factor in establishing the
credit premium risk for a new financial asset. Thus, the CDS is a key element for any investor in taking relative
value opportunities across a firm’s capital structure. In the first chapter we study the most relevant aspects of
the microstructure of the CDS market in terms of pricing, to have a clear idea of how this market works. We
consider that such an analysis is a necessary point for establishing a solid base for the rest of the chapters in
order to carry out the different empirical studies we perform.
In its document “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”,
Basel sets the requirement of a capital charge for credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk in the trading book and
its methodology for the computation for the capital requirement. This regulatory requirement has added extra
pressure for in-depth knowledge of the CDS market and this motivates the analysis performed in this thesis.
The problem arises in estimating of the credit risk premium for those counterparties without a directly quoted
CDS in the market. How can we estimate the credit spread for an issuer without CDS? In addition to this, given
the high volatility period in the credit market in the last few years and, in particular, after the default of Lehman
Brothers on 15 September 2008, we observe the presence of big outliers in the distribution of credit spread
in the different combinations of rating, industry and region. After an exhaustive analysis of the results from
the different models studied, we have reached the following conclusions. It is clear that hierarchical regression
models fit the data much better than those of non-hierarchical regression. Furthermore, we generally prefer the
median model (50%-quantile regression) to the mean model (standard OLS regression) due to its robustness
when assigning the price to a new credit asset without spread, minimizing the “inversion problem”. Finally, an
additional fundamental reason to prefer the median model is the typical "right skewness" distribution of CDS
spreads.
In the third chapter we provide a methodology for credit risk analysis that can be embedded into a risk
appetite framework. We start by estimating a global risk factor using CDS data, and we analyse the information
content in a wide set of financial indicators of the global risk factor as well as of credit risk at the sector level.
The global risk factor is then used to evaluate the systemic and idiosyncratic components of credit risk for
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sectorial credit indices. Our results show that the most systemic sector was the financial sector. According to
our methodology, the industrial sector was the second most systemic during this period of time. On the other
hand, along the same line of reasoning, the two sectors that are the least correlated with the rest have been the
health care and technology sectors. In addition to this, a similar decomposition of credit risk is obtained for
CDS issuers in the industrial and financial sectors of Europe and North America. Such decomposition can be
an important tool when evaluating the diversification possibilities of credit portfolios as well as for the design
of appropriate hedging strategies. It could be used by financial institutions to maintain their risk limits when
taking their asset allocation decisions as well as by supervisors searching for potential systemic risk problems
In the following chapter we study the rising fears that CVA hedging will become increasingly difficult as
the long-standing correlation between single-name and index CDS products breaks down. Therefore, in the
fourth chapter, we have analysed the empirical risk in a CDS portfolio, defining basis risk as that induced by
the imperfect correlation between the underlying single CDS contract to be replicated and the credit index
contract involved in the dynamic replication strategy (e.g., iTraxx Index). Financial institutions usually prefer
to hedge their CDS or CVA by trading in a credit index because of their higher liquidity and lower frictions. If
changes in the price of the CDS and the price of credit index contracts were perfectly correlated, no further
risk would be introduced, and one could perfectly offset any gain or loss in the position by dynamically trading
in the related index contract. But we have shown that basis risk exists even in the case of a large diversified
portfolio with more than seven hundred issuers, meaning that we cannot fully immunize the value of such a
portfolio with a hedge based on credit index contracts and implicitly assuming that the idiosyncratic risk is
offset among the different issuers in the portfolio.
Finally, in the last chapter, we focus on asset correlation. The correlation among a firm’s assets is one of
the most important factors when calculating the capital needed to face unexpected losses of a credit portfolio
under the Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB) of Basel, Basel II, and for many of the credit models in the
financial industry. Unfortunately, the asset correlation is not directly observable in the market, thus we are
forced to use different methods in order to estimate asset correlation. In this chapter, we have argued that
the main reason for the increase in Credit VaR over time has been the growing intra-sector and inter-sector
correlations among credit markets. Also worth noting is the increase in the average probability of default of the
issuers provided by the external rating. In addition to this, we show that there were signs in the credit market
that the financial sector probably did not introduce them into their internal risk models in order to manage
their risk during the crisis.
Global summary
Global introduction
¿What have we learnt from the crisis occurred during 2006-2012, including events such as the subprime crisis,
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers or the European sovereign debt crisis, among others?
In its document “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”,
the Basel Committee (2011) sets the requirement of a capital charge for CVA risk in the trading book and its
methodology for the computation for the capital requirement. In a later document, “Basel III counterparty
credit risk and exposures to central counterparties - Frequently asked questions”, the Basel Committee (2012b)
reaffirms the idea of requiring the financial entities to estimate credit spread curves, considering the different
factors of rating, sector and region of each counterparty. Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) is defined as the
difference between the risk-free portfolio value and the true portfolio value that takes into account the pos-
sibility of a counterparty’s default. In other words, CVA is the market value of counterparty credit risk. Those
entities coping with advanced models in their risk management are facing the problem of the determining of
the credit spread for the counterparties in their portfolios and, even more, the hedging strategies to follow us-
ing either single-name CDS or index CDS. This regulatory requirement has added extra pressure for in-depth
knowledge of the CDS market and this motivates the analysis performed in this thesis.
In Chapter 1, we study the most relevant aspects of the microstructure of the CDS market in terms of pri-
cing, to have a clear idea of how this market works. We consider that such analysis is a necessary point for
establishing a solid base for the rest of the chapters in order to carry out the different empirical studies we
perform, designed to answer, among others, the following questions:
What type of restructuring clause should we use to aggregate the different CDS data? Which currency
should we use to estimate our credit curves? How can we manage the different standard recovery rates in
the market? What type of filter should we apply to the dataset?
Any type of investment requires the acquisition of assets (financial, real or both), and hence analysing their
different features is crucial. The three main attributes of financial assets are return, risk, and liquidity. The
first two are generally taken into consideration when deciding whether to invest in an asset or not. However,
the financial crisis has made of liquidity a central risk factor. Therefore, investors must analyse risk, return
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and liquidity characteristics of those financial assets before taking their investment decision [Altman (1996),
Cebenoyan and Strahan (2001), James (1996) and Guill (2008)]. In relation to this idea, in Chapter 2 we pay
attention to the determination of credit spreads with different econometric models. This is decisive for any
financial entity for several reasons:
• The assignment of prices for new loans, or financial guarantees, especially because of its implications for
the valuation of the banking book.
• Using market-implied ratings instead of agency ratings for the monitoring of the loan portfolio.
• CVA quantification of the trading book for those counterparties with no direct liquid CDS quoted in the
market.
It is usually assumed that in firms that have a CDS quotation, this CDS is the key factor in establishing the
credit premium risk for a new financial asset [see Longstaff et al. (2003) and Longstaff et al. (2005)]. Thus, the
CDS is a key element for any investor in taking relative value opportunities across a firm’s capital structure. All
this being true, the problem arises in estimation of the credit risk premium for those counterparties without a
directly quoted CDS in the market. And in this case, two main questions must be answered:
How can we estimate the credit spread for an issuer without CDS? In addition to this, given the high volatility
period in the credit market in the last few years and, in particular, after the default of Lehman Brothers on 15
September 2008, we observe the presence of big outliers in the distribution of credit spread in the different
combinations of rating, industry and region. In the context of the current financial and economic crisis, it is
natural to ask whether the ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is the optimal method to estimate credit
spread curves. Or could it be more efficient to use more robust estimators that are not so affected by the
presence of outliers? For a financial institution, it is clear that the best approach is the one that best reflects
market trends, while minimizing the fluctuations in the implied estimates.
In Chapter 3, we provide a methodology for credit risk analysis that can be embedded into a risk appetite
framework. We start by estimating a global risk factor using CDS data, and we analyse the information content
in a wide set of financial indicators of the global risk factor as well as of credit risk at the level of sectors. The
global risk factor is then used to evaluate the systemic and idiosyncratic components of credit risk for sectorial
credit indices. A similar decomposition of credit risk is obtained for CDS issuers in the industrial and financial
sectors of Europe and North America. Such decomposition can be an important tool when evaluating the
diversification possibilities of credit portfolios as well as for the design of appropriate hedging strategies. It
could be used by financial institutions to maintain their risk limits when taking their asset allocation decisions
as well as by supervisors searching for potential systemic risk problems.
This analysis will allow us to address the following specific issues:
• What were the most systemic sectors during 2006-2012?
• What were the sectors with the largest idiosyncratic component of risk during 2006-2012?
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• What are the most influential financial variables explaining credit spread fluctuations?
• How is the risk of CDS spreads decomposed among systemic risk, sector risk and idiosyncratic risk?
• Can the use of credit indices hedge a diversified CDS portfolio appropriately?
• Is there a strong geographical factor in the intra-sector analysis of the different corporate sectors?
In Chapter 4, based on the recent article “CDS de-correlation a threat to CVA hedging, traders warn” by Risk
Magazine (Devasaba (2014), among others) we highlight the climate of fear prevalent throughout the industry.
“The ongoing slump in traded volumes of single-name credit default swaps (CDSs) is a "nasty side effect" of
international regulatory reforms, a senior banker has claimed, raising fears that credit valuation adjustment
(CVA) hedging will become increasingly difficult should the long-standing correlation between single-name and
index CDS products break down. “
“As single-name volumes wither, notional outstanding in index CDS products is growing, raising fears that
the long-standing correlation between CDS indexes and single-name contracts is in danger of breaking down –
a consequence of tougher margin regimes and trading restrictions that have forced many credit arbitrage players
out of the market.”
Therefore, in Chapter 4, we estimate the basis risk between the CDS portfolio and the hedge with different
indices to answer, among others, the following questions: Is the basis risk higher in North America than in
Europe? Does the effectiveness of the hedge increase when we consider more than one index to hedge the
portfolio? Could we improve the results using an estimation technique other than OLS? In addition to these
issues we introduce the issue of hedging the Jump-to-Default risk.
Finally, in Chapter 5, the correlation among the firm’s assets is one of the most important factors when
calculating the capital needed to face unexpected losses of a credit portfolio under the Internal Ratings-Based
approach (IRB) of the Basel Committee (2006), Basel II, and for many of the credit models in the financial
industry. Unfortunately, the asset correlation is not directly observable in the market, thus we are forced to use
different methods in order to estimate asset correlation.
Although the CDS market is the main reference for the credit market, we do not know about any paper stat-
ing that the use of the CDS determines the economic capital required for a loan portfolio. The main problem
with this approach comes from the fact that the CDS is a risk neutral instrument. Thus, the use of the CDS
for capital estimates (which is a problem based on physical probabilities instead of risk neutral probabilities),
is not trivial. The economic capital estimated by CDS spreads might be a very useful alternative for portfo-
lio managers. These estimates could provide us with relevant information regarding future systemic adverse
shocks as well as an alternative tool for risk management and asset allocation.
We propose an analysis similar to Dullmann et al. (2007) but using CDS data with more industries, eleven
instead of the six industries used by Dullmann, and for a more recent period, 2006-2012, where we could dis-
tinguish among the pre-crisis period, the global crisis period, and the post-crisis period. Thus, we would be
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able to compare these estimations against Basel II, placing these figures in the context of the regulatory capital
requirement.
Global conclusions
In Chapter 1, we have reviewed the main aspects of the microstructure of the CDS market, leading to the fol-
lowing results:
The CDS market is concentrated in North America, Europe and Asia, most of the issuers having A or BBB
ratings, with the most representative sectors being the financial, industrial and consumer services sectors. Typ-
ically, the CDS curve slope of an issuer is positive: the higher the tenor, the wider the spread, except in a stressed
scenario. Also noteworthy is the usual right-skewed distribution of the CDS spread for a particular rating sector
that can sometimes lead to a considerable number of “inverse observations” during a crisis period, meaning
that higher ratings have wider spreads (“inversion problem”).
With respect to the restructuring event in the CDS contract, we observe that after the Big Bang Protocol
there has been a higher standardisation of the CDS market, reducing the impact of the restructuring event on
the CDS quotation. The Big Bang Protocol was adhered to by over 2,000 market participants and took effect on
8 April 2009, introducing the main changes:
1. Establishment of Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DC) for each ISDA regions to determ-
ine whether credit or succession events occurred.
2. “Auction Hardwiring”
3. Rolling Event Effective Date
In terms of the foreign exchange (FX) adjustment in CDS prices, we have shown that there is a substantial
FX adjustment in CDS prices at times when the market estimates a significant adverse impact between the
issuer default and the systemic risk of the local economy, as Ehlers and Schonbucher (2006) and Jankowitsch
and Pichler (2005) pointed out. However, this FX adjustment is close to zero in any other time period. These
conclusions should also be important for pricing loans on matters related to trade financing subject to country
risk.
Regarding the impact of recovery rates on CDS, we have seen that the different standard recovery rates by
regions do not influence CDS prices under normal conditions, as Duffie (1999) stated. However, we must point
out the importance of taking into consideration the stochastic nature of recovery whenever bond prices are far
below par value.
In Chapter 2, we have presented different econometric models to estimate sector credit curves. After an
exhaustive analysis of the results from the different models, we have reached the following conclusions:
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It is clear that hierarchical regression models fit the data much better than those of non-hierarchical regres-
sion. In addition, the ranking of models does not change with the sample period. However, it is obvious that
during the crisis period, “fitting” errors for every model are much greater than in the rest of sample periods.
In general, we prefer the median model (50%-quantile regression) to the mean model (standard OLS re-
gression) due to its robustness when assigning the price to a new credit asset without spread, minimizing the
“inversion problem”. An additional fundamental reason to prefer the median model is the typical "right skew-
ness" distribution of CDS spreads.
In terms of volatility, we have observed that the exponential models smooth the changes due to the rating,
sector or regional factors, by estimating a less volatile spread than linear models. It is important to note that
with respect to the sample criteria, we observe that the estimated series are less volatile when we do not apply
any filter to the data. Our interpretation of this result is that the lowest quality rating data are less volatile than
the rest of the data. This could be because the lower quality rating data tend to be fairly constant due to their
low liquidity; therefore, if we include these data in the sample, we reduce the overall series volatility.
Regarding the sample criteria, we observe that all the results of this second chapter are rescaled in terms of
the sum of the absolute errors and series volatility. This means that all of the econometric models presented in
this chapter show the same trend, independently of the selected sample (pre-crisis, crisis or post-crisis period).
Thus the rank order of the models is not altered by the selected sample criteria. For instance, the exponential
models estimate a less volatile spread than the linear models independently of the selected sample. Finally, we
consider the “BB Markit rating” as the best of the different analysed criteria, because it allows us to use a quality
characteristic of the data, as well as all the “good” price information available daily in the market to estimate
credit curves.
In Chapter 3, we provide answers for some of the questions posed in the Introduction to this thesis:
• What were the most systemic sectors during 2006-2012?
Throughout the paper, we have interpreted the first principal component calculated over the sectorial credit
indices as a global risk factor. This is justified by the results we have presented as well as by the analysis in Peña
and Rodriguez-Moreno.Our results show that the most systemic sector was the financial sector. The first prin-
cipal component has an R-squared above 80% when explaining the variation of the Financial Sector Index for
the whole period 2006-2012. These results are consistent with Moody’s [Munves (2008)] and with the proposal
by the Basel Committee (2011) of a specific increase in the estimated value of asset correlation for the financial
sector when calculating the level of regulatory capital required. That correlation was set at 30%, up from the
previous value of 24%, while maintaining the 24% correlation for the rest of corporate sectors. According to our
methodology, the industrial sector was the second most systemic sector during this period of time, possibly
reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis in the real economy, since the industrial sector is distinct-
ively dependent on financing and capital for their long-run investments, as well as the effect of the increased
deterioration in the global housing market.
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• What were the sectors with the largest idiosyncratic component of risk during 2006-2012?
Along the same line of reasoning, the two sectors that are the least correlated with the rest of the sectors have
been the health care and technology sectors. That makes it harder to hedge credit portfolios in these sectors by
taking contrary positions in some others. This outcome is not surprising, taking into account the robust growth
that the health care sector is experiencing around the world. This is especially the case in developed countries
(which represent the major part of our data sample) as the population of these countries is getting older, with
more economic resources and a greater demand for health care services so as to achieve a better quality of life.
As a consequence, the health care sector has been less influenced by the recent crisis. On the other hand, CDS
returns in the technology sector have also shown low correlations with the rest of the market, possibly because
of the specific nature of innovation in this industry, which has a life cycle very different from the other sectors
of the economy.
• What are the most influential financial variables explaining credit spread fluctuations?
There are alternative sets of explanatory factors that can be used to explain a very significant percentage of the
time fluctuations in our estimated global risk factor. This is interesting because, as we have repeatedly pointed
out, such a factor represents the general evolution in the CDS spreads market. Interest rates, like the overnight
LIBOR rate or its spread with the EONIA rate, the 3-month EURIBOR rate, the US Treasury 5-year rate and the
slope and curvature of the term structure of US swap rates, are correlated negatively with CDS spreads. In par-
ticular, the negative correlation between CDS premia and the risk-free rate is similar to the result documented
for bond yield spreads by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and also by Ericsson et al. (2009) when analysing the
single-name CDS. This is an important result for the estimation of wrong-way risk, for which a standard as-
sumption is to consider independence between interest rates and CDSs when searching for indicators of the
risk exposure of derivatives. Hence, such assumption may lead to an underestimation of the level of risk. An-
other interesting empirical result is the observed positive correlation between volatility indicators like VIX, the
implied volatility of the euro/dollar exchange rate and US swaption rates, and the global risk factor for the CDS
market, which could be used for hedging purposes.1 The possibility of hedging represents an interesting open
question that would require further research.
• How is the risk of CDS spreads decomposed among systemic risk, sector risk and idiosyncratic risk?
We have analysed industrial and financial sectors in Europe and North America to find that, in terms of median
R-squared values across issuers:
(SEE TABLE 3.16)
These results suggest the high risk involved in undiversified positions in CDS from issuers in these sectors,
especially in the illiquid CDS market circumstances that arose with the financial crisis, which still exist today.
They are also interesting for pricing purposes, since we could use this information to infer the credit premium
of a new issuer. On the other hand, to the extent that the idiosyncratic components of risk could be uncorrel-
1The global risk factor also shows a natural positive association with credit indices and implicit volatility indicators for credit markets.
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ated, they might allow for interesting hedging strategies, which we comment on next.
• Can the use of credit indices hedge a diversified CDS portfolio appropriately?
The answer is yes. In the light of the results of our analysis, the global risk factor displays high and positive
correlations with iTraxx, in consistency with the interpretation we have given to the global risk factor. A simple
regression of CDS sectorial indices with iTraxx as the only explanatory variable, other than a constant term,
leads to beta estimates between 0.35 and 0.50, and R-squared coefficients between 0.20 and 0.50. An ex-post
analysis of a delta-hedging strategy for a sectorial credit portfolio based on using the estimated beta to define
a contrary position in the iTraxx Index, shows a substantial reduction of about 70% or more in return variance,
except for the health care and technology sectors.
Furthermore, we have also shown in previous sections that the low correlation of idiosyncratic components
allows for a diversified credit portfolio in any of the four sectors considered, which can be hedged following
a delta-hedge strategy with the iTraxx Index. In fact, portfolios made up by firms with higher idiosyncratic
components allow for quite an efficient hedge through contrary positions on the iTraxx Index, while portfolios
made up by firms with lower idiosyncratic components are much harder to hedge, as expected.
These results reinforce the appropriateness of our estimates of idiosyncratic risk. They also suggest the
interest of running a more detailed, ex-ante examination of the efficiency of a hedge strategy designed with the
conditional second order moments estimated from a GARCH specification, possibly with some asymmetric
(leverage) effects on volatility, which we leave as an issue for future research.
• Is there a strong geographical factor in the intra-sector analysis of the different corporate sectors?
A further implication from the results in the previous paragraph is that the first principal components for a
given sector, estimated in different geographical regions, display similar fluctuations over time, since they are
all highly correlated with the sectorial factor from Section 3.4. This suggests that the sectorial factor is more
important in determining CDS spreads than the geographical region. It also implies that it might be more
promising to hedge a credit position taking contrary positions in the same sector in other regions than taking
a contrary position in different sectors in the same region. In fact, the sectorial risk factors for the industrial
sectors in the US and Europe display a high correlation of 0.85, suggesting that sector-specific risk factors have
a strong global nature, capturing elements of risk that are common to different geographical areas.
A similar observation emerges from the comparison between estimates of the sectorial components of risk
for the financial sectors in Europe and North America, which are again closely related. The implication is that
the sectorial factor may be much more important than the geographical factor, suggesting that firms should be
thought of as members of a global sector instead of members of a particular region, there not being a noticeable
diversification across the geographies in the corporate sectors. This kind of result should be interesting for
financial institutions when establishing an adequate asset allocation policy for the corporate market. It seems
that sectorial factors are more decisive than geographical factors in the corporate market under normal market
circumstances. However, during a specific crisis in a country, the geographical factor is going to be fundamental
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in the CDSs of those issuers within that country. Thus, we should not forget that the geographical factors are
more decisive for small/medium enterprises and for retail banking.
In Chapter 4, we have analysed the empirical risk in a CDS portfolio, defining basis risk as that induced
by the imperfect correlation between the underlying single CDS contract to be replicated and the credit index
contract involved in the dynamic replication strategy (e.g., iTraxx Index). Financial institutions usually prefer
to hedge their CDS or CVA by trading in a credit index because of their higher liquidity and lower frictions. If
changes in the price of the CDS and the price of credit index contracts were perfectly correlated, no further
risk would be introduced, and one could perfectly offset any gain or loss in the position by dynamically trading
in the related index contract. But we have shown that basis risk exists even in the case of a large diversified
portfolio with more than seven hundred issuers, meaning that we cannot fully immunize the value of such a
portfolio with a hedge based on credit index contracts and implicitly assuming that the idiosyncratic risk is
offset among the different issuers in the portfolio.
We have seen that among the diverse strategies that we have applied, having accounted for the illiquidity
of the market, the best strategy could be the weekly delta hedge estimate by OLS using just the three main
credit indices, Europe Main iTraxx, CDX, and Japanese iTraxx. The rest of alternative strategies only slightly
improve these results and they use other indices which are more illiquid, implying higher transaction costs.
The Dynamic Conditional Correlation Beta estimate (DCC) turns out to be a more volatile estimate, implying
the higher entrance and exit costs of continuously adjusting the hedge. The DCC estimate might be optimal in
a situation with very high volatility, but it performs almost equally to OLS over the course of an economic cycle.
Another important result in this chapter is that the Jump-to-Default cannot be ignored as the use of delta
hedging is partial hedging and its effectiveness is predicated by continually adjusting the hedge ratio. There-
fore, if a single issuer jumped to default, we would not be able to adjust the hedge ratio appropriately, and the
defaulted credit exposure would not be fully covered, resulting in a loss. It is still an open question whether we
can calibrate a jump model to evaluate the credit index hedge over the Jump-to-Default of issuers that are not
included in that credit index.
Hence, it seems clear that when pricing credit derivatives, we should charge some basis points reflecting
unheadgeable risk. A good starting point might be to measure the losses in basis points as an extra charge to
include in the price of the derivatives depending on the proxy portfolio and adjusting by maturity. From the
point of view of regulators, we could think of using a historical percentile as a lower bound on the historical
basis risk that should be added in terms of capital, and monitor this risk in financial institutions in order to
prevent future problems.
In Chapter 5, we have shown that the four models considered (Market, Sector, Individual Sector and Sector
Market) have the same trend in terms of VaR, with some small differences. In our opinion, our results suggest
that the use of a one-factor model can be a good representation of the problem, due to the high inter-sector
correlation during our 2006-2012 sample period. If that were not the case, the different models might have
rather distinct implications.
XXVII
On the other hand, we have argued that the main reason for the increase in Credit VaR over time has been
the growing intra-sector and inter-sector correlations among credit markets. Also worth noting is the increase
in the average probability of default of the issuers provided by the external rating. In addition to this, we show
that there were signs in the credit market that the financial sector probably did not introduce into their internal
risk models in order to manage their risk during the crisis.
Finally, as a general reflection, it would be interesting to consider a new calibration for the Basel II func-
tional representation of the capital requirement in the banking book that could better reflect credit market
expectations. The credit derivative market has a strong speculative component and it is very illiquid. But it
is also clear that this market reflects quite well the specific economic circumstances of each moment, and the
CDS market will continue to be a key component of future credit markets. In order to have a robust credit mar-
ket, we need to have the possibility of hedging the credit exposure against any counterparty. In the absence of
a market where we can buy protection for credit, the price of credit will be unnecessarily high.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Microstructure of CDS
market
1.1 Introduction
In this first chapter, we study the most relevant aspects of the microstructure of the CDS market in terms of
pricing in order to have a clear idea of how this market works. Thus, perhaps it is not so relevant for the finan-
cial literature, but we consider it to be the starting point for establishing a solid base for the rest of the chapters
in order to carry out the different empirical studies of this thesis. Given the aim of the next chapter, the de-
termination of credit spread, the first question is: Could we aggregate the several single-name CDSs without
considering the currency of the CDS contract? Similarly, how do the restructuring clauses affect the CDS quo-
tations? And of course, what filters can be applied to the data quality? All these questions will be analysed
throughout the first section of this chapter, as they are key to building the credit spread models.
This chapter is divided into eight sections in addition to this one. In Section 1.2 we define a CDS contract.
In Section 1.3 we follow with a description of the Markit database that we will use in the rest of the chapters. In
Section 1.5 we briefly describe the CDS spread distribution by sector, rating and region to have an initial idea of
the main features of the CDS distribution. Section 1.7 deals with the analysis of the restructuring event in the
CDS price. Section 1.6 focuses on the FX adjustment in the CDS price. In Section 1.7 we review the recovery of
the CDS market to have a better understanding of this assumption of the market and its implications. In Section
1.8 we start to analyse the implications of the use of some filters for the data quality of the CDS market in order
to see if this assumption is relevant or not. Finally, in Section 1.9 we propose a criterion for data aggregation
that we will use in the rest of the chapters.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: MICROSTRUCTURE OF CDSMARKET
1.2 CDS definition
A CDS contract involves the transfer of the credit risk of an underlying agreement like municipal bonds, emer-
ging market bonds, mortgage-backed securities, or corporate debt between two parties, Figure 1.1. It provides
the buyer (who may also own the underlying credit) with protection against default or another negative credit
event. In the event of default, the buyer of the CDS receives compensation, usually the face value of the loan,
and the seller of the CDS takes possession of the defaulted loan. A default is often referred to as a "credit event"
and includes events such as failure to pay, restructuring and bankruptcy, or even a drop in the borrower’s credit
rating. The exact nature of a credit event varies from contract to contract and is defined in the specific agree-
ment between two parties [JP Morgan (1999)].
The seller of the contract assumes the credit risk that the buyer does not wish to maintain in exchange for
a periodic protection fee similar to an insurance premium, and is forced to pay only if a defined credit event
occurs. It is important to note that the CDS contract is not actually tied to a bond, but instead references it.
For this reason, the bond involved in the transaction is the so-called "reference obligation." A contract can
reference a single credit, or multiple credits. If there is no credit event or no default, the seller of protection
receives the periodic fee from the buyer, and profits if the reference entity’s debt remains good through the life
of the contract and no payoff takes place.
In case of a credit event, the party that sold the credit protection, who has assumed the credit risk, must
deliver the value of principal and interest payments that the reference bond would have paid to the protection
buyer. With the reference bonds still having some low residual value, the protection buyer must in turn deliver
either the current cash value of the referenced bonds or the actual bonds to the protection seller, depending
on the terms agreed upon at the onset of the contract. If there are more CDS contracts outstanding than bonds
in existence, a protocol exists to hold a credit event auction; the payment received in such cases is usually
substantially less than the face value of the loan.
1.3 Introduction to Markit database
The database that we have used for this thesis is provided by Markit, the main source of CDS prices [Markit
(2008) and Markit (2012)]. The several fields that we have selected are:
• Ticker gives us information about the key name of the issuer.
• Tier gives us information about the type of debt that we have to deliver in the event of a default. We
distinguish the following:
SEDCOM Secured Debt (Corporate/Financial)
SNRFOR Senior Unsecured Debt (Corporate/Financial)
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Figure 1.1: CDS payments
SOVEREIGN Debt (Government)
SUBLT2 Subordinated or Lower Tier 2 Debt (Banks)
JRSUBUT2 Junior Subordinated or Upper Tier 2 Debt (Banks)
PREFT1 Preference Shares, or Tier 1 Capital (Banks)
• Ccy represents the currency that we use to make the payment in the CDS contract in case of a credit event.
A permitted currency includes the currencies of the G7 or an OECD member with a AAA or equivalent
rating.
• DocClause defines the type of default event that is under the CDS contract. Depending on the geograph-
ical area and counterparty, there will normally be different standard clauses:
CR (Full Restructuring). The buyer can deliver a bond of the reference entity with a maximum maturity of 30
years after the default event date. It represents the standard clause for the sovereign CDS contract.
MM (Modified-Modified). The buyer can deliver a bond of the reference entity with a maximum maturity of
five years for the restructuring event after the default event date. In case of another type of default event,
the buyer can deliver a bond of the reference entity with a maximum maturity of 2.5 years after the default
event date.
MR (Modified-Restructuring). The buyer can deliver a bond of the reference entity with a maximum maturity
of 2.5 years after the default event date.
XR (No Restructuring). In this case, the restructuring is not considered as an event of default. Nowadays XR is
the standard clause in the USA. Refer to Section 1.5 for additional details.
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• Markit provides us with the information of the different CDS spreads with different tenors: 6M, 1Y, 2Y,
3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 15Y, 20Y and 30Y. The most liquid CDS is the 5-year contract. All these prices are
composite, that is, they are average prices for a restructuring event and currency for an issuer provided
by different financial institutions.
• Recovery represents the standard market recovery for each geographical region.
• Average Rating is the mean rating provided by the rating agencies with a short rating scale, being AAA,
AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC and D.
• Sector is based on the ICB criteria, (Industry Classification Benchmark), which distinguishes four levels:
industry, supra-sector, sector and subsector. In this case, Markit works with the industry level, differenti-
ating eleven industries:
• Basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, energy, financials, government (Markit category),
health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication services and utilities.
• By regions, we have thirteen different regions:
• Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern Europe (E.Eur), Europe, India, Latin America (Lat.Amer), Middle East,
North America (N.Amer), Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supranational (Supra).
• CompositeDepth5y gives information about the number of price contributors to the 5-year CDS contract.
The higher the number of contributors, the more liquid the contract.
• CompositeCurveRating tells us about the data quality average of the different CDS contracts for a partic-
ular issuer. Markit has their own methodology to assign this rating. These ratings can be AAA, AA, A, BBB,
BB, B and CCC. It is also possible to find this quality rating for a single tenor CDS contract of the issuer.
This information has been available since 1 January 2006.
1.4 First outlook for CDS by rating, sector and region
In this section, we analyse in depth our understanding of the CDS market by studying the following questions:
Which are the most common ratings among CDS issuers? Which are the sectors with the most CDS issuers?
Which are the most representative regions in the CDS market? Which is the usual type of CDS distribution for
a determined rating-sector? Is it possible to observe an “inverted” premium risk (worse ratings imply better
spreads) in the market?
We analyse the distribution of CDS by ratings, sectors and regions for a particular day, 31 January 2012 (see
Figures 1.2 and 1.3). We see that most of the issuers have “BBB” or “A” ratings. The most representative sectors
are financials, consumer services and industrials. Finally, it makes sense that the main regions are: North
America, Europe and Asia. Although we show the CDS distribution by rating, sector, and region for a particular
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day, these distributions are relatively stable through time.
Figure 1.2: CDS market by ratings on 31 January 2012
Note: CDS market share by rating classification on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
Figure 1.3: CDS market by sectors (right graph) and CDS market by regions on 31 January 2012
Note: CDS market share by Industry Classification Benchmark provided by Markit (right graph) and CDS market share by regions on 31
January 2012, using Markit database.
First outlook for CDS by rating
Analysing the premium risk for all the ratings in Figure 1.4 and Table 1.1 (we select the senior 5-year CDS con-
tract as it is the most liquid contract), it can be seen immediately that market discriminates clearly by the rating.
This means that, the better the rating, the lower the spread. The last class represents those issuers without a
rating. We focus on the spreads that mainly appear in dataset (0%-15%), including the sector component in
Figure 1.5. It can be observed that the market is more volatile for “high yield”ratings, significant differences
existing across sectors.
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Figure 1.4: CDS spread (basis points) box-plot by rating on 31 January 2012
Note: CDS spread (basis points) box-plot by rating on 31 January 2012 using Markit database. The last box-plot corresponds to those
issuers with no rating.
Table 1.1: CDS spread (basis points) by rating . Main statistics on 31 January 2012
Rating Min. 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max. NA’s
AAA 25.2 43.0 67.2 133.6 127.1 644.6
AA 13.1 59.9 108.3 136.0 158.0 957.5
A 14.8 74.6 118.4 157.8 199.5 1534.0
BBB 10.8 88.7 141.1 181.6 219.7 1194.0
BB 21.9 199.9 320.1 392.4 503.3 3763.0 7
B 17.7 366.5 578.4 724.0 861.3 4932.0 1
CCC 100.0 794.6 1581.0 1636.0 2170.0 8260.0 37
D 1633.0 1633.0 1633.0 1633.0 1633.0 1633.0 8
Not Rated 30.2 106.2 179.0 280.1 330.9 1785.0 43
Note: Min: Minimum, 1st Qu: First quartile, 3rd Qu: Third Quartile, Max: Maximum. NA’s: Not Available information.
CDS spread (basis points) on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
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Figure 1.5: CDS distribution (basis points) by rating and sector on 31 January 2012
Note: NR: Not rated, NS: Without sector, BM: Basic materials, CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, F: Financials,
G: Government, H: Health care, I: Industrials, O&G: Energy , TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services and
UT: Utilities.
First outlook for CDS by sector
Now, we describe the CDS market by sector, representing the box-plot and the main statistics on 31 January
2012 (Figure 1.6), Table 1.2 and Figure 1.7. During the recent crisis, the most affected sectors are the financial
sector and the government sector. On the other hand, in the high-yield sectors we see that the industrial (which
includes the real estate sector) and the consumer services sectors have been the most affected ones by the crisis.
It must be taken into account that this last sector is very diverse and depends on the region where it is located.
Table 1.2: CDS spread (basis points) by sector. Main statistics on 31 January 2012
Sector Min. 1stQu. Median Mean 3rdQu. Max. NA’s
Without sector 58.0 90.1 184.4 204.3 342.1 553.2
Basic materials 17.4 76.3 148.0 245.4 319.4 5254.0 5
Consumer goods 27.8 71.9 118.8 221.9 244.0 2493.0 6
Consumer services 17.6 78.8 153.0 295.8 370.5 3458.0 13
Financials 27.9 152.7 229.2 358.4 368.0 8260.0 20
Government 13.1 118.0 169.6 241.3 290.7 6972.0
Health care 14.8 55.9 78.5 134.5 132.8 991.7
Industrials 11.8 80.4 142.7 232.3 248.2 3800.0
Energy 37.4 80.4 135.8 161.6 176.0 2599.0
Technology 22.5 75.9 139.9 248.9 287.4 1401.0
Telecommunication services 10.8 81.0 129.4 280.0 347.4 2907.0
Utilities 1.0 86.4 129.9 248.9 185.9 4932.0 9
Note: Min: Minimum, 1st Qu: First quartile, 3rd Qu: Third Quartile, Max: Maximum. NA’s: Not Available information.
CDS spread (basis points) on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
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Figure 1.6: CDS spread (basis points) box-plot by sector on 31 January 2012
Note: NS: Without sector, CG: Consumer goods, FIN: Financial, HC: Health care, Oil & Gas: Energy, TELECO: Telecommunication services.
CDS spread (basis points) by sector on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
Figure 1.7: CDS distribution (basis points) by sector and rating on 31 January 2012
Note: NR: Not rated, NS: Without sector, BM: Basic materials, CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, F: Financials,
G: Government, H: Health care, I: Industrials, O&G: Energy , TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services and
UT: Utilities.
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First outlook for CDS by region
By region, we observe that the principal CDS markets are placed in North America, Europe, Asia (mainly in
Japan) and Oceania (Figure 1.8 and Table 1.3). At the same time, North America and Europe show a greater
dispersion due to the higher number of issuers in these regions, covering a wide spectrum of ratings and sectors
.Such dispersion in CDS spreads exists even for the same rating, indicating that the sector component can
be very influential in the CDS spread. According to the following table, if we focus on the senior 5-year CDS
contract by region, we clearly observe that, in general, the market premium risks in Asia are lower than in other
regions.
Figure 1.8: CDS (basis points) box-plot by region on 31 January 2012
Note: E.Eur: Eastern Europe, Lat.Amer: Latin America, MiddleEast: Middle East, N.Amer: North America. CDS spread (basis points) by
region on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
Table 1.3: CDS spread (basis points) by region. Main statistics on 31 January 2012
Region Min. 1stQu. Median Mean 3rdQu. Max. NA’s
NA 101.5 217.8 422.2 398.5 512.3 1210.0
Asia 24.2 79.5 143.0 187.5 189.3 5254.0
Caribbean 118.4 221.0 313.5 352.0 492.9 628.8
E.Eur 109.9 278.1 378.5 433.0 557.3 1059.0
Europe 24.1 108.7 174.2 285.0 331.4 6972.0 17
India 175.4 340.1 372.2 430.9 442.4 990.5
Lat.Amer 91.0 145.5 160.4 293.1 240.6 2145.0
Middle East 86.8 179.4 228.4 302.5 406.5 960.0
N.Amer 1.0 76.9 138.9 272.0 281.4 8260.0 36
Oceania 76.2 113.8 157.5 198.8 250.5 812.0
Offshore 28.2 113.2 180.2 277.7 250.7 1811.0
Supra 52.7 62.3 127.1 598.3 1538.0 1539.0
Note: Min: Minimum, 1st Qu: First quartile, 3rd Qu: Third Quartile, Max: Maximum. NA’s: Not Available information.
CDS spread (basis points) on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
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First outlook for CDS by tenor
Generally, the slope of the CDS curve for a particular investment grade issuer is positive, meaning that the
higher the tenor, the wider the spread (Figures 1.9 and 1.10). However, the slope of the CDS curve for the
high yield issuer is typically flat, even negative in some cases. On the other hand, by sectors, we have similar
outcomes, we observe that sectors that are more stressed have flattened slopes or even negative ones. Lastly,
for those sectors that present normal market conditions, the slope is typically positive.
Figure 1.9: CDS distribution (basis points) by tenor and rating on 31 January 2012
Note: NR: Not Rated, 1y: 1-year tenor, 5y: 5-year tenor, 10y: 10-year tenor.
Figure 1.10: CDS distribution (basis points) by tenor and sector on 31 January 2012
Note: NR: Not Rated, NS: Without Sector, BM: Basic materials, CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, F: Financials,
G: Government, H: Health care, I: Industrials, O&G: Energy , TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services and
UT: Utilities.
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First outlook for CDS by rating sector
Now we analyse CDS data for a selected sample sorted by ratings and sectors. In this case, we have chosen
the AA financial and BBB industrial sectors because of their representativeness (Table 1.4 and Figures 1.11 and
1.12). As the financial literature shows [see, for example, Munves et al. (2007)], the CDS distributions by rating
sector are usually right-skewed; that is, the heavy tail is on the right side.
Table 1.4: AA financial and BBB industrial CDS spreads (basis points). Main statistics on 31 January 2012
Sector Min. 1stQu. Median Mean 3rdQu. Max.
AA financial 27.9 116.9 157.0 196.7 215.9 957.5
BBB industrial 11.7 86.0 128.7 156.6 180.1 1023.0
Note: Min: Minimum, 1stQu: First quartile, 3rdQu: Third Quartile, Max: Maximum.
CDS spread (basis points) on 31 January 2012 using Markit database.
Figure 1.11: AA financial CDS spread (basis points) density function on 31 January 2012
Note: X axis: Spread CDS in basis points. Y axis: Density
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Figure 1.12: BBB industrial CDS spread (basis points) density function on 31 January 2012
Note: X axis: Spread CDS basis points. Y axis: Density
First outlook for temporal CDS distribution by rating sector
For this first outlook, we consider the dataset from January 2008 to April 2010. Analysing the global mean of
CDS by rating, we observe a considerable number of “inverse observations”; this means that higher rating have
wider spreads, Figure . This fact has more relevance if we observe the average CDS by ratings for a particular
sector, as we can see in Figure 1.13. An alternative option to solve this “inversion problem”, having the skew to
the right of the distribution of the CDSs is to use the median, which is more robust in the presence of outliers
in the distribution than the mean, thus reducing the “inversion problem” observed in the market (see Figure
1.14). This fact could be explained by factors like the stress of the market, the illiquidity of the market, or a
high speculative component in the CDS market in the short run. We propose a solution for this problem in
Subsection 2.5.7.
Figure 1.13: Global mean CDS (right graph), and industrial average CDS (left graph) by rating. January 2008 to
April 2011
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Figure 1.14: Global median CDS( right graph), and industrial median CDS (left graph) by rating. January 2008
to April 2011
1.5 Outlook for the restructuring event in the CDS contract
What is the definition of a restructuring event? Why are there so many definitions of the restructuring event
depending on the type of counterparty and the region? What changes were introduced by Big Bang Protocol in
2009? What is the influence of the restructuring event in the CDS quotation? These are some of the questions
that we will focus on this section.
1.5.1 Introduction
The definitions of the different restructuring event clauses included in the CDS contract are the following:
• Full Restructuring (CR). In this case, we are protected against the restructuring event, and the default
event. This type of clause is the broadest definition for the delivery of bonds with a maximum tenor
of 30 years after the restructuring date in a default event. Under this clause, any restructuring event is
considered a credit event. This is the standard clause outside of Europe and North America. Similarly, it
is the standard for sovereign CDSs because the restructuring event is included. This event is the classical
way for countries to avoid or delay payments.
• Modified Modified Restructuring (MM). Restructuring is defined as a credit event and deliverable oblig-
ations limited to debt maturing in up to 60 months, (30 months for the rest of the credit events). This
clause is standard for Europe.
• Modified Restructuring (MR). Restructuring is defined as a credit event and deliverable obligations are
limited to debt maturing in up to 30 months, or even less if the maximum maturity of the restructured
debt is lower than those 30 months. Additionally, it is necessary for the deliverable obligations to be fully
transferable, which is not the standard for the loan market.
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• No Restructuring (XR). Finally, with this clause, we are protected against the default events, but a restruc-
turing event is not considered as a credit event. This was the standard clause for “High Yield” companies
in North America before the CDS Big Bang Protocol. In 2009 with the introduction of the CDS Big Bang
Protocol, this clause became standard for any company in North America.
The different definitions about the restructuring event were gradually introduced in response to market needs,
Markit (2009a).
In 1991 the ISDA definition required the obligation to be “materially less favourable” to holders introducing
the concept of the materiality test for CDSs.
In 1999 ISDA defined the Credit Derivatives and listed the five cases that define a Restructuring event. The
contracts that include these definitions are known as Full Restructuring or Old R. The five cases are listed here:
1. Reduction in the amount of principal at maturity or redemption dates.
2. Reduction in the rate or amount of interest payable or in the overall number of interest payment periods.
3. Any change in the seniority or ranking of payments of any obligation, causing the subordination to any
other obligation.
4. Postponement or deferral of a date for payment of interest, accrual, or principal.
5. Any change in the currency conversion of the interest payment or principal to any currency that is not a
permitted currency.
However, restructuring events vary significantly from one credit event to another. The softest credit event
would be a change in the payment currency. In general, this fact has a small impact for the bond owner ex-
cept in specific circumstances. The hardest restructuring event would be a reduction of principal or interest
payment. It would be very close to the definition of failure payment or default, and it would imply a big pricing
impact on the issuer’s debt.
For instance, in the Conseco Finance restructuring event, maturity extension of the short run bank loans
triggered the restructuring event. At the time, longer maturity bonds quoted with a deep discount compared to
bank loans. Protection buyers triggered their trades and delivered their distressed bonds, taking advantage of
this situation, while the general view of financial analysts was that the restructuring event was soft.
Thus, the question is: how material does a restructuring have to be in order to constitute a restructuring
event? While it is possible to give a legal definition for the restructuring event, it is more difficult to define the
concept of material restructuring. For this reason, market participants prefer to define clear rules to specify
the deliverable obligations, depending on whether a protection buyer or seller triggers, instead of defining the
difficult concept of material restructuring.
After a restructuring event, the bonds which are not in default, generally longer dated bonds quote cheaper
than shorter dated bonds. Thus, buyers have a maturity limit when delivering bonds, in order to constrain their
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protection, as buyers could deliver longer dated bonds, which are cheaper than the restructured bonds, taking
into account that the restructured bonds were the ones affected.
On the other hand, if it is the seller who triggers the trade, then the seller will have an incentive to do so. But
without any restrictions in the deliverable bonds, the unintended gain for the seller is limited. For example, in a
context of low rates, it is possible for the bonds to trade above par. Thus, in case of an immaterial restructuring
event, the buyer is forced to deliver bonds which trade above par, receiving the par value. Therefore, to avoid
this situation, there is no limitation for the buyer to deliver any bond if the seller triggers it.
The case of Conseco Inc. was the reason to develop in more detail the previous definition of Modified
Restructuring. Europe was more concerned than the USA about the Modified Restructuring clause because
it was very limited. For this reason, Europe developed Modified Modified Restructuring, as the maturities of
corporate bonds were longer than in the past.
In Figure 1.15 Markit summarises the different clauses, the deliverable bonds under each clause, and the
transferability of these obligations.
Figure 1.15: Restrictions on deliverable obligations for restructuring events
Source: Markit
1.5.2 Big Bang Protocol
By the Big Bang Protocol, regulators want to standardize CDS contracts so that they could be netted at an early
stage. The aim is to allow contracts to nett at time zero. Figure 1.16 shows how markets traded before the
“bang” protocols and how markets trade today [Markit (2009d), Markit (2009a) and Markit (2009b)].
The Big Bang Protocol was adhered to by over 2,000 market participants and took effect on 8 April 2009.
These were the main changes introduced:
1. Establishment of Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees (DC) for each ISDA regions to determ-
ine of whether credit or succession events occurred.
2. “Auction Hardwiring”
3. Rolling Event Effective Date
According to the Big Bang Protocol, there are different CDs for each ISDA region: the Americas, Asia excluding
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Figure 1.16: Big Bang Protocol
Source: Markit
Japan, Japan, Australia-New Zealand and EMEA. The most important responsibility is to decide if a credit event
happened, the type and date. This means that a credit event will be determined by the Committee instead of
the two involved parties as in the past. The CDs will make decisions on the acceptable deliverable obligations
and any substitute reference obligations if applicable. Thus, the new protocol facilitates central clearing, as the
default event will be the same for all the reference contracts.
Prior to the Big Bang Protocol, an auction process took place and most market participants signed protocols
(a legal document amending all previous trades) to celebrate an auction in order to determine the final recovery
rate of a defaulted entity. The process arose because there were concerns that the sheer size of outstanding
CDS notional amounts relative to the amount of deliverable bonds would set off a competition between CDS
investors to acquire bonds to deliver, artificially increasing the price. Figure 1.17 shows the most important
historical auction protocols with the number of adhering firms and the date.
The Big Bang Protocol establishes that the credit event auction methodology will be hardwired into stand-
ard CDS contracts on a global basis while leaving only the specific auction settlement terms for each credit
event to be determined shortly before to the auction.
Finally, under the current CDS contract, protection against a credit event begins on the business day that
follows the trade date. As such, two trades buying and selling CDSs from the same reference entity for the
same notional amount but on different days are not truly offsetting. For example, suppose that an investor sold
protection today and then entered into an offsetting transaction to close off the exposure a week later (bought
protection). With a T+1 effective date for protection, there is a “stub” or window of seven days where the in-
vestor is short and does not have the buy protection leg in effect. Under the existing contract, this would persist
until the first trade matures. The investor could find out that a credit event occurred during this seven day win-
dow. Creating a standard date for the existence of protection regardless of trade date solves this problem. Now,
we analyse the main changes en each region.
• North American changes
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Figure 1.17: Historical auction protocols: Adhering parties & protocol dates
Source: Markit, ISDA
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1. Restructuring clauses changes
2. Fixed coupons
As we have mentioned before, prior to the Big Bang Protocol the standard clause in North America was Mod R
for investment grade companies, and the XR clause for high yield firms. With the introduction of the Big Bang
Protocol, the restructuring event exists as credit event. The reason for this is that many cases of restructuring
are included as default in Chapter 11.
Another main change is the introduction of two fixed coupons. The spread will be 100 b.p. for the invest-
ment grade companies, and 500 b.p. for high yield companies. Formerly, as the CDS spread changes every day,
no contract had the same spread to be paid. This makes netting very complex. With the Big Bang Protocol,
the CDS spread is fixed for all contracts; hence, there will be an upfront paid at time zero to make the traders
indifferent1, and to facilitate future netting.
• European changes
The Small Bang Protocol introduces the changes in the European market. In Europe, in contrast to the United
States regulation, there is no unique regulation that defines the default event. Each country has its own regula-
tion, making the restructuring event not so clear in the different local regulations. Therefore, it is necessary to
define which bonds are acceptable for delivery if a restructuring event occurs.
The other difference is the fixed coupon. There will be 25, 100, 500 and 1000 b.p. spread contracts. The
reason for this is that traders prefer to enter into contracts that are closer to the previous running spread. How-
ever, this fact reduces future netting of the contracts.
• Asian and Japanese changes
The Asian and Japanese changes are similar to the North America changes. The fixed coupons will be 25, 100,
and 500 basis points. The standard clause for the restructuring event will remain the Full Restructuring clause.
1.5.3 Quantification of the restructuring event in the CDS price
How do the different restructuring clauses affect the CDS market price?
Packer and Zhu (2005), in their article “Contractual terms and CDS pricing”, estimate the main differences
between the prices of CDS contracts as a function of the restructuring event included in the CDS contracts, for
the period from 11 February 2003 to 3 June 2004, using the Markit database. The main results of their study on
the CDS quote, changing only the restructuring event for each issuer, are shown in Figure 1.18.
1See Beumee et al. (2009) for more details.
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Figure 1.18: CDS spread differences
Note: FR = CR (Full restructuring), NR=XR (No restructuring)
Source: Packer and Zhu (2005)
We have selected the year 2007, as a sample prior to the Big Bang Protocol to estimate the daily median of
the ratio for every issuer of each restructuring clause with respect to the full restructuring clause, differentiat-
ing the results by regions. For this analysis, we used the 5-year CDS contract because of its liquidity and we
must not lose sight of the next equation of the restructuring event quote for the same issuer and currency. By
definition, as the restructuring event is wide, we observe the following relation with respect to the restructuring
event price for each CDS issuer for the same tenor contract:
CR>=MM>=MR>=XR2
Below we show the results obtained by regions. We start with the case of North America, one of the biggest
CDS markets (Figure 1.19). We observe that the daily median ratio is almost constant in the case of the MM
ratio, in contrast to the MR and XR that show small jumps in the ratio time series. 3 The observed ratio values
are similar to those of to the “Markit.com User Guide”, in February 2008 (Markit, 2008), with ratio values of
MM 96%, MR 95%, XR 91.5%. In Europe (Figure 1.20), we observe that those ratios present a similar pattern
to the North American case, but with less volatility. The Japanese case (Figure 1.21) is special because the
restructuring event is regulated in a total different way than the rest of the geographies; thus the XR quote is
very different from the other observed values (around 78%). It is also worth mentioning that the MR and MM
ratios converge clearly at the end of 2007.
Finally, we observe these ratios in the regions where we have fewer observations. It is interesting to note the
instability of those ratios, reflecting a good proxy of the market’s illiquidity (Figures 1.22 and 1.23). Therefore,
it is easy to observe that in terms of restructuring event, these regions are more volatile than the markets in the
developed regions, such as North America, Europe or Japan.
2CR: Full restructuring clause, MM: Modified modified restructuring clause, MR: Modified Restructuring and XR: No Restructuring clause. These clauses
has been explained above.
3Those jumps were perhaps due to a specific change in the CDS convention, but we could not find the exact reason for them.
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Figure 1.19: North American restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2007
Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value.. X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio (CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio
(MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR). The base denominator is CR, for this
reason, the CR ratio is always 1.
Figure 1.20: European restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2007
Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value.. X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio (CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio
(MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR). The base denominator is CR, for this
reason, the CR ratio is always 1.
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Figure 1.21: Japanese restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2007
Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value.. X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio (CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio
(MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR). The base denominator is CR, for this
reason, the CR ratio is always 1.
Figure 1.22: Latin American restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2007
Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value.. X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio (CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio
(MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR). The base denominator is CR, for this
reason, the CR ratio is always 1.
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Figure 1.23: African restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2007
Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value.. X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio (CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio
(MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR). The base denominator is CR, for this
reason, the CR ratio is always 1.
As we mentioned before, after the Big Bang Protocol and with the great standardisation of the CDS con-
tracts, we observe that the MM clause gained more importance in Europe, with more quotes than the CR clause.
In North America, we observe the same trend with the XR clause increasing its quotes in contrast to the rest of
restructuring clauses. In addition, it is important to highlight that the CDS prices from 2010 onwards are al-
most the same regardless of their restructuring clause (see Figures 1.24, 1.25, 1.26). This can be motivated by
two reasons:
1. By Big Bang Protocol itself, since it establishes a Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee (DC) to
determine if credit and succession events occurred. Thus, the new protocol provides more transparency
and standardisation to the default event, implying less differentiation in the CDS prices in terms of the
restructuring clauses.
2. The CDS prices provided by Markit are composite prices; that is, they are the average prices for an issuer
with a determined restructuring clause and currency. These prices go through a series of filters guar-
anteeing the information quality. However, they are not “real” transaction prices. After consulting with
Markit, they informed us that they have to provide different restructuring clause quotes on a daily basis,
as financial entities still hold old contracts that need to be revalued. However, after the Big Ban Protocol,
liquid markets to estimate the price of the different restructuring clauses for an issuer have disappeared.
Therefore, we can conclude that the restructuring event was presented in the price of the CDS market prior
to the Big Bang Protocol, as there is a theoretical basis. However, after the new protocol, the impact of the
restructuring event on the price of the CDS market has been diluted and has lost importance by the increased
standardisation of the CDS market.
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Figure 1.24: European restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2011
Note: Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value. ( CR Base denominator). X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio
(CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio (MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR).
Figure 1.25: North American restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2011
Note: Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value. ( CR Base denominator). X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio
(CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio (MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR).
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Figure 1.26: Asian restructuring clause ratio medians. Year 2011
Note: Note: Y-axis: Daily Median Ratio Value. ( CR Base denominator). X-axis: Year 2007. Green Line: Ratio
(CR/CR). Red Line: Ratio (MM/CR). Blue Line: Ratio (MR/CR). Black Line: Ratio (XR/CR).
1.6 Outlook for FX adjustment on CDS prices
Is there an adjustment in the CDS quote for an issuer depending on the currency of the contract? Does this
adjustment, if any, depend on the type of counterparty?
Reviewing financial literature, we found the article “The influence of FX risk on credit spreads” written by
Ehlers and Schonbucher (2006). This article analyses the different prices in the CDS contract for the same issuer
and different currency. The majority of those differences are covered by two factors. The first one is the possible
correlation between the FX and the default issuer. The second one is an additional jump of the depreciation
of the local currency under the issuer default scenario, anticipating a general recession for the local economy.
This article shows that the first factor, the correlation between the FX and the issuer default, cannot explain the
different quotations in terms of the currency of the CDS contract for the Japanese issuers.
Another interesting article is “Currency dependence of corporate credit spreads”, by Jankowitsch and Pichler
(2005). The article is based on corporate bonds issued in several currencies for a big sample of firms, and it
shows that there is a specific spread quotation for each firm depending on the currency of the issue. Ehlers
ans Schonbucher explained in their article that one of the problems of the Jankowitsch study is that the bonds
could have different regulations. This problem can be avoided by using the CDS market, as the issuers have the
same ISDA regulation.
Our analysis is structured in the following way: First, we select 5-year CDS contracts for all European issuers
in different currencies, using only the issuers that have CDS contracts with the most common restructuring
clauses (MM in Europe). Thus, we have opted for those issuers in the sample, analysing their own CDS spreads
in the following currencies: dollar (USD), Japanese yen (JPY), British pound (GBP), Swiss franc (CHF), and
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Australian dollar (AUD) for the European case, and we have used the senior unsecured debt for the type of CDS
debt. In Table 1.5, we show the main statistics of these distributions. Row “Abs. b.p.” stands for the distribution
for the European issuers of the difference between the CDS spread in foreign currency and the CDS spread in
local currency for each issuer in basis points. Row “Rel(%)” stands for the distribution for the European issuers
of the ratio between the CDS spread in foreign currency over the CDS spread in local currency for each issuer.
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Looking at the first results, we observe that for the European issuers, their CDS contracts in EUR quote
very similar to their USD, JPY, GBP CDS contracts, except in January 2011. We have found two reasons for this
fact. The first one is the big correlation between the eurozone and the US economy, in an increasingly global-
ized world. This also happens between Europe and United Kingdom, given the strong economic relationship
between them. The second factor is related to the market belief in the independent relationship between a
single European company default and its possible systemic spill-over to the rest of the European economy.
This means that the market estimates that any European corporate default could collapse the whole European
financial system. However, this highlights the fact that, since the 2010 European crisis, the market feeling has
changed and begun quoting USD CDS contracts much higher than EUR CDS contracts. Finally, we must not
lose track of our MM restructuring event sample criterion. This is the most used clause in Europe for the cor-
porate counterparties; therefore, we are leaving out of the analysed sample the European government CDSs, as
they are normally quoted in the CR clause. We will focus on this topic later.
On the other hand, in the JPY CDS quotations for European issuers, we distinguish two stages: The first
one, in 2007 and prior to the crisis, we see a small negative premium in the JPY CDS contracts. This means that
the market paid less to hedge the European issuer risk in JPY than in EUR. The lack of default risk is a possible
reason for this, and perhaps, an additional FX risk in the JPY contracts. The other possibility is the idiosyncrasy
of the Japanese credit market itself, where the observed spreads are lower than in the rest of the regions. From
2008 onwards, with the global financial crisis and its increasing intensification, the market quoted a positive
adjustment in JPY contracts, meaning that they are more expensive in median than European contracts for
European issuers as the eurozone is less correlated with Japan.
To conclude this first analysis, in Table 1.6 we show the results for the European case in two other important
currencies, such as CHF and AUD. In the CHF currency, the US and GBP comments above apply to this par-
ticular case, due to the big commercial relationship between Switzerland and the eurozone. Finally, the AUD
results are very similar to the Japanese case; thus, we could use the same explanation.
In the second analysis, we focus on US issuers. We have chosen those contracts which have MR as the
restructuring clause. The selected currencies for this analysis are EUR, JPY and AUD. Table 1.7 presents the
main statistics of these distributions. From these results, we see that there is a symmetric effect between the
European issuers with the US CDS contracts and US issuers with the EUR CDS contracts. This means that the
FX adjustment is practically zero, as we mentioned in the European analysis, except in the year 2011. In the case
of a US issuer with a JPY CDS contract, we observe a general negative FX adjustment meaning that the market
perceives an additional risk to hedge the currency risk. As we mentioned above, another reason for this can be
the lower rate and credit spreads in Japan. There are exceptions where we observe a positive FX adjustment for
some issuers, meaning that the buyer of protection is willing to pay a higher premium to hedge the issuer risk
in a foreign currency such as the JPY. The case of the AUD (last column) is very similar to the JPY case.
28 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: MICROSTRUCTURE OF CDSMARKET
Ta
b
le
1.
6:
F
X
ri
sk
in
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
is
su
er
C
D
S
p
ri
ce
s.
C
H
F,
an
d
A
U
D
cu
rr
en
ci
es
C
U
R
R
E
N
C
Y
U
SD
JP
Y
D
at
e
N
º
O
bs
1Q
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
3Q
N
º
O
bs
1Q
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
3Q
1/
30
/0
7
A
b
s.
b.
p.
20
3
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
26
3
-2
.8
-0
.8
-1
.9
0.
0
1/
30
/0
7
R
el
(%
)
20
3
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
26
3
89
.3
%
94
.1
%
94
.7
%
10
0.
3%
1/
30
/0
8
A
b
s.
b.
p.
27
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
31
2
-0
.1
0.
1
0.
2
0.
5
1/
30
/0
8
R
el
(%
)
27
0
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
31
2
99
.9
%
10
0.
2%
10
0.
2%
10
0.
6%
1/
30
/0
9
A
b
s.
b.
p.
30
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
24
8
0.
0
0.
6
3.
8
1.
6
1/
30
/0
9
R
el
(%
)
30
0
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
24
8
10
0.
0%
10
0.
4%
10
0.
6%
10
0.
8%
1/
29
/1
0
A
b
s.
b.
p.
30
1
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
25
6
0.
0
0.
1
0.
3
0.
6
1/
29
/1
0
R
el
(%
)
30
1
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
25
6
10
0.
0%
10
0.
1%
10
0.
3%
10
0.
7%
1/
31
/1
1
A
b
s.
b.
p.
55
-0
.5
0.
7
0.
7
1.
6
16
2
-1
.7
-0
.1
-0
.6
0.
4
1/
31
/1
1
R
el
(%
)
55
99
.6
%
10
0.
8%
10
1.
2%
10
2.
9%
16
2
98
.7
%
99
.9
%
98
.7
%
10
0.
5%
1/
30
/1
2
A
b
s.
b.
p.
16
8
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
22
6
0.
0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
0
1/
30
/1
2
R
el
(%
)
16
8
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
22
6
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
99
.8
%
10
0.
0%
N
o
te
:
R
ow
“A
b
s.
b.
p.
”
st
an
d
s
fo
r
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
re
gi
o
n
is
su
er
s
o
ft
h
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
fo
re
ig
n
cu
rr
en
cy
an
d
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
lo
ca
lc
u
rr
en
cy
fo
r
ea
ch
is
su
er
in
b
as
is
p
o
in
ts
.R
ow
“R
el
(%
)”
st
an
d
s
fo
r
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
re
gi
o
n
is
su
er
s
o
ft
h
e
ra
ti
o
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
fo
re
ig
n
cu
rr
en
cy
ov
er
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
lo
ca
lc
u
rr
en
cy
fo
r
ea
ch
is
su
er
.
1.6. OUTLOOK FOR FX ADJUSTMENT ON CDS PRICES 29
Ta
bl
e
1.
7:
F
X
ri
sk
in
U
S
is
su
er
C
D
S
p
ri
ce
s.
E
U
R
,J
P
Y
an
d
AU
D
cu
rr
en
ci
es
C
U
R
R
E
N
C
Y
E
U
R
JP
Y
AU
D
D
at
e
N
º
O
bs
1Q
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
3Q
N
º
O
bs
1Q
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
3Q
N
º
O
bs
1Q
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
3Q
1/
30
/0
7
A
b
s.
b.
p.
77
6
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
40
5
-0
.3
0.
0
-0
.8
0.
0
38
7
-0
.5
-0
.1
-1
.2
0.
0
1/
30
/0
7
R
el
(%
)
77
6
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
40
5
99
.2
%
99
.8
%
99
.3
%
10
0.
2%
38
7
98
.9
%
99
.6
%
98
.9
%
10
0.
1%
1/
30
/0
8
A
b
s.
b.
p.
81
4
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
47
8
-0
.9
0.
0
-0
.4
0.
0
44
5
-1
.1
-0
.2
0.
5
0.
0
1/
30
/0
8
R
el
(%
)
81
4
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
47
8
99
.4
%
99
.9
%
99
.8
%
10
0.
1%
44
5
99
.1
%
99
.8
%
99
.7
%
10
0.
0%
1/
30
/0
9
A
b
s.
b.
p.
77
8
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
41
7
-3
.2
-0
.8
-5
.4
0.
0
36
5
-4
.9
-1
.1
-7
.0
0.
0
1/
30
/0
9
R
el
(%
)
77
8
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
41
7
98
.9
%
99
.5
%
99
.3
%
10
0.
0%
36
5
98
.8
%
99
.3
%
99
.2
%
10
0.
0%
1/
29
/1
0
A
b
s.
b.
p.
72
9
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
40
4
-1
.7
-0
.7
-1
.5
-0
.1
38
4
-2
.2
-0
.8
4.
2
0.
2
1/
29
/1
0
R
el
(%
)
72
9
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
40
4
98
.7
%
99
.1
%
99
.3
%
99
.9
%
38
4
98
.6
%
99
.1
%
99
.3
%
99
.8
%
1/
31
/1
1
A
b
s.
b.
p.
59
9
-1
.2
-0
.1
1.
1
1.
2
22
0
-0
.9
0.
3
-0
.1
1.
4
14
7
-1
.7
-0
.1
3.
8
3.
3
1/
31
/1
1
R
el
(%
)
59
9
98
.5
%
99
.9
%
99
.3
%
10
0.
7%
22
0
99
.3
%
10
0.
2%
10
0.
5%
10
1.
5%
14
7
98
.3
%
99
.9
%
99
.2
%
10
2.
1%
1/
30
/1
2
A
b
s.
b.
p.
61
4
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
29
3
-0
.1
0.
0
-0
.6
0.
0
24
2
0.
0
0.
0
0.
5
0.
0
1/
30
/1
2
R
el
(%
)
61
4
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
29
3
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
99
.8
%
10
0.
0%
24
2
10
0.
0%
10
0.
0%
99
.8
%
10
0.
0%
N
o
te
:
R
ow
“A
b
s.
b.
p.
”
st
an
d
s
fo
r
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
re
gi
o
n
is
su
er
s
o
ft
h
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
fo
re
ig
n
cu
rr
en
cy
an
d
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
lo
ca
lc
u
rr
en
cy
fo
r
ea
ch
is
su
er
in
b
as
is
p
o
in
ts
.R
ow
“R
el
(%
)”
st
an
d
s
fo
r
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fo
r
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
re
gi
o
n
is
su
er
s
o
ft
h
e
ra
ti
o
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
fo
re
ig
n
cu
rr
en
cy
ov
er
th
e
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
in
lo
ca
lc
u
rr
en
cy
fo
r
ea
ch
is
su
er
.
30 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: MICROSTRUCTURE OF CDSMARKET
The following analysis focuses on the Japanese economy (Table 1.8). In this case, we selected the CR clause,
as it is the standard, and the currencies USD, EUR and AUD. We notice that for the Japanese issuers with the
USD CDS contracts, there is a positive FX adjustment that is in line with the result shown by Ehlers and Schon-
bucher (2006). However, their estimation was higher than our results, as they only selected the big corporates,
and in our analysis, we are estimating the average effect for all the issuers with CDSs in foreign currency. In
the case of the euro, we see the same pattern than the US dollar. However, this positive adjustment is higher
than before, perhaps reflecting the market belief of a lower correlation between the Japanese economy and
the eurozone than Japan and the US economy. Finally, we analyse the AUD CDS contracts, where we see that
the number of observations are reduced over time and, at the same time, the positive FX adjustments have
increased. As the AUD CDS sample is smaller than the EUR and USD samples, and as a consequence contains
the biggest Japanese corporations, which are the ones that have more systemic risk, the main statistics of the
main statistics of the FX adjustment are higher.
In the previous analysis, we saw the main statistics for all the issuers by regions; however, by following the
philosophy of rating agencies such as Moody’s [see Cailleteau et al. (2008)], or S&P, which highlight that the
country risk only materialises in those firms where its local rating is higher to the foreign country ceilings, we
should look at only the best credit rated firms. For this reason, in the next analysis, we selected AA issuers in
Japan, and found the next results (Table 1.9). These last results are very similar to those presented for all of
the Japanese issuers, it being quite reasonable to think that the positive FX adjustment in the quotation in this
case would be higher than in the first case. Therefore, there is a positive FX adjustment in the corporate CDS
prices that has increased with the crisis, but such an adjustment, in terms of the median or mean, is small for
the corporate issuers. This means that the FX adjustment in CDS price for the corporate counterparties only
exists for the bigger ones, where there is a strong correlation between the issuer default and the systemic risk
of the local economy.
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Finally, in the last analysis, we focus on the government sector in Europe (Table 1.10) . On this occasion, we
use the CR clause, and again the 5-year CDS contract. These are, without doubt, the most interesting results.
First, as in the previous cases, we see that the USD contract quotations are the same as the EUR contracts. In the
JPY case, the FX adjustment is even negative. However from 2010, the strong correlation between the European
government defaults and the possible deep euro depreciation led to an extra premium in foreign currency CDS
contracts for European governments.
To sum up, we can conclude this section affirming that there is a substantial FX adjustment in the CDS price
when the market estimates a significant adverse impact between the issuer default and the systemic risk of the
local economy, as Ehlers and Schonbucher (2006) and Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005) pointed out. However,
this FX adjustment is almost negligible for the remaining cases.
1.7 Outlook for recovery in CDS prices
Are the standard recoveries different depending on the type of CDS issuer? How does recovery affect CDS
prices? Why do we use different recoveries depending on the region and type of counterparty?
The standard recovery of the market is a fixed value that depends on the region and the underlying asset.
Generally, this standard is 40%, with a few exceptions like Japan, where the recovery value is 35%. In other
regions, as Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe or the Middle East, the assumed recovery is 25%. Finally, the
recovery value for bank subordinated debt is 20%. The question is, why do we use different recovery standards
depending on the region?
The 40% value assumed by the market for the CDS recovery for the unsecured debt is very close to the
historic average recovery for unsecured bonds [see Altman et al. (2004)] and shown in the different agencies’
rating studies. Moody’s report, “Annual default study: Corporate default and recovery rates, 1920-2012”, Ou
et al. (2013), estimates that the recovery for the unsecured bonds for the period 1982-2012 was 37%, weighting
by issuer, or 38%, weighting by volume. In 2012, the recovery was 43.4% by issuer and 40.2% by volume.
Japan’s current insolvency regime is a complicated system consisting of five separate legal proceedings [see
Tan et al. (2004)]. The formal legal proceedings are often bypassed; informal negotiations among the parties,
known as “private arrangements” (shiteki-seiri), are more common than formal proceedings because Japan’s
insolvency regime and business practices are deeply influenced by its corporate governance system based on
cross-shareholdings and long-term relationships among a group of firms, or keiretsu. At the centre of the
keiretsu there is frequently a main bank, which is the largest creditor of the group of companies, and often
holds shares. In addition to this, the Japanese government plays a much more visible role in the bankruptcy
regime than in the rest of the economy. For example, the Japanese government has been involved in specific
corporate insolvency cases. For these reasons, the government and banks often support a borrower until the
last minute. In Japan the typical court-ruled recovery rate is usually lower than in the US or Europe. By the time
the borrower’s condition has deteriorated to a point beyond rescue, the value of its assets may have already
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been greatly diminished and often offers little recovery for creditors. Thus, the market standard for recovery of
the Japanese CDS is 35% instead of the 40% in the rest of developed regions.
For the rest of the regions, usually emerging regions, the standard of the market is 25%. However, it is
highlighted in Moody’s report, “Latin American corporate default and recovery rates update, 1990 to July 2012”,
Sorensen et al. (2012), that the recovery value for Latin America for unsecured bonds is 35%, similar to the
global recovery, 38%. Such discrepancy between the market standard and the historic recovery value could be
explained due to the fact that Moody’s register started in 1990, and consequently ignores the previous defaults,
and some political crises in the eighties, such as the Argentinian crisis, where the recovery value was lower.
How does recovery affect the CDS prices? Duffie (1999) shows that the effect of varying the hazard rate and
the recovery rate is offset when the CDS is close to the bond spread for an issuer. Such a mechanism works
really well for short-dated bonds and when the bonds are close to par value. Andritzky and Singh (2006) show
that the empirical evidence point out that CDS spreads are higher than bond spreads for an issuer in a stress
scenario, and this is because it exceeds the traditional basis risk. They mention two different arguments for
this. The first one is that the CDS provides over protection assuring the nominal value, given that the bond
is far below par value, which leads to the existence of a positive basis, among the CDS and bond spread. The
second one is that the buyer of protection will deliver the cheapest-to-deliver bond, therefore the higher the
difference between the cheapest-to-deliver bond and the rest of the bonds for that issuer, the higher the basis.
Thus, the CDS market accepts constant recovery, while the bond market will be deep below par value in a stress
scenario. Therefore, assuming risk neutral probability and consistency between bonds price and CDS prices,
a new decrease in the bond price will lead to a large exponential increase in the CDS spread to maintain that
relationship. Such an increase will be higher as longer dated bonds and higher bond spreads [see Andritzky
and Singh (2007), Singh and Andritzky (2005) and Singh and Spackman (2009)]. Finally, Bilal and Singh (2012)
show the importance of estimating the default probability inferred from the CDS market using the CDS spread,
and the proxy recovery estimated by the cheapest-to-deliver bond for the Portuguese, Greek, Italian or Spanish
crises. Using a constant recovery instead of a stochastic recovery leads to the risk neutral probability inferred
from the market to double its value, for instance from 7% to 14% in the recent Portuguese crisis.
To sum up, in this section we have seen the reason why the market uses different standard recoveries de-
pending on the region. Normally, these standard recoveries do not influence in the CDS prices under normal
conditions, as Duffie (1999) pointed out. However, it is very important to take into account the stochastic re-
covery in those cases where the bond price is far below par value.
1.8 Outlook for dataset quality rating
Given the recent credit and illiquidity crisis and the lack of transparency in the credit markets, the question that
arises is, could we use all the Markit dataset without applying any filter to estimate the credit sector curves?
Markit provides a data quality rating for the CDS prices [see Markit (2008), Markit (2011) and Mayordomo
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et al. (2014)]. This means that Markit assigns a daily rating for the published CDS data. The range of this quality
rating can be AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC or NR. The ratings are assigned based on qualitative and quantitative
criteria. The most important quantitative variable is the number of different clean contributions. The qualit-
ative criteria measures how competitive, liquid and transparent the market is, and whether the trades are time
stamped and tradable quotes updated frequently or not. According to Markit, a great deal of confidence can
be placed in ratings of BBB or higher, for which a very minimum of three clean contributions are required in
addition to the highest scores on qualitative criteria. Markit assigns a AAA rating only for data that has obtained
the highest score on the qualitative tests and is based on more than twelve clean contributions.
In this section we propose a very simple regression using our dataset for a particular day to analyse the
influence of quality rating over our estimations and our residuals. In the next chapter we will focus on an
extensive estimation analysis of the sector credit curves.
Our basic proposed model is
pl =β0+β1Rl ,z +β2Sl ,i +β3Gl , j +µl , l = 1,2, ....L (1.1)
where pl represents the risk premium of the issuer l , and the variables R, S and G are dicotomic variables,
representing the different levels of rating, sector, and geographical regions present in the sample. There are
n variables Rz , m variables Si , and k variables G j , being n, m, and k the number of rating class, sectors, and
geographical regions included in the sample. These variables are defined as
Rl ,z = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l has rating z, and Rl ,z = 0 otherwise, for all z = 1,2, ...n. In total,
there are nine rating classes: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, D and NR (without rating).
Sl ,i = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a firm that belongs to sector i , and Sl ,i =
0 otherwise, for all i = 1,2, ...m .11 sectors are represented in the sample: Basic materials, consumer goods,
consumer services, energy, financials, government, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication
services and utilities.
Gl , j = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a company located in the geographical region
j , and Gl , j = 0 otherwise, for all j = 1,2, ...k. We have thirteen different regions in the sample: Africa, Asia,
Caribbean, E.Eur, Europe, India, Lat.Amer, Middle East, N.Amer, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra.
In this case, we use the senior debt, as it is the most representative in the CDS market. We focus on a
particular date (31 January 2012) to analyse the proposed models’ residuals and study if there is any relationship
between the data residual size and the data quality rating.
In Figure 1.27, we represent the absolute value of the residuals against the fitted value by the model. It is
very easy to note that the biggest residuals are found among the lower quality data. Finally, we present Cook’s
distance in Figure 1.28. Once again, it should be emphasised that the most influential observations are those
that have lowest data quality. By conducting this simple study, we can conclude that it is necessary to apply
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Figure 1.27: Markit quality rating for the biggest absolute residual values on 31 January 2012
Note: Y- axis: Residual absolute value for the lineal estimation of the senior 5-year CDS for each issuer as a function of the
rating, sector and region (without applying any quality data filter). X-axis: Issuers. Thus, we show the quality ratings
for the biggest residuals, which are normally the worst quality ratings.
Figure 1.28: Markit quality rating in terms of Cook’s distance on 31 January 2012
Note: Y- axis: Cook’s distance for the lineal estimation of the senior 5-year CDS for each issuer as a function of the rating,
sector and region (without applying any quality data filter). X-axis: Issuers. Thus, we show the quality ratings for the
biggest Cook’s distance, which are normally the worst quality ratings.
filters to the database in order to avoid biasing the estimation of the sector credit curves. We will focus on this
matter later.
1.9 Conclusion and open questions
In this first chapter, we have reviewed the main aspects of the microstructure of the CDS market. Our main
outcomes are the following:
The CDS market is concentrated in North America, Europe and Asia, most of the issuers being A or BBB
ratings, and the most representative sectors are financial, industrial and consumer services. The CDS curve
slope of an issuer is typically positive, the higher the tenor, the wider the spread, except in a stress scenario.
It can also be observed that the usual right-skewed distribution of the CDS spreads grouped by rating sector
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sometimes lead to the presented “inversion problem” in Subsection 1.4.
What type of restructuring clause should we use to aggregate the different data? As we have seen, prior to
the Big Bang Protocol, Markit (2009d), there was higher liquidity in non-standard clauses of CDS contracts, but
today the market has changed radically, it being unfeasible to estimate the value of the non-standard clause
by regions. Furthermore, we observe that after the Big Ban Protocol there is a higher standardisation of the
CDS market reducing the impact of the restructuring event in CDS prices. Therefore, we have opted to use
the standard market clause for each issuer depending on its geographical region and counterparty type. We
thus propose being consistent with the default definition of each legislation, but we will be inconsistent with a
universal definition of default.
Related to the previous point the next question is which currency for each issuer we should use to estimate
credit curves. As we have shown, there is a substantial FX adjustment in the CDS price when the market estim-
ates a considerable adverse impact between the issuer default and the systemic risk of the local economy as
Ehlers and Schonbucher (2006) and Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005) pointed out. However, this FX adjustment
is nearly 0 for the rest of the cases. These conclusions should also be important for pricing loans on matters
related to trade finance where country risk exists. Thus, we propose using the standard currency for each is-
suer, according to its region and counterparty type. We would like to highlight that the standard currency for
European governments will be the dollar instead of the euro, given the correlation between the issuer default
and the depreciation of the currency.
Regarding the recovery of the CDS, we have seen that the different recovery standards by regions do not
influence CDS prices under normal conditions as Duffie (1999) mentioned. However, we have to note that it
is very important to take into consideration the stochastic recovery in those cases where the bond price is far
below par value. Thus, how can we manage the different standard recoveries of the market? Given that our
main objective is to estimate the premium risk of an issuer without an active credit spread, we could assume
that these premiums are close to par value. Consequently, the hypothesis on the recovery is not as relevant as
we have shown above. In addition to this, we have seen that the standard recovery assumed by the market is in
line with the historical recoveries by regions, with only few exceptions such as Latin America. Therefore, we use
the standard recovery for each issuer without the need to adjust a common recovery for all the issuers, which
would lead to adjusting the market CDS spread.
With regard to the matter of contract maturity, we will use the 5-year CDS spread in later analyses, due to
its liquidity, as we pointed out before. Because of the liquidity factor, we also opt to use the senior debt CDS.
Finally, what type of filter should we apply to the dataset? We are quite concerned about this topic, and
therefore we propose using three different filters in order to estimate our credit curves and analyse the implic-
ations of these filters. The first one will be the use of “non-filters”, the second one will be based on the Markit
quality rating, and the third one will be based on a fixed sample of the most liquid CDS contracts. We will
analyse this matter in-depth in the following chapter.
In conclusion, in this first chapter we have defined criteria to aggregate the dataset in order to estimate
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the credit curves by rating, sector and region as Basel requires. The different econometrics models to estimate
these credit curves will also be analysed in the following chapter.
Chapter 2
Econometric models of credit spreads
2.1 Motivation
Is it a good business for a financial entity to issue a loan with a 5-year tenor, the borrower having a BBB rating,
belonging to the utilities sector, located in Europe and paying 300 basis points (b.p.) plus the risk-free rate?
What about the same business deal but with a borrower located in Asia?
Any type of investment requires the acquisition of assets (financial, real or both), it being crucial to analyse
several features. The three main attributes of financial assets are return, risk and liquidity. The first two are
normally taken into consideration when deciding whether to invest in an asset or not. However, liquidity is
nowadays more important since the last crisis. Therefore, the investors must analyse the risk and return of
those financial assets before taking the investment decision [see among others, Altman (1996), Cebenoyan and
Strahan (2001), James (1996) and Guill (2008)]. Consequently, this analysis is carried out by the return on risk-
adjusted capital (RORAC).
The main RORAC applications (for a financial entity) in managing credit risk are the following:
1. Criteria for the selection of the investment project. The approval policy establishes criteria for a bank
to accept the financial assets or not. When a financial entity uses RORAC, the “new” asset has to be
above the minimum value demanded by the entity, for example, the minimum threshold required by
stockholders.
2. Risk-based pricing, RBP. It is closely related to the previous point. It establishes the credit margin that a
financial entity must receive from the borrowers according to the trend in international credit markets.
3. Risk-adjusted performance, RAP. It consists of monitoring the RORAC of an asset as long as it is in the
portfolio of an entity. Thus, the entity could compare the current RORAC with the initial one. If there is
a substantial divergence between them, the entity will take action to solve this situation by, for instance,
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increasing the cross-selling of products that do not imply any additional risk.
The main limitations of RORAC methodology in the financial literature are as follows:
• The lack of consideration of possible cash flows weighted by the probabilities of occurrence during the
life of the loan, given that the majority of loan contracts set up several embedded options. The RORAC
does not normally take these options into consideration. The RORAC methodology typically uses initial
values or expected values for the entire life of the loan.
• The RORAC uses historical risk parameters. Most of these RORAC analyses ignore the current level of
credit spreads and emphasize agency ratings. Therefore, for a fair valuation, we need to calibrate our
models to the current market credit spread. Loan proposals which implied an arbitrage between agency
rating and the market-implied rating were very common during the last crisis.
Therefore, the determination of borrowers’ credit spreads is decisive for any financial entity for several reasons:
• The assignment of prices for new loans or financial guarantees and for the valuation of the banking book.
• Due to the monitoring of the loan portfolio, using market-implied ratings instead of agency ratings.
• CVA quantification of the trading book.
On the latter point, the Basel Committee (2011) in its document “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for
more resilient banks and banking systems”, sets CVA methodology for the trading book, when the determina-
tion of the credit spread for those entities interested in advanced models in their risk management is vital. In
a later document, the Basel Committee (2012b) reaffirms the idea of requiring the financial entities to estimate
the credit spread curves considering the different factors of rating, sector and region of each counterparty.
It is usually assumed that in the firms that have a CDS contract, this is the key factor that establishes the
credit premium risk for a new financial asset [see Longstaff et al. (2003) and Longstaff et al. (2005)]. Thus, a CDS
is a key element for any investor when exploiting relative value opportunities across a firm’s capital structure
(Figure 2.1). All of this being true, there are many unanswered questions: How could we estimate the credit
spread for an issuer without CDS? Could we use the Markit dataset, the main source of the CDS prices? Do we
need to set up quality filters at different levels of the sample in the Markit dataset? The graphic idea (shown in
Figure 2.2) is to build up credit spread curves for every combination of rating, sector and region; thus, we get a
proxy for the risk premium of each financial asset without a CDS [see among others, Fabozzi et al. (2007) and
Chourdakis et al. (2013)].
On the other hand, given the high volatility period in the credit market in recent years, triggered by the
default of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, we observe the presence of big outliers in the distribution
of credit spreads in the different groups of rating, industry and region. In the current context of the financial
and economic crisis, is the OLS regression the optimal method to estimate credit spread curves? Or is it more
efficient to use more robust estimators which are not so affected by the presence of outliers? For a financial
institution, it is clear that the best approach is the one that reflects the market trend and minimizes the fluctu-
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Figure 2.1: CDS as a key element for other credit markets
Figure 2.2: Spread curves by rating, sector and region
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ations of the estimates.
In addition, we do not have a big enough subsample for each group by rating, industry and region. For
this reason, we have to aggregate the information using different criteria. If we use hierarchical models, which
prioritize the information of the variables, we use the rating information as the first risk factor, but as a second
factor: Should we use the industry or the region of the issuer? And, are there significant differences using
alternative hypothesis?
This work contributes to the financial literature in specific ways, since we use a great variety of statistical
models to estimate the credit spread curve, also taking into account the special features of the CDS market. In
order to conduct the analysis and evaluate the different possibilities that we could use, we compare all the in-
troduced models in this chapter for 2006-2012. We use this time frame as we believe that it is the most relevant
period of time for the credit market. We think that this is an adequate starting point to establish a standard
methodology in building up credit spread curves for the financial system. Methodology standardization leads
to more transparency and rigour in the financial community.
This chapter is divided into five sections in addition to this one. In Section 2.2 we review briefly the two
categories of the credit models, structural models and reduced-form models. Then we follow with a descrip-
tion of the econometric models of credit spreads in Section 2.3. In that section, we focus on non-hierarchical
regression, differentiating between ordinary least-squares regression and quantile regression. Furthermore,
the section also deals with the hierarchical regression. In Section 2.4 we start to analyse the implications of the
different presented econometric models with a transversal data analysis. In Section 2.5 we test in depth the
different econometric model for the period 2006-2012. At the end of the chapter, we review our main findings
and open questions in Section 2.6.
2.2 Introduction: Structural models vs reduced-form models
As we have just pointed out, credit spread modelling is absolutely essential. Classifying credit spread model
into two categories is widespread in the financial literature:
1. Structural models (Merton approach)
2. reduced-form models (intensity approach)
Structural models
Structural models were originally developed by Merton (1974), the so-called “Merton Model” being the corner-
stone of such an approach. It is based on the asset value and the capital structure of a company, trying to
determine its probability of default. As equity and debt are considered as company value options, we are able
to transform them into credit spreads [see Crouhy et al. (2000) and Gordy (2000)].
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Figure 2.3: Default in the Merton approach
The main drawback lies in the lack of relevant information for these models, since it is not usually public,
such as for asset value or threshold debt. To date, research in this field has shown that this structural approach
does not generally properly match the credit market spread and the dynamic of the credit spread, specially in
the short run. This approach represents credit models with very strong economic foundations, but they are
very limited for pricing debt. In Figure 2.3, we depicted the main idea of the Merton Model in a simple way.
Reduced-form models
The second type of models are the reduced-form (or intensity) models. These models are distinguished by
the fact that they do not consider the relation between default and the firm value in an explicit manner. The
dynamic of the default is taken as exogenous and is defined by the default intensity. The principal advantage
of this approach is that we could calculate the price of the credit financial assets as a risk-free assets, adding
the credit spread rate to the risk-free rate. Therefore, instead of asking why the defaults occur, we infer the
probability of default from market prices. These models are mainly used for pricing; however, this approach
is more difficult to apply in a different context, such as economic capital estimations, due to the lack of link
between the probability of default and the asset value. Given that our main goal is to establish criteria for
pricing debt of different issuers without CDS, we decided to work with the reduced-form models as they are
designed for pricing.
The credit intensity default models are based on one of the more commonly used statistical functions, the
“hazard rate” function [see Duffie and Singleton (1999)]. T is a random variable called the time-until-default,
or simply survival time, for an asset, to denote this length of time. Let denote F (t ) the distribution of T .
F (t )= Pr (T ≤ t ), t ≥ 0 (2.1)
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and set
S(t )= 1−F (t )= Pr (T > t ), t ≥ 0 (2.2)
where the function S(t ) is the survival function. Thus, the following equation stands for the instantaneous
probability of default of an asset, which has survived x years.
Pr [x < T ≤ x+4x | T > x] = F (x+4x)−F (x)1−F (x)
≈ f (x)4x1−F (x)
(2.3)
The function
f (x)
1−F (x) (2.4)
represents the value of the density function of the conditional probability of T at the exact time x, given survival
until that moment.
Let us name this function h(x), known as hazard rate function. The relationship between the hazard rate
function with the distribution function and the survival function is the following:
h(x)= f (x)
1−F (x) =−
S′(x)
S(x)
(2.5)
Thus, the survival probability could be expressed in terms of the hazard rate as:
S(t )= e−
´ t
0 h(s)d s (2.6)
In addition to this, we define t qx as the conditional probability that the asset will default within the next
t years conditional on its survival for x years and t qx as the conditional probability that the asset will survive
within the next t years conditional on its survival for x years.
t qx = Pr [T −x ≤ t | T > x], t ≥ 0
t px = 1− t qx = Pr [T −x > t | T > x], t ≥ 0
(2.7)
Now, , we can express t px and t qx in terms of the hazard rates as follows:
t px = e−
´ t
0 h(s+x)d s
t qx = 1−e−
´ t
0 h(s+x)d s
(2.8)
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Furthermore,
F (t )= 1−S(t )= 1−e−
´ t
0 h(s)d s (2.9)
And,
f (t )= S(t ) ·h(t ) (2.10)
which is the density function for T.
A classical assumption, is to consider that the hazard rate, h, is constant over a certain period of time,
defined by [x, x+1]. Therefore, the density function is:
f (t )= he−ht (2.11)
It shows that the survival time follows an exponential distribution with parameter h. Under this assump-
tion, the survival probability over the time interval [x, x+ t ] for 0< t ≤ 1 is:
t px = 1− t qx = e−
´ t
0 h(s)d s = e−ht = (px )t (2.12)
where px is the survival probability over 1 year. This assumption could also be used with a time interval of
less than a year, always assuming a constant hazard rate for that interval. Therefore, by applying a hypothesis
about CDS recovery, we can extract the probability of default from CDS prices.
To sum up, there are several reasons to use the hazard rate for modelling the probability of default. First,
it gives us information about the instantaneous probability of default at time t of a firm, having survived until
t . In second place, the hazard rate function could easily be applied in complex problems, where we need to
introduce the dynamic of the default. Finally, there are a lot of similarities between interest rate and hazard
rate, which is desirable.
2.3 Econometric models of credit spreads
Introduction
This section focuses on the estimates of credit spreads for issuers with no CDSs. As mentioned before the Basel
Committee requires financial entities to establish credit spreads considering the rating, sector and region of
the borrower. Furthermore, these credit curves will be decisive in pricing new assets in the banking book of a
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financial institution.
As we mentioned above, one of the most important problems that we find when estimating credit curves
is the lack of reliable data in some combination of rating-sector-region, finding frequently outliers in the CDS
distribution by rating sector. Thus, given the particular features of the CDS spread, is the OLS regression the
optimal method to estimate credit spread curves? Or is it more efficient to use more robust estimators which
are not so affected by the presence of outliers? Should we weight the information for rating, sector or region
evenly? For a financial institution, it is clear that the best approach is that which reflects the market trend and
minimizes the fluctuations of the estimates.
The analysed models in this chapter could be classified in two differentiated groups:
1. Non-hierarchical regression. We present the classical ordinary least-squares, OLS, regression as a pos-
sibility for estimating credit curves. In addition, in that subsection we introduce the quantile regression
for the median as an alternative to the OLS model.
2. Hierarchical regression. Non-hierarchical regression models are often run using data with observations
that are highly correlated within subsamples. Hierarchical models share the notion that individual ob-
servations are grouped in some way by the data design. For example, in the credit market we can use the
rating, sector and region as factors to explain the observed credit spread for an issuer, and therefore, we
can establish the order of these factors to explain the observed spread in this type of models.
2.3.1 Non-hierarchical regression
2.3.1.1 Ordinary least-squares regression (OLS)
Linear OLS regression
The initial basis model will be1
pl =β0+β1Rl ,z +β2Sl ,i +β3Gl , j +µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.13)
where pl represents the risk premium of the issuer l , and the variables R, S and G are dicotomic variables,
representing the different levels of rating, sector, and geographical regions present in the sample. There are
n variables Rz , m variables Si , and k variables G j , being n, m, and k the number of rating class, sectors, and
geographical regions included in the sample. These variables are defined as
Rl ,z = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l has rating z, and Rl ,z = 0 otherwise, for all z = 1,2, ...n. In total,
there are nine rating classes: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, D and NR (without rating).
1See Novales (2000) for more details of these models.
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Sl ,i = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a firm that belongs to sector i , and Sl ,i =
0 otherwise, for all i = 1,2, ...m .11 sectors are represented in the sample: Basic materials, consumer goods,
consumer services, energy, financials, government, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication
services and utilities.
Gl , j = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a company located in the geographical region
j , and Gl , j = 0 otherwise, for all j = 1,2, ...k. We have thirteen different regions in the sample: Africa, Asia,
Caribbean, E.Eur, Europe, India, Lat.Amer, Middle East, N.Amer, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra.
In this case, we use senior 5-year CDS contracts (because of their representativeness), the currency and
restructuring clause will be the standard one for each issuer, and the data contains the observations on 31
January 2012. In the first regression, the base regressors are the AAA rating, basic material sector, and Africa
region. Such estimates are expressed as a decimal number, meaning that to show the results in basis points,
it is necessary to multiply each coefficient by 10,000. The outcome is shown in Table 2.1 and the histogram
of residuals in Figure 2.4. From these results, it can be observed that the influence of the coefficient rating
regressors is as expected: the better the rating, the lower the coefficient. Furthermore, it is clear that there are
significant differences among sector coefficients, the financial sector being more penalised than others, as the
health care sector. Similarly, it occurs with region coefficients.
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Table 2.1: Linear OLS regression on 31 January 2012
Coefficients Estimate Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.0086 0.0095 0.9 0.36
AA 0.0018 0.0063 0.3 0.78
A 0.0009 0.0060 0.1 0.88
BBB 0.0076 0.0059 1.3 0.20
BB 0.0277 0.0061 4.5 0.00 ***
B 0.0585 0.0063 9.3 <2e-16 ***
CCC 0.1678 0.0071 23.8 <2e-16 ***
D 0.1462 0.0190 7.7 0.00 ***
NR (1) 0.0150 0.0061 2.5 0.01 *
Consumer goods -0.0036 0.0030 -1.2 0.23
Consumer services -0.0055 0.0031 -1.8 0.08
Energy -0.0032 0.0036 -0.9 0.38
Financials 0.0107 0.0027 3.9 0.00 ***
Government -0.0020 0.0033 -0.6 0.55
Health care -0.0086 0.0041 -2.1 0.04 *
Industrials -0.0001 0.0030 0.0 0.98
Technology -0.0033 0.0040 -0.8 0.41
Telecommunication services -0.0003 0.0038 -0.1 0.94
Utilities 0.0000 0.0033 0.0 0.99
Asia -0.0008 0.0071 -0.1 0.91
Caribbean -0.0063 0.0120 -0.5 0.60
E.Eur 0.0153 0.0080 1.9 0.05 .
Europe 0.0032 0.0070 0.5 0.65
India 0.0123 0.0090 1.4 0.17
Lat.Amer 0.0074 0.0079 0.9 0.35
Middle East 0.0086 0.0081 1.1 0.29
N.Amer -0.0023 0.0070 -0.3 0.74
Oceania 0.0026 0.0079 0.3 0.74
Offshore 0.0171 0.0092 1.9 0.06 .
Supra -0.0013 0.0150 -0.1 0.93
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.03124 on 2516 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.4674, Adjusted R-squared:
0.4612, F-statistic: 76.12 on 29 and 2516 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Note: These estimates are expressed as decimals, it means that to get the result in basis points, it is necessary
to multiple each coefficient by 10,000.
(1) NR: Not rated
Exponential OLS regression
The second model represents the risk premium of a borrower as an exponential function of rating, sector and
region.
Thus, let us denote:
pl = expβ0+β1Rl ,z+β2Sl ,i+β3Gl , j+µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.14)
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Figure 2.4: Histogram of residuals of the linear OLS regression on 31 January 2012
where pl represents the risk premium of the issuer l , and the variables R, S and G are dicotomic variables,
representing the different levels of rating, sector, and geographical regions present in the sample. There are
n variables Rz , m variables Si , and k variables G j , being n, m, and k the number of rating class, sectors, and
geographical regions included in the sample. These variables are defined as
Rl ,z = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l has rating z, and Rl ,z = 0 otherwise, for all z = 1,2, ...n. In total,
there are nine rating classes: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, D and NR (without rating).
Sl ,i = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a firm that belongs to sector i , and Sl ,i =
0 otherwise, for all i = 1,2, ...m .11 sectors are represented in the sample: Basic materials, consumer goods,
consumer services, energy, financials, government, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication
services and utilities.
Gl , j = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a company located in the geographical region
j , and Gl , j = 0 otherwise, for all j = 1,2, ...k. We have thirteen different regions in the sample: Africa, Asia,
Caribbean, E.Eur, Europe, India, Lat.Amer, Middle East, N.Amer, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra.
In this case, we again use senior 5-year CDS contracts. The currency and restructuring clause will be the
standard ones for each issuer. The data contains the observations of 31 January 2012. In this first regressions,
the base regressors are AAA rating, basic material sector, and Africa region. Such estimates are expressed as
decimals, meaning that to show the result in basis points, it is necessary to multiply each coefficient by 10,000.
Table 2.2 shows the results of this model, using the same assumptions as before, and Figure 2.5 depicts the
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histogram of residuals . Indeed, the output for this second model has a great relationship with the previous
one.
Table 2.2: Exponential OLS regression on 31 January 2012
Regressors Estimate Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -4.9794 0.1870 -26.6 <2e-16 ***
AA 0.3585 0.1238 2.9 0.00 **
A 0.4692 0.1174 4.0 0.00 ***
BBB 0.8177 0.1166 7.0 0.00 ***
BB 1.5576 0.1197 13.0 <2e-16 ***
B 2.2286 0.1236 18.0 <2e-16 ***
CCC 2.9149 0.1386 21.0 <2e-16 ***
D 3.2168 0.3727 8.6 <2e-16 ***
NR (1) 1.0082 0.1201 8.4 <2e-16 ***
Consumer goods -0.0998 0.0590 -1.7 0.09
Consumer services -0.0271 0.0605 -0.4 0.65
Energy 0.0817 0.0700 1.2 0.24
Financials 0.5049 0.0539 9.4 <2e-16 ***
Government 0.1338 0.0644 2.1 0.04 *
Health care -0.2715 0.0802 -3.4 0.00 ***
Industrials 0.0684 0.0598 1.1 0.25
Technology 0.0423 0.0776 0.5 0.59
Telecommunication services -0.0538 0.0742 -0.7 0.47
Utilities 0.0405 0.0650 0.6 0.53
Asia -0.3055 0.1388 -2.2 0.03 *
Caribbean -0.0127 0.2365 -0.1 0.96
E.Eur 0.3640 0.1562 2.3 0.02 *
Europe -0.0786 0.1384 -0.6 0.57
India 0.4869 0.1766 2.8 0.01 **
Lat.Amer 0.1169 0.1552 0.8 0.45
Middle East 0.2727 0.1588 1.7 0.09 .
N.Amer -0.3542 0.1372 -2.6 0.01 **
Oceania 0.0525 0.1559 0.3 0.74
Offshore 0.0506 0.1803 0.3 0.78
Supra 0.0669 0.2948 0.2 0.82
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.6134 on 2516 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.5343, Adjusted R-squared:
0.5289, F-statistic: 99.53 on 29 and 2516 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Note: These estimates are expressed as decimals, it means that to get the result in basis points, it is necessary
to multiple each coefficient by 10,000.
(1) NR: Not Rated
2.3.1.2 Quantile regression
Introduction
Is the OLS method the best approach to estimate a data regression? Are there better alternatives?
The comparison between the mean and the median has been widely studied in the past. Since the days
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of residuals of the exponential OLS regression on 31 January 2012
of Gauss, it has been recognised that the mean is an optimal estimator if the residuals follow a normal distri-
bution; therefore, under this hypothesis, the ordinary least-squares method is the best approach. However, in
the presence of big outliers, as occurs with the distribution of credit spreads by a determined rating and sec-
tor, the median is a better estimator than the mean. These arguments were pointed out by Shiryayev (1992).
Median regression is more robust to outliers than least-squares regression, and the median regression is semi-
parametric as it avoids assumptions about the parametric distribution of the error process [see Koenker and
Machado (1999), Koenker (2001), Koenker (2005) and Koenker (2006)].
Analogous to the conditional mean function of linear regression, we may consider the relationship between
regressors and outcome (y) using the conditional median function or quantile (q) of the empirical distribution.
Quantile regression also provides a richer characterization of the data, allowing us to consider the impact of a
covariate on the entire distribution of y, not merely its conditional mean. Thus, the quantile regression offers a
more focused view of the problem than could be achieved by looking exclusively at conditional mean models.
This method uses just “local” information around the conditional distribution in which we are interested. In
addition to this, it avoids assumptions about the parametric distribution of the residuals. Median regression,
also known as least-absolute-deviations (LAD) minimizes the sum of the absolute values of the residuals. For
example, Moody’s uses this type of methodologies based on the median to estimate the credit spreads by rating
and sector and implied rating [see, for example, Munves et al. (2007)].
The model for linear quantile regression is
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y = X ′β+µ (2.15)
where y = (y1, ......, yn)′ is the (nx1) vector of responses, X ′ = (x1, ......, xn)′ is the (nxp) regressor matrix, β′ =
(β1, ......,βn)
′
is the vector (px1) of unknown parameters, and µ= (µ1, ......,µn)′ is the (nx1) vector of unknown
errors.
L1 regression, also known as median regression, is a natural extension of the sample median when the
response is conditioned on the covariates. In L1 regression, the least absolute residuals estimate βˆL AR , referred
to as the L1-norm estimate, is obtained as the solution of the minimization problem
min
β²Rp
n∑
i=1
| yi −x
′
iβ | (2.16)
More generally, for quantile regression Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) defined the τth regression quantile,
0< τ< 1 , as any solution to the minimization problem
min
β²Rp
 ∑
i²
{
i :yi>x′iβ
}τ | yi −x ′iβ | +
∑
i²
{
i :yi<x′iβ
}(1−τ) | yi −x ′iβ |
 (2.17)
The solution is denoted as ˆβ(τ), and the L1-norm estimate corresponds to βˆ(1/2) . The τth regression
quantile is an extension of the τth sample quantile ω(τ), which can be formulated as the solution of
min
ω²Rp
[ ∑
i²{i :yi>ω}
τ | yi −ω | +
∑
i²{i :yi<ω}
(1−τ) | yi −ω |
]
(2.18)
Linear median regression
After the introduction of the quantile regression, we will look at the median regression to compare it with the
previous results based on the mean. In the linear case, as we defined before:
pl =β0+β1Rl ,z +β2Sl ,i +β3Gl , j +µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.19)
where pl represents the risk premium of the issuer l , and the variables R, S and G are dicotomic variables,
representing the different levels of rating, sector, and geographical regions present in the sample. There are
n variables Rz , m variables Si , and k variables G j , being n, m, and k the number of rating class, sectors, and
geographical regions included in the sample. These variables are defined as
Rl ,z = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l has rating z, and Rl ,z = 0 otherwise, for all z = 1,2, ...n. In total,
there are nine rating classes: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, D and NR (without rating).
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Sl ,i = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a firm that belongs to sector i , and Sl ,i =
0 otherwise, for all i = 1,2, ...m .11 sectors are represented in the sample: Basic materials, consumer goods,
consumer services, energy, financials, government, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication
services and utilities.
Gl , j = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a company located in the geographical region
j , and Gl , j = 0 otherwise, for all j = 1,2, ...k. We have thirteen different regions in the sample: Africa, Asia,
Caribbean, E.Eur, Europe, India, Lat.Amer, Middle East, N.Amer, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra.
Again, we use senior 5-year CDS contracts, because of their representativeness. The currency and restruc-
turing clause will be the standard ones for each issuer. The data contains the observations of 31 January 2012.
In this first regressions, the base regressors are AAA rating, basic material sector, and Africa region. Such es-
timates are expressed as decimals, meaning that to express the result in basis points, it is necessary to multiply
each coefficient by 10,000.
Table 2.3 shows the coefficients of the median regression, and the histogram of residuals is shown in Figure
2.6. For this particular sample, the results from least-absolute-deviations method and OLS method are very
similar in terms of the coefficients regressors, as well as the more representative statisticians. It would be in-
teresting to analyse this outcome through time to extract conclusions. As we described in the Section 1.4 in
the first chapter, the CDS spread is typically right-skewed; therefore, the median estimates will be usually lower
and more robust than the mean.2
2Another approach, which is not discussed in this document, is the use of robust OLS regression.
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Table 2.3: Linear median regression on 31 January 2012
Coefficients Value Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.0091 0.0033 2.8 0.01
AA 0.0029 0.0017 1.6 0.10
A 0.0042 0.0017 2.5 0.01
BBB 0.0087 0.0017 5.2 0.00
BB 0.0257 0.0022 11.8 0.00
B 0.0513 0.0029 17.8 0.00
CCC 0.1458 0.0344 4.2 0.00
D 0.1584 0.0068 23.2 0.00
NR (1) 0.0101 0.0018 5.5 0.00
Consumer goods -0.0010 0.0010 -1.0 0.31
Consumer services -0.0010 0.0011 -0.9 0.36
Energy 0.0016 0.0011 1.4 0.15
Financials 0.0080 0.0010 8.3 0.00
Government 0.0011 0.0012 0.9 0.37
Health care -0.0025 0.0012 -2.1 0.04
Industrials 0.0010 0.0011 0.9 0.35
Technology 0.0000 0.0016 0.0 1.00
Telecommunication services -0.0014 0.0012 -1.1 0.26
Utilities 0.0015 0.0010 1.5 0.14
Asia -0.0059 0.0028 -2.2 0.03
Caribbean -0.0080 0.0056 -1.4 0.15
E.Eur 0.0130 0.0032 4.1 0.00
Europe -0.0032 0.0028 -1.2 0.25
India 0.0125 0.0032 4.0 0.00
Lat.Amer -0.0004 0.0031 -0.1 0.89
Middle East 0.0050 0.0033 1.5 0.13
N.Amer -0.0068 0.0027 -2.5 0.01
Oceania -0.0021 0.0029 -0.7 0.46
Offshore -0.0022 0.0042 -0.5 0.59
Supra -0.0035 0.0105 -0.3 0.74
Note: These estimates are expressed as decimals, it means that to get the result in basis points, it is necessary
to multiple each coefficient by 10,000.
(1) NR: Not Rated
Exponential Median Regression
Finally, we present the exponential median regression as follows:
pl = expβ0+β1Rl ,z+β2Sl ,i+β3Gl , j+µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.20)
where pl represents the risk premium of the issuer l , and the variables R, S and G are dicotomic variables,
representing the different levels of rating, sector, and geographical regions present in the sample. There are
n variables Rz , m variables Si , and k variables G j , being n, m, and k the number of rating class, sectors, and
geographical regions included in the sample. These variables are defined as
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of residuals of the linear median regression on 31 January 2012
Rl ,z = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l has rating z, and Rl ,z = 0 otherwise, for all z = 1,2, ...n. In total,
there are nine rating classes: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, D and NR (without rating).
Sl ,i = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a firm that belongs to sector i , and Sl ,i =
0 otherwise, for all i = 1,2, ...m .11 sectors are represented in the sample: Basic materials, consumer goods,
consumer services, energy, financials, government, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication
services and utilities.
Gl , j = 1 if the CDS denoted by the subindex l corresponds to a company located in the geographical region
j , and Gl , j = 0 otherwise, for all j = 1,2, ...k. We have thirteen different regions in the sample: Africa, Asia,
Caribbean, E.Eur, Europe, India, Lat.Amer, Middle East, N.Amer, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra.
As with all previous exercises, we make the same assumptions, so we choose senior 5-year CDS contracts
(because of their representativeness). The currency and restructuring clause will be the standard one for each
issuer. The data contains the observations of 31 January 2012. In this first regressions, the base regressors are
AAA rating, basic material sector, and Africa region. Such estimates are expressed as decimals, meaning that to
express the result in basis points, it is necessary to multiply each coefficient by 10,000. As we expected, these
results are in line with the Exponential OLS represented above for this particular day (see Table 2.4 and Figure
2.7).
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Table 2.4: Exponential median regression on 31 January 2012
Coefficients Value Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -5.0697 0.1770 -28.6 0.00
AA 0.3584 0.1086 3.3 0.00
A 0.5589 0.1040 5.4 0.00
BBB 0.9441 0.1035 9.1 0.00
BB 1.7012 0.1107 15.4 0.00
B 2.3876 0.1172 20.4 0.00
CCC 3.1984 0.1539 20.8 0.00
D 3.2615 0.1982 16.5 0.00
NR (1) 0.9829 0.1139 8.6 0.00
Consumer goods -0.1467 0.0746 -2.0 0.05
Consumer services -0.0593 0.0765 -0.8 0.44
Energy 0.1252 0.0754 1.7 0.10
Financials 0.5293 0.0635 8.3 0.00
Government 0.1695 0.0785 2.2 0.03
Health care -0.2431 0.0892 -2.7 0.01
Industrials 0.0932 0.0742 1.3 0.21
Technology 0.0211 0.1039 0.2 0.84
Telecommunication services -0.0962 0.0863 -1.1 0.26
Utilities 0.1394 0.0756 1.8 0.07
Asia -0.3396 0.1368 -2.5 0.01
Caribbean -0.2143 0.3338 -0.6 0.52
E.Eur 0.3564 0.1482 2.4 0.02
Europe -0.1074 0.1346 -0.8 0.43
India 0.4253 0.1514 2.8 0.01
Lat.Amer 0.0320 0.1492 0.2 0.83
Middle East 0.2551 0.1502 1.7 0.09
N.Amer -0.3804 0.1332 -2.9 0.00
Oceania 0.0413 0.1470 0.3 0.78
Offshore 0.0612 0.2092 0.3 0.77
Supra -0.1025 0.2318 -0.4 0.66
Note: These estimates are expressed as decimals, it means that to get the result in basis points, it is necessary
to multiple each coefficient by 10,000.
(1) NR: Not rated
2.3.2 Hierarchical regression, multilevel regression
Motivation
Are regression models (be the standard OLS regression or the median regression) the best approaches to es-
timate credit curves? The answer is probably no. Suppose we need to estimate the credit spread for an A-rating
basic material borrower and an A-rating financial borrower, none of them having a CDS contract. Under a fin-
ancial crisis scenario, it is easy to assume that the spread for an issuer of rating A in the basic material sector
will be more in line with the rest of A-rating spreads in the market than the A-rating financial spread, which
would be well above the sample mean. Hence, the A-rating financial spread estimated by an OLS regression or
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Figure 2.7: Histogram of residuals of the exponential median regression on 31 January 2012
a median regression will probably be subsidized, as these models use all the available information on A-rating
issues, even though the two borrowers for which we want to estimate an spread belong to different sectors.
In such situations, relatively frequent in the credit market, where the available sample of CDS spreads can
be differentiated by ratings, sectors or regions, the OLS or median regression models are not optimal. The
reason is that these type of models estimate an average credit spread by rating type, sector or region. Therefore,
these models will penalize some determined homogeneous borrowers and they will subsidize others. As a way
out of this difficulty, we propose the use of hierarchical regressions, also known as multilevel regression models,
for these type of situations. They apply to cases in which a given sample can be naturally classified among
subsamples, with observations being relatively homogeneous inside each subsample, while heterogeneity can
be important across subsamples. In our sample, credit spreads can be expected to display a similar behaviour
in a given sector, while experiencing different behaviour among different sectors. Something similar might
be expected if we classify our sample of credit spreads according to rating levels, for instance. Hierarchical
regressions are statistically more efficient precisely because they exploit the similarity among the observations
that belong to the same subsample [see Snijders and Bosker (1999)].
Introduction
Hierarchical models consider the existence within the sample of different subsamples made up with relatively
homogeneous observations. In that situation, more precise estimates can be obtained even if we allow for
parameter variation over subsamples, since we will use a relatively homogeneous sample to estimate the para-
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meters associated to each subsample. This is the strategy followed by hierarchical models. In general, assuming
the existence of m subsamples, a basic cross-section regression of firm data with a single explanatory variable
could be written for the N firms in the sample:
yl =α+
m∑
i=1
βi Xl Dl ,i +ul , l = 1,2, ...., N (2.21)
Where Dl ,i is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 only if firm l is included in subsample i , and it is
equal to zero otherwise. Now, we assume that the coefficient βi , that measures the sensitivity of yl to changes
in Xl , depends on which of the m subsamples contains the l − th observation:
βi = δ+γ
′
Zi , i = 1,2, ....,m (2.22)
In this model, differences in βi across sectors come from differences in sector characteristics Zi . In (2.22) γ
and Zi are vectors with the same dimension. Vector Zi will contain some variables that are specific of the i -th
subsample. Suppose that firm l is included in the i0 subsample. We will then end up with:
yl =α+βi Xl Dl ,i0 +ul =α+ (δ+γZi0 )Xl +ul
=α+δXl + (γ′Z i0 )Xl +ul , l = 1,2, ...., N
(2.23)
So that the effect of a unit change in Xl on yl has a component that is common to all firms, and a second
component that is specific of the subsample to which the firm belongs. Notice that yl ends up being affected
by variables (Zi ) that were not explicitly included in the original model.
If the intercept in the original regression also changes across subsamples, we would have:
yl =
m∑
i=1
(αi Dl ,i +βi Xl Dl ,i )+ul , l = 1,2, ...., N (2.24)
With:
αi =µ+λ′Wi , i = 1,2, ....,m
βi = δ+γ′Zi , i = 1,2, ....,m
(2.25)
Where some or all of the variables in vector Wi will be specific of the subsample i . The model then becomes:
yl =
m∑
i=1
(αi Dl ,i +βi Xl Dl ,i )+ul =
m∑
i=1
[(µ+λ′Wi )Dl ,i + (δ+γ
′
Zi )Xl Dl ,i ]+ul , l = 1,2, ...., N (2.26)
If firm l is included in subsample i0, only one of the dummy variables above, Dl ,i0 will be different from
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zero, and we will have:
yl =αi0 +βi0 Xl +ul = (µ+λ
′
Wi0 )+ (δ+γ
′
Zi0 )Xl +ul
=µ+λ′Wi0 +δXl + (γ
′
Zi0 )Xl +ul , l = 1,2, ...., N
(2.27)
To these specifications we could add the consideration that the functions that determine the values of coef-
ficients α, and β have a stochastic additive term and are therefore random functions. That would produce
different kinds of heteroskedastic structures in the error term of the final equation, which may be interesting
in some applications. We do not consider that possibility in our analysis.
A simple situation arises when:
αi =µ+λZi , i = 1,2, ....,m
βi = δ+γZi , i = 1,2, ....,m
(2.28)
leading to model:
yl =
(
µ+λZi0
)+ (δ+γZi0)Xl +ul , l = 1,2, ...., N (2.29)
in which the slope and possibly the intercept are functions of a variable Z .
This description corresponds to a two-level hierarchical model, with the response of yl to Xl being a func-
tion of characteristics of the subsamples defined by the different values of i . A three-level model would arise if
we allowed for some of the coefficients λ,γ to depend on characteristics of subsamples defined by a different
classification of the sample data.
2.3.2.1 One-level hierarchical model for credit spreads
Having introduced the hierarchical regression, we now want to use that framework to determine which vari-
able, rating, sector, or region, is the most important factor in the determination of credit spreads. In our pre-
vious analysis, based on simple regressions, we have seen the rating to be the most influential variable in the
CDS price through time. Thus, we start with the specification:
pl =α+βRl +µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.30)
Where pl is the credit spread for firm l , and Rl is its rating. The one-level hierarchical model is just a
standard linear regression model.3
3If we use the median estimate, we get the same results of the median regression.
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2.3.2.2 Two-level hierarchical model for credit spreads
Our model has the peculiarity that the explanatory variable, rating, is defined by a set of dummy variables Rl ,z ,
where Rl ,z =1 if firm l has rating z, being equal to zero otherwise.
Hence, assuming there are n different ratings in the sample, the model can be more precisely formulated
as:
pl =α+
n∑
z=1
βz Rl ,z +µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.31)
For each firm l, there will be just one value of the z-index, z0say, for which Rl ,z0 =1, thus, having for that firm:
pl =α+βz0 +µl , (2.32)
which is a model where credit spread has a component that is common to all firms in the sample, and a
second component that is specific of the level of rating, but it is the same for all firms with the same rating.
Therefore, this model assigns the same level of credit spread to all firms with the same level of rating.
As in the general description above, the two-level hierarchical model for credit spreads arises when we allow
the coefficients in the model to depend on a sample partition. In our application, we will consider the partition
defined by the different sectors. For simplicity, we will assume in this presentation that only the slope varies
across sectors and regions.
So, letting the rating slope in the credit spread equation to change across sectors i = 1,2, ...,m,
βz = δz +γz,i , i = 1,2, ...,m
we would have:
pl =α+
m∑
i=1
n∑
z=1
βz R l ,z Sl ,i +ul =α+
∑n
z=1(δz +γz,i0 )R l ,z +ul , l = 1,2, ....,L (2.33)
with dummy variables Sl ,i being defined by Sl ,i =1 if firm l belongs to sector i , being equal to zero otherwise,
and we have assumed that firm l belongs to sector i0. If firm l has rating z0, then we will have:
pl =α+ (δz0 +γz0,i0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....,L (2.34)
In this two-level model, the credit sector has a component that is common to all firms in the sample, a
second component that is specific of each level of rating, and a third component that is different for each pair
(rating, sector). At a difference from the previous model, given two firms with the same rating, the model will
assign them a different credit spread, depending on the sector to which they belong. However, firms with the
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Figure 2.8: Histogram of residuals of the mean two-level hierarchical regression on 31 January 2012
same rating in the same sector will be assigned the same credit spread.
This is the model estimated in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, and the histogram of residuals is shown in Figure 2.8 . To
avoid the trap of singularity, we estimate the model excluding the dummy variable for a level of rating (AAA)
that it is taken as reference, as well as excluding the dummy variable for one of the sectors (basic materials). As
in all previous exercises, we choose the senior 5-year CDS contract, because of their representativeness. The
currency and restructuring clause will be the standard one for each issuer. For a first example, we select the data
for January 31, 2012. Estimates are expressed as decimals, meaning that to express the result in basis points, it
is necessary to multiply each coefficient by 10,000.
Other two-level models would be possible, using the region instead of the sector. So, letting the rating slope
in the credit spread equation to change across regions βz = δz +γz, j , j = 1,2, ...,k, we would have:
pl =α+
j∑
j=1
n∑
z=1
βz R l ,zGl , j +ul , l = 1,2, ....,L (2.35)
with dummy variables Gl , j being defined by G l , j =1 if firm l belongs to region j , being equal to zero other-
wise. If firm l belongs to region j0,we would have:
pl =α+
∑n
z=1(δz +γz, j0 )R l ,z +ul , l = 1,2, ....,L (2.36)
and if that firm l has rating z0, then we will end up with credit spread being characterized as:
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Table 2.5: Mean two-level hierarchical regression on 31 January 2012. (Part I)
Coefficients Estimate Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 0.0041 0.0195 0.2 0.83
AA 0.0065 0.0206 0.3 0.75
A 0.0044 0.0199 0.2 0.82
BB 0.0094 0.0197 0.5 0.63
BB 0.0253 0.0201 1259.0 0.21
B 0.1008 0.0218 4614.0 0.00 ***
CCC 0.2786 0.0276 10082.0 <2e-16 ***
NR (1) 0.0053 0.0209 0.3 0.80
AA:Consumer goods -0.0051 0.0090 -0.6 0.57
A:Consumer goods -0.0017 0.0051 -0.3 0.74
BBB:Consumer goods -0.0020 0.0037 -0.5 0.59
BB:Consumer goods 0.0030 0.0062 0.5 0.63
B:Consumer goods -0.0523 0.0109 -4787.0 0.00 ***
CCC:Consumer goods -0.0983 0.0218 -4503.0 0.00 ***
NR:Consumer goods 0.0006 0.0104 0.1 0.96
AA:Consumer services -0.0046 0.0092 -0.5 0.62
A:Consumer services -0.0010 0.0064 -0.2 0.87
BBB:Consumer services -0.0013 0.0037 -0.4 0.73
BB:Consumer services 0.0070 0.0058 1194.0 0.23
B:Consumer services -0.0438 0.0106 -4122.0 0.00 ***
CCC:Consumer services -0.1930 0.0209 -9242.0 <2e-16 ***
NR:Consumer services 0.0112 0.0092 1218.0 0.22
AAA:Energy -0.0004 0.0239 0.0 0.99
AA:Energy -0.0023 0.0098 -0.2 0.82
A:Energy 0.0003 0.0062 0.0 0.97
BBB:Energy 0.0020 0.0039 0.5 0.60
BB:Energy -0.0053 0.0077 -0.7 0.49
B:Energy -0.0480 0.0138 -3477.0 0.00 ***
AAA:Financials 0.0053 0.0276 0.2 0.85
AA:Financials 0.0079 0.0074 1073.0 0.28
A:Financials 0.0111 0.0044 2555.0 0.01 *
BBB:Financials 0.0106 0.0036 3.0 0.00 **
BB:Financials 0.0183 0.0064 2855.0 0.00 **
B:Financials -0.0315 0.0131 -2405.0 0.02 *
CCC:Financials -0.1045 0.0211 -4953.0 0.00 ***
NR:Financials 0.0194 0.0096 2018.0 0.04 *
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.01954 on 1279 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.5978 Adjusted R-squared: 0.5745 F-statistic: 25.69 on 74 and 1279 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Note: These estimates are expressed as decimals, it means that to get the result in basis points, it is necessary to multiple
by10,000 each coefficient.
(1) NR: Not rated
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Table 2.6: Mean two-level hierarchical regression on 31 January 2012 (Part II)
Coefficients Estimate Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
AAA:Government 0.0051 0.0203 0.3 0.80
AA:Government 0.0034 0.0092 0.4 0.72
A:Government 0.0134 0.0056 2382.0 0.02 *
BBB:Government 0.0143 0.0044 3245.0 0.00 **
BB:Government 0.0217 0.0087 2488.0 0.01 *
B:Government -0.0429 0.0131 -3275.0 0.00 **
CCC:Government -0.2060 0.0276 -7454.0 0.00 ***
NR:Government 0.0072 0.0089 0.8 0.42
AA:Health care -0.0055 0.0109 -0.5 0.61
A:Health care -0.0023 0.0058 -0.4 0.70
BBB:Health care -0.0053 0.0068 -0.8 0.44
BB:Health care 0.0054 0.0092 0.6 0.56
B:Health care -0.0671 0.0131 -5121.0 0.00 ***
NR:Health care 0.0887 0.0209 4246.0 0.00 ***
AA:Industrials -0.0027 0.0130 -0.2 0.83
A:Industrials 0.0007 0.0050 0.1 0.90
BBB:Industrials 0.0009 0.0038 0.2 0.80
BB:Industrials 0.0014 0.0059 0.2 0.81
B:Industrials -0.0547 0.0116 -4.7 0.00 ***
CCC:Industrials -0.1302 0.0276 -4711.0 0.00 ***
NR:Industrials 0.0154 0.0098 1561.0 0.12
AA:Technology -0.0055 0.0206 -0.3 0.79
A:Technology 0.0010 0.0069 0.1 0.89
BBB:Technology 0.0025 0.0052 0.5 0.64
BB:Technology 0.0063 0.0083 0.8 0.45
B:Technology -0.0329 0.0126 -2607.0 0.01 **
CCC:Technology -0.2041 0.0276 -7387.0 0.00 ***
NR:Technology 0.0079 0.0157 0.5 0.61
AA:Telecommunication services -0.0028 0.0117 -0.2 0.81
A:Telecommunication services 0.0004 0.0058 0.1 0.94
BBB:Telecommunication services 0.0048 0.0050 1.0 0.34
BB:Telecommunication services 0.0147 0.0087 1692.0 0.09 .
B:Telecommunication services -0.0289 0.0126 -2294.0 0.02 *
NR:Telecommunication services 0.0432 0.0122 3528.0 0.00 ***
A:Utilities 0.0028 0.0051 0.5 0.59
BBB:Utilities 0.0006 0.0041 0.2 0.88
BB:Utilities 0.0055 0.0092 0.6 0.55
B:Utilities 0.0170 0.0122 1386.0 0.17
NR:Utilities 0.0009 0.0157 0.1 0.96
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1. Residual standard error: 0.01954 on 1279 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.5978 Adjusted R-squared: 0.5745 F-statistic: 25.69 on 74 and 1279 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
Note: These estimates are expressed as decimals, it means that to get the result in basis points, it is necessary to multiple
by10,000 each coefficient.
(1) NR: Not rated
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pl =α+ (δz0 +γz0, j0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....,L (2.37)
In this two-level model, the credit sector has a component that is common to all firms in the sample, a
second component that is specific of each rating and a third component that is different for each pair (rating,
region). Given two firms with the same rating, the model will assign them a different credit spread, depending
on the region to which they belong. Firms with the same rating in the same region will be assigned the same
credit spread.
The question that arises in this context is whether we should use using the sector or the region as a second
level in the hierarchical model. In our opinion there are two arguments in favour of using the sector as the
second factor instead of the region:
1. The first reason is the economic globalisation. Companies operating in the credit corporate world are
more globalized each day which makes the results of multinational companies to be very affected by
the situation of their respective sector. As a consequence, the decision by the agency rating when ana-
lysing the solvency of a corporate company will increasingly depend on the company sector and more
marginally on its region. With all these approximations we depart from hierarchical models.
2. The structure of the credit market data itself. There are several credit classes, defined by a pair (rating,
region), for which we do not have any available data (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). That is, indeed, the case
for the AA Africa class, precluding the possibility of estimating credit spreads for such (rating, region)
pairs. We have more data available across the different classes composed by (rating; sector), as the next
two tables show, so that it is more often feasible to estimate the two-level hierarchical model in (rating,
sector) than in (rating, region).
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2.3.2.3 Three-level hierarchical model for credit spreads
The three-level hierarchical model arises when parameter values in the two-level hierarchical model are as-
sumed to be a function of another variable that also introduces a classification of the sample observations. In
our case, that might be the geographical region to which the issuer belongs.
So, returning to our initial model:
pl =α+
n∑
z=1
βz Rl ,z +µl , l = 1,2, ....L (2.38)
and letting the rating slope in the credit spread equation to change across sectorsβz = δz+γz,i ,i = 1,2, ...,m,
as before. We now consider the possibility that the sector-specific component of βz changes with the region:
γz,i =ϑz,i +ρz,i , j , j = 1,2, ...,k (2.39)
we would have:
pl =α+
k∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
n∑
z=1
βi R l ,z Sl ,i Gl , j +ul =α+
k∑
j=1
n∑
z=1
(δz +γz,i0 )R l ,z +ul = (2.40)
=α+
n∑
z=1
(δz +ϑz,i0 +ρz,i0, j0 )R l ,z +ul , l=1,2,....L (2.41)
where we have assumed that firm l belongs to sector i0 and region j0. If, in addition, firm l has rating z0,
the model will predict a credit spread:
pl =α+ (δz0 +ϑz0,i0 +ρz0,i0, j0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.42)
having a first component that is common to all firms in the sample, a second component that is specific of
each level of rating, a third component that differs for each pair (rating, sector) and a fourth component that is
different for each trio (rating, sector, region).
The number of estimated coefficient will depend on the way how we specify the dummy variables to avoid
the trap of perfect multicollinearity. If we include a constant intercept, then we will need to exclude one of
the parameters in the three classes in the parenthesis above, thereby estimating n +mn +mnk − 2 different
parameters.
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Three-level hierarchical model for credit spreads without CDS data
As we mentioned before, the lack of data is very common in some combination of rating, sector and region,
being impossible to apply equation (2.42). Suppose that we lack data for some of the combinations (rating z0,
sector i0, region j0).
Two-level (rating, sector) model with adjustment by (sector, region)
One possibility would then be to consider and letting the rating slope in the credit spread equation to
change across sectors βz = δz +γz,i , i = 1,2, ...,m, as before. We now consider the possibility that the sector-
specific component of βz changes with the region:
γz,i =ϑi , j +ρz,i , j = 1,2, ...,k (2.43)
we would have:
pl =α+
k∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
n∑
z=1
βi R l ,z Sl ,i Gl , j +ul =α+
k∑
j=1
n∑
z=1
(δz +γz,i0 )R l ,z +ul = (2.44)
=α+ϑi0, j0 +
n∑
z=1
(δz +ρz,i0 )R l ,z +ul , l=1,2,....L (2.45)
where we have assumed that firm l belongs to sector i0 and region j0. If, in addition, firm l has rating z0,
the model will predict a credit spread:
pl =α+ (δz0 +ϑi0, j0 +ρz0,i0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.46)
having a first component that is common to all firms in the sample, a second component that is specific of
each level of rating, a third component that differs for each pair (sector, region) and a fourth component that is
different for each pair (rating, sector).
Two-level (rating, sector) model with adjustment by (rating, region)
One possibility would then be to consider and letting the rating slope in the credit spread equation to
change across sectors βz = δz +γz,i , i = 1,2, ...,m, as before. We now consider the possibility that the sector-
specific component of βz changes with the region:
γz,i =ϑz, j +ρz,i j = 1,2, ...,k (2.47)
we would have:
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pl =α+
k∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
n∑
z=1
βi R l ,z Sl ,i Gl , j +ul =α+
k∑
j=1
n∑
z=1
(δz +γz,i0 )R l ,z +ul = (2.48)
=α+
n∑
z=1
(δz +ϑz, j0 +ρz,i0 )R l ,z +ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.49)
where we have assumed that firm l belongs to sector i0 and region j0. If, in addition, firm l has rating z0,
the model will predict a credit spread:
pl =α+ (δz0 +ϑz0, j0 +ρz0,i0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.50)
having a first component that is common to all firms in the sample, a second component that is specific of
each level of rating, a third component that differs for each pair (rating, region) and a fourth component that is
different for each pair (rating, sector).
Two-level (rating, sector) model with adjustment by region
We now consider the possibility that we also lack data for some pairs (rating, region). Let us then assume
that the sector-specific component of βz changes with the region as in:
γz,i =ϑ j +ρz,i j = 1,2, ...,k
we would then have:
pl =α+
k∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
n∑
z=1
βi R l ,z Sl ,i Gl , j +ul =α+
k∑
j=1
n∑
z=1
(δz +γz,i0 )R l ,z +ul = (2.51)
=α+ϑ j0 +
n∑
z=1
(δz +ρz,i0 )R l ,z +ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.52)
where we have assumed that firm l belongs to sector i0 and region j0. If, in addition, firm l has rating z0,
the model will predict a credit spread:
pl =α+ϑ j0 + (δz0 +ρz0,i0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.53)
having a first component that is common to all firms in the sample, a second component that is specific of
each region (it is the same for all firms in a given region), a third component that is the same for all firms with
the same rating and a fourth component that is different for each pair (rating, sector). The estimate of ϑ j0 will
be an average of the residuals that would be obtained by explaining credit spread by using rating through the
δz0 term, and the cross (rating, sector) information through the ρz0,i0 term. If a constant was included in this
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latter model, the estimate of ϑ j0 might be positive or negative.
Two-level (rating, sector) model with adjustment by country
In some situations, the adjustment by region through the ϑ j0 term might be considered too broad. If we
have enough country data, we could make the adjustment by country. Assuming that the sector-specific com-
ponent of βz changes with the country as in:
γz,i =ϑw +ρz,i j = 1,2, ...,k
we would end up with an estimate for credit spread:
pl =α+ϑw0 + (δz0 +ρz0,i0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.54)
where we have assumed that firm l has rating z0, it belongs to sector i0 and to country w0.
The credit spread would then have a first component that is common to all firms in the sample, a second
component that is specific of each country, a third component that is specific of each level of rating, and a
fourth component that is different for each pair (rating, sector). The numerical estimate of ϑw0 would be the
mean residual obtained when explaining credit spreads by rating and by the combination (rating, sector). Two
more observations that we have in fact used in our estimations:
1. we could use a quantile regression approach with hierarchical models to estimate the mean effects of
rating, sector and geographical region, the median effects, or effects on other parts of the sample distri-
bution of CDS spreads,
2. hierarchical models could also be specified as an exponential function, resulting:
pl = exp(α+δz0 +ϑz0,i0 +ρz0,i0,, j0 )+ul , l = 1,2, ....L (2.55)
As an example, we show the region median differentials ϑ j0 calculated as the median for a region j of the
difference between the credit spread for an issuer l that belongs to region j and the risk premium estimated
with pl =α+ϑ j0+(δz0+ρz0,i0 )+ul ,l = 1,2, ...,L in Table 2.9. Finally, we present the country median differentials
ϑw0 calculated as the mean residual for a country w0 of the difference between the credit spread for an issuer l
that belongs to country w0 and the risk premium estimated with the mentioned equation in Table 2.10. Large
country differentials relative to other countries in the same region might be anticipating rating changes as in
the cases of Spain and Italy.
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Table 2.9: Region median differentials (basis points) in May 2012
Differentials (basis points) on 16 May 2012
Region Dif.1y Dif.3y Dif.5y Dif.10y
Asia -1 -5 -7 -10
E.Eur 48 47.5 56 51
Europe 17 23 20 11
Lat.America 9 17 9 12
Middle East 33 21 19 18
N.Amer -4 -5 -5 -4
Oceania 6,5 11 14 16.5
Offshore 5.5 5.5 -0.5 3.5
Differentials (basis points) on 28 May 2012
Region Dif.1y Dif.3y Dif.5y Dif.10y
Asia -3 -6 -8 -12
E.Eur 45 54.5 49 42
Europe 22.5 23 19 13.5
Lat.America 7 15.5 6 2.5
Middle East 30 23 17 16
N.Amer -4 -6 -7 -6
Oceania 10 11 21 26
Offshore -3 -9 -5 -2
Note: Region median differentials calculated as the median for a region k of the difference between the CDS price for an issuer l belongs
to region k and the premium risk estimated with equation (2.37).
Table 2.10: Country median differentials (basis points) in May 2012
Differentials (basis points) on 16 May 2012
Country Dif.1y Dif.3y Dif.5y Dif.10y
Australia 6.5 11 14 16.5
Bermuda 45 52 55 63
Canada -9 -12.5 -12 -14
Finland 4.5 11.5 11.5 2.5
France 36 60 60 55
Germany 10 12 11 3
Hong Kong 6.5 12 19.5 25.5
Italy 256.5 273.5 257 228.5
Japan -2.5 -5 -8.5 -18
Korea (Republic of) 6 -6 -1 0
Luxembourg -3 -4 26 39
Malaysia 6 -3 0 3
Netherlands 13 18 24 16
Russian Federation 16 36 46 49
Singapore -8 -26.5 -36.5 -50.5
Spain 204 236 226 215
Sweden 2.5 -1 -4 -13.5
Switzerland 4 -2 -8 -14
United Kingdom 2 -2 -9 -16
United States -4 -6 -5 -4
Differentials (basis points) on 28 May 2012
Country Dif.1y Dif.3y Dif.5y Dif.10y
Australia 10 11 21 26
Bermuda 43 52 53 56
Canada -8.5 -13.5 -15 -15
Finland 3.5 11 12 2.5
France 39 63 63 57
Germany 16 18 14 8
Hong Kong 11 16 24 28
Italy 271 282 256 219
Japan -4 -7.5 -8.5 -16.5
Korea (Republic of) 12 -4 0 0
Luxembourg -6 -5 26 35
Malaysia 11 -1 1 4
Netherlands 19.5 23 25 16
Russian Federation 35.5 54.5 53 44.5
Singapore -10.5 -29.5 -43.5 -61
Spain 224 258 241 234
Sweden 1 -2 -6 -16
Switzerland 4.5 -2.5 -7 -12
United Kingdom 1 -2 -6 -15
United States -4 -6.5 -8 -7
Note: Country median differentials calculated as the median for a country w of the difference between the CDS price for an issuer l that
belongs to country w and the risk premium estimated with equation (2.37).
2.4 Transversal data analysis
Are the results of presented models in the above section very different among them when applied to CDS mar-
kets?
In this section, we start to answer this key question presenting some ad hoc results given by the different
models that we introduced in the above section in order to better understand the possible differences due to
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the assumptions. We select the following dates: 30 January 2007, 30 January 2008, 30 January 2009, 29 January
2010, 31 January 2011, and 30 January 2012. Again, we use the 5-year CDS for senior unsecured debt, and we
select different subsamples because of the interest of these particular classes. Finally, we use the next statistical
models:
Lin_OLS = Linear ordinary least-squares regression.
Exp_OLS = Exponential ordinary least-squares regression.
Lin_MedReg = Linear median regression.
Exp_MedReg = Exponential median regression.
Med_3LHM = Median three-level hierarchical regression.
Av_3LHM = Mean three-level hierarchical regression.
In Table 2.11, we present the results for our first analysed subsample, AA North American financial sector. It
is interesting to observe that the number of issuers with rating AA in the North American financial sector has
been reduced from 44 to 18 because during the last crisis rating agencies began downgrading the ratings of
financial issuers, especially from 2009 onwards. In addition, we see that in relative terms there has been a
nearly 10-fold increase in these issuers compared to the initial spread levels in 2007, although the 2007 spread
levels were very low. On the other hand, analysing the results of the different statistical models, the Lin_OLS
estimates highlight that these results are not so similar to the rest of the models estimates, not even with the
main statistics of the sample. The rest of the models produced similar estimates; however, the Lin_MedReg
estimates are higher than the outcomes obtained by using an exponential model. This makes sense because
the exponential models typically have a smoother effect than the linear models. Med_3LHM estimates and
Av_3LHM estimates by definition are the same as the sample median and mean, respectively.
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In the next example, we analyse the A financial sector in Europe (Table 2.12) to look at the effect of the
financial crisis in Europe. The conclusions are similar to the previous ones with some nuances. First, we see
that the number of issuers is relatively stable through the sample. A possible explanation for this is that the
original 2007 A issuers were probably downgraded to BBB issuers, but at the same time some AAA and AA is-
suers were downgraded to A issuers, keeping the number of A issuers relatively stable over time. In terms of the
main statistics, we see the same trend as in the case described above. This means a 16-fold increase in the A
European financial spreads, from 13.2 to 215 basis points (b.p.) in terms of the median. Finally, we can appre-
ciate that the financial crisis in Europe was more prolonged than in the US. In terms of the models estimates,
we observe again that the Lin_OLS estimates are very inaccurate. On the other hand, Lin_MedReg, Exp_OLS
and Exp_MedReg estimates provide very similar outcomes among them. It can be seen that these results are far
from the original main statistics. The reason is that these models estimates use all of the available information
for the A rating, all the information for the financial sector and all of the information for the European issuers
(not just the information provided by the A European financial sector). Thus, if the analysed subsample is far
from the rest of the sample in terms of the spread, then the results are too inaccurate, as in this example.
In the next analysis, we present the results of the BBB telecommunication services in Europe to see how the
last crisis affected the corporate sector (Table 2.13). We observe that the number of issuers is relative stable over
time, and probably the number of telecoms downgrades is much lower than in the financial sector. Similarly,
we observe that the spread increased from 35.5 to 122.9 basis points, although in relative terms there was a
4-fold increase; therefore, the increase was much less than in the financial sector. It can even be observed that
the BBB telecommunication services spread in 2012 was lower than the A financial spread, verifying that the
crisis was mainly a financial crisis. In terms of the estimates, it can be observed that the Lin_OLS estimates are
again very inaccurate, and we see that the Lin_MedReg, and Exp_MedReg outcomes are very similar, possibly
describing the robustness of the median. However, Exp_OLS estimates are higher, as these results could be
conditioned by the presence of outliers. It is thus clear that the Exp_OLS model estimate higher values than
median regression models in this context. Finally, Med_3LHM estimates, and Av_3LHM estimates are the same
as the median and the mean, respectively.
In the last case, we select the BB Latin American government (Table 2.14) for several reasons. The first is
to select a sector with few observations in order to analyse the model performances under this circumstance.
The next reason is that we are interested in studying the government spread behaviour during the crisis, and
finally, due to the great increase in the GDP in the Latin American region. Our first observation is that in the
case of Latin America, the information is less in terms of the number of issuers compared to Europe, Asia or
North America and possibly with less data quality. First, we see that the number of issuers has decreased from
eight to five, reflecting that there were perhaps several rating upgrades in the region in contrast to Europe or
North America. In terms of the spread, we observe that the crisis has affected Latin America less than other
regions (2.6 times higher), the spread increasing to 214 b.p. from original 80. As we said before, due to the
rating upgrades, some BB issuers became BBB issuers; therefore, the factor of 2.6 could be even less if we use
a fixed sample. In terms of the analysed models, it is interesting to highlight that the OLS models and median
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regression models are too far from the main statistics of the sample. This means that when the sample has
few observations, these models do not fit so precisely. Furthermore, the spreads trend of this sample makes
adjusting of these models very difficult. We have selected a sectorial subsample of the BB rating issuers that
is an outlier among the all BB rating issuers, because of the particular economic conditions given in Latin
America during the crisis. The GDP increase in this region during 2006-2012 favoured a relatively stable level
of the credit spread in contrast to the rest of the regions.
To sum up, we could conclude that the different estimates depend on the used models. As they present
considerable differences, it will be interesting to examine the performance of these models though time in
order to extract conclusions about which could be the best approach in estimating credit curves.
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2.5 Testing credit econometric models
2.5.1 Introduction
What econometric model of credit spread had the best performance during the crisis? How big are these dif-
ferences? Are the differences among these models stable through the time? Does the rank order of the per-
formance of these models depend on the sample criteria? What sample criterion is the best? In this section, we
will answer these and other interesting questions by examining the behaviour of the credit spread econometric
models during the period 2006-2012 on a daily basis.4
This section is divided into several parts: First we show the used sample criteria for this study. Next we will
detail the used econometric models. Then we present the selected criteria for examining the models perform-
ance. Finally we show the results and conclusions.
2.5.2 Sample criteria
As we introduced in Subsection 1.8 in the first chapter, it is clear that the data quality influences the credit
spread estimates. Thus, the question that arises is whether or not the order of the performance credit econo-
metric model is conditioned by the used criteria sample. Furthermore, what would the most adequate sample
criteria be? To answer these questions, we employ three different criteria, trying to cover a wide spectrum of
possibilities.
1. The first criteria (“non-filter”) that we have selected is not to use any filter. This means that by using it we
employ all the available price information in the CDS market, independently of the data quality rating of
the CDS contract, or whatever other filter is used in that sense. Employing this criteria, the sample would
be composed by approximately 1,500 issuers with a 5-year CDS for senior unsecured debt.
2. The second criteria (“BB Markit Rating”) is based on the Markit data quality rating. As we introduced in
Subsection 1.8, Markit states that particular confidence can be placed in BBB or higher ratings. At the
same time, we are interested in getting the maximum available information in the credit market. Thus,
we allow that the data quality rating to be one grade below a BBB. Therefore, the second criteria uses all
the 5-year CDS contracts with a minimum data quality rating of BB on a daily basis. This means that the
study sample changes daily. Once the sample is defined, all the CDS prices are weighted equally. Using
this criteria, the sample would be composed by approximately 1,200 issuers with a 5-year CDS for senior
unsecured debt.
3. Finally, we use a third criteria (“fixed sample”) that is stricter than the previous ones. We propose the use
of a fixed sample with the most liquid issuers. As an alternative to the Markit data quality rating criteria,
we work with the number of pricing contributors to the 5-year CDS contract (CompositeDepth5y). For
4For this exercise we follow Faraway (2002) and Faraway (2005), and we use the next R packages Koenker (2012) and Genz and Bretz
(2014).
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Figure 2.9: Business day percentiles from 2006-2012 of the number of contributors of pricing to the 5-year CDS
contract for each issuer
Note: X-axis: Business day percentiles. Y-axis: Number of contributors of pricing to the 5-year CDS contract.
Z-axis: issuers. Therefore the P5% represents the number of contributors giving 5-year CDS prices for
each issuer in the business day that was exactly the one with 5% fewer contributors to the 5-year CDS
contracts for the period 2006-2012.
this reason, and after exploring several alternatives, we have opted for the following criteria. We select
all the issuers that have had at least three contributors to their 5-year CDS contract for the 95% of the
business days from 2006 to 2012. With this criteria, we use a fixed sample of 784 issuers. Figure 2.9 shows
the different percentiles of the number of pricing contributors to the 5-year CDS for each issuer during
the business days between 2006 and 2012. This means that, for example, P5% represents the number of
contributors giving 5-year CDS prices for each issuer in the business day, which was exactly the one with
5% fewer contributors to the 5-year contracts for the period 2006-2012. From this chart we can also see
evidence of the lack in liquidity of the CDS market due to the small number of contributors giving prices.
2.5.3 Analysed models
For this analysis we have used the statistical models presented in Subsection 2.4:
Lin_OLS = Linear ordinary least-squares regression.
Exp_OLS = Exponential ordinary least-squares regression.
Lin_MedReg = Linear median regression.
Exp_MedReg = Exponential median regression.
Med_3LHM = Median three-level hierarchical regression.
Av_3LHM = Mean three-level hierarchical regression.
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In addition, we have used other alternatives for the three-level hierarchical regression were CDS lacks of data
in any combination of rating, sector and region. These are the alternatives:
Rat_Med_1LHR = Median one-level hierarchical regression, using the rating as explanatory variable, applying
equation (2.30).
Rat_Av_1LHR = Mean one-level hierarchical regression, using the rating as explanatory variable, applying
equation (2.30).
RatSec_Med_2LHR = Median two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory vari-
ables applying equation (2.34).
RatSec_Av_2LHR = Mean Two-Level Hierarchical Regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory vari-
ables applying equation (2.34).
RatGeo_Med_2LHR = Median two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and region as explanatory
variables applying equation (2.37).
RatGeo_Av_2LHR = Mean two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and region as explanatory vari-
ables applying equation (2.37).
RatSec_Med_2LHR_Reg = Median two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory
variables firstly, and then adding a median % differential region factor to adjust the credit spread as in
equation (2.53).
RatSec_Av_2LHR_Reg = Mean two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory
variables firstly, and then adding a mean % differential region factor to adjust the credit spread as in
equation (2.53) .
RatSec_Med_2LHR_RegRat = Median two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explan-
atory variables firstly, and then adding a median % differential region-rating factor to adjust the credit
spread as in equation (2.50).
RatSec_Av_2LHR_RegRat = Mean two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory
variables firstly, and then adding a mean % differential region-rating factor to adjust the credit spread as
in equation (2.50).
RatSec_Med_2LHR_Cty = Median two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory
variables firstly, and then adding a median % differential country factor to adjust the credit spread as in
equation (2.54).
RatSec_Av_2LHR_Cty = Mean two-level hierarchical regression, using the rating and sector as explanatory
variables firstly, and then adding a mean % differential country factor to adjust the credit spread as in
equation (2.54).
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2.5.4 Criteria for the selection of the best approach
What criteria should we use in order to determine the best statistical model presented above? In this section,
we detail three criteria that should be taken into account in order to know what the best model is.
1. The first criteria, without any doubt, has to be a measure of how good the estimates fit in the original
dataset. Consequently, we employ the sum of the absolute errors for each day to analyse the performance
of the presented models in Subsection 2.5.3. We work with the sum of the absolute errors instead the sum
of the quadratic errors to avoid overweighting the possible outliers of the sample.
2. The second criteria is based on the volatility estimates. As we mentioned in the introduction, financial
institutions generally desire little volatility in the credit spread series for managing their risk. This means
that sometimes we can reduce the estimates accuracy if we reduce the volatility of these estimated series.
3. Finally, we look at the implementation and maintenance of these models on financial institutions. Fol-
lowing the results, we explain briefly if there is any significant difference in terms of time and costs for a
financial institution in using the different models to decide to use a particular model instead of another
one.
2.5.5 Applied methodology
After presenting the different filters used for the dataset (Subsection 2.5.2), the models used (Subsection 2.5.3)
and the criteria to examine the results (Subsection 2.5.4), we will then detail the applied methodology.
Firstly, for this study, we use the daily senior 5-year CDS contract with the standard currency and restruc-
turing clause for each issuer of the sample. We use this particular criterion because of its liquidity and repres-
entativeness. (For more detail see Subsection 2.5.4). The analysed period is from 2006 to 2012, as we think that
it is the most relevant period of time for the credit market.
Secondly, we estimate all the presented models to determine the sum of the absolute error. This means that
we calculate the absolute difference between the estimated risk premium and the real price, and then we add
all these errors of the issuers included in the sample. We suppose that the exposure of each issuer is the same
and equals to one unit.
Finally, we estimate the spread for each class grouped by rating, industry and region. Then we estimate
the volatility of each class included in the sample with a one year data window, and we average the different
estimated volatility for each class to get the estimated volatility of the model for each day. We highlight that to
estimate the volatility, we only use the classes (combinations of rating, sector, and region) that are presented in
the sample during everyday of the analysed period. This means that for example, if we do not have data on the
BB Oceania basic material sector for a particular day, such estimate spread series would not be included in the
sample of this study to average the volatility of the model. Therefore, we have a sample of 186 classes for the
“non-filter” sample, 120 classes for the BB Markit sample, and 107 for the “fixed sample”.
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2.5.6 Results
2.5.6.1 Rating-sector-region class spread estimates
Firstly, we show the estimates for the A financial sector in Europe, North America, and Asia using the different
models and using the “BB Markit sample” in Figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12, respectively. In this case, we observe
that some days, in the presence of high market volatility, the differences among the spread estimates by the
presented models are very considerable. Furthermore, the financial sector distribution is right-skewed by the
financial crisis, resulting in a big difference between the estimates based on the median and those based on the
mean. Finally, we present the BBB basic material in North America and Europe, using the BB Markit sample
in Figures 2.13 and 2.14. Again, we observe a significant difference depending on the models used. Especially,
significant is the difference in the analysed period of time between the model based on the median and that
based on the mean.
Figure 2.10: A European financial sector spread estimates using different models with BB Markit sample. 2006-
2012
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Figure 2.11: A North American financial sector spread estimates using different models with BB Markit sample.
2006-2012
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Figure 2.12: A Asian financial sector spread estimates using different models with BB Markit sample. 2006-2012
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Figure 2.13: BBB European basic materials sector spread estimates using different models with BB Markit
sample. 2006-2012
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Figure 2.14: BBB North American basic materials sector spread estimates using different models with BB Markit
sample. 2006-2012
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2.5.6.2 Daily models’ performance from 2006 to 2012
In this last section, we show the results of all the models presented in Subsection 2.5.3 in terms of the sum
of the absolute errors and the series volatility with the different sample criteria according to Subsection 2.5.2.
Given that the analysed period is so long, we decided to present the results distinguishing three periods of time.
Thus, we consider that a good division could be the next one: Pre-crisis period (2006-2007) , crisis period, (2008-
2010) and post-crisis period (2011-2012), although is very difficult to establish an exact line that separates the
different periods.
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Table 2.24: “BB Markit” sample results. 2006-2012
Models 2.5.3 Med_3LHM Exp_Av_3LHM Av_3LHM Exp_OLS Lin_OLS Exp_MedReg Lin_MedReg
Sum Abs. Errors 12.00 12.55 13.22 15.44 17.66 15.35 15.30
% Respect to Min. 100% 105% 110% 129% 147% 128% 127%
Average Vol. 115.6% 94.9% 104.0% 53.6% 687.0% 70.5% 136.6%
Models 2.5.3 RatSec_Med_2LHR RatSec_Av_2LHR RatGeo_Med_2LHR
Sum Abs. Errors 14.54 15.89 14.96
% Respect to Min. 121% 132% 125%
Average Vol. 93.6% 88.2% 74.6%
Models 2.5.3 RatGeo_Av_2LHR RatSec_Med_2LHR_Reg RatSec_Av_2LHR_Reg RatSec_Med_2LHR_RegRat
Sum Abs. Errors 16.40 14.32 15.65 13.62
% Respect to Min. 137% 119% 130% 114%
Average Vol. 72.7% 101.4% 97.0% 109.8%
Models 2.5.3 RatSec_Av_2LHR_RegRat RatSec_Med_2LHR_Cty RatSec_Av_2LHR_Cty
Sum Abs. Errors 16.24 13.51 15.41
% Respect to Min. 135% 113% 128%
Average Vol. 108.7% 97.1% 96.2%
2.5.6.3 Exponential mean three-level hierarchical regression
In this case, we show the results of using an exponential mean three-level hierarchical regression (Exp_Av_3LHM)
to analyse if we reduce the volatility of the spread estimate series. We present the outcomes from 2006 to 2012,
with the “BB Markit rating” criteria in Table 2.24. It can be observed that the exponential models generally
produce lower volatility of the estimates.
2.5.6.4 Average ten-day spread estimates vs daily spreads estimates
In Figure 2.15, we show the average 10-day spread estimates for the AA European financial sector versus the
daily AA European financial sector. It is clear that with this simple average we reduce the volatility of the estim-
ates, which is desirable for the risk management of financial institutions.
2.5.6.5 Different samples for sector spread estimates
In Figure 2.16, we present the results for AA European financial spread estimates from 2006 to 2012, applying
three different samples criteria. In general, as we also show in Subsection 2.5.6.2, the sample criteria is not
so decisive except for a few days, as we saw in the year 2012 where the fixed sample AA European financial
estimates had a different pattern compared to the other two samples (BB Markit rating and “Non-Filter”).
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Figure 2.15: Daily AA European financial sector estimate vs ten-day average AA Europe financial sector estimate
with BB Markit sample. 2006-2012
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Figure 2.16: AA European financial spread estimates with different samples criteria. 2006-2012
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
3,5%
Ja
n
-
06
Ap
r-
06
Ju
l-0
6
O
ct
-
06
Ja
n
-
07
Ap
r-
07
Ju
l-0
7
O
ct
-
07
Ja
n
-
08
Ap
r-
08
Ju
l-0
8
O
ct
-
08
Ja
n
-
09
Ap
r-
09
Ju
l-0
9
O
ct
-
09
Ja
n
-
10
Ap
r-
10
Ju
l-1
0
O
ct
-
10
Ja
n
-
11
Ap
r-
11
Ju
l-1
1
O
ct
-
11
Ja
n
-
12
Ap
r-
12
Ju
l-1
2
O
ct
-
12
BB Markit Rating
"Non-Filter"
"Fixed Sample"
92 CHAPTER 2. ECONOMETRICMODELS OF CREDIT SPREADS
Figure 2.17: AA European financial sector with BB Markit rating estimates under the best fit models. 2006-2012
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2.5.6.6 Different samples for sector spread estimates
In Figure 2.17, we present the graph to present the AA European financial estimates with the “BB Markit rating”
sample, using the median three-level hierarchical regression and two good alternatives in the cases where we
do not have data such as the RatSec_Med_2LHR_Reg (2.5.3) and the RatSec_Med_2LHR_RegRat (2.5.3).
2.5.6.7 Quantifying model risk
In this last section, we calculate daily the difference between the sum of the absolute errors using the Med_3LHM
(2.5.3) and the rest of the models divided by the sum of the absolute error of the Med_3LHM for the period 2006-
2012. In Tables 2.25, 2.26 and 2.27, we show the results of the percentiles of that distribution for each model
applying the criteria of the different samples. Either the 95th or the 99th percentile could be a good proxy of
the model risk when we are interested in pricing credit financial assets without a market risk premium.
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Table 2.28: Rating probability of default
Rating PD
AAA 0.01%
AA+ 0.02%
AA 0.03%
A+ 0.05%
A 0.08%
A- 0.1%
BBB+ 0.1367%
BBB 0.2019%
BBB- 0.3059%
BB+ 0.5111%
BB+ 1.00%
BB- 1.5001%
B+ 2.5493%
B 4.4117%
B- 7.8513%
CCC 21.2175%
D 100.00%
2.5.7 How to deal with the “inversion problem”
As we presented in Subsection 1.4 in the first chapter, it is usual that the median spread of a particular rating
class has a normal value compared to the rest of the ratings, meaning that higher quality ratings have lower
spreads. However, under market stress conditions, we observe that in some cases this does not happen. These
market stress conditions lead to higher quality ratings having wider spreads. Thus, how should we manage this
problem in assigning a price for a new credit asset in our portfolio? We propose the following method:
In case the next order relation is not true for the market spread values: A A A < A A < A < BBB < BB < B 5,
we correct the spread value in the market using the below expression (we assume the first initial “true” spread
is the rating spread with the most market observations, and depending on the sector, this rating will typically
be the A or the BBB rating).
A log-linear relationship between the CDS spread and the probability of default is assumed .
Ln(C DSr ati ng 2)= pLn(C DSr ati ng 1)+ (1−p)Ln(C DSr ati ng 3)
PDr ati ng 2 = pPDr ati ng 2+ (1−p)PDr ati ng 3 ,r ati ng 3< r ati ng 2< r ati ng 1
(2.56)
Considering Table 2.28 for assigning a probability of default to the different ratings, we achieve the follow-
ing outcomes for assigning the corrected spread values in Table 2.29. Of course, it is worth noting that these
corrections can also be applied to a particular rating-sector class, or a specific rating-sector-region class.
5We normally exclude the CCC rating because we have very few observations, although we estimate the CCC value by extrapolation.
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Table 2.29: Inverse spread proposed correction
Case Correction
A A A > A A ln(A A A)= (3/2) · (ln(A A)− l n(A)/3)
A A > A l n(A A)= (1/0.71) · (ln(A)−0.29 · ln(BBB))
A >BBB ln(A)= (1/0.85) · (ln(BBB)−0.15 · ln(BB))
BBB >BB ln(BB)= 0.16 · ln(B)+0.84 · ln(BBB)
BB >B ln(B)= (1/0.16) · (l n(BB)−0.84 · ln(BBB))
2.6 Conclusions and open questions
In this second chapter, we have presented different econometric models to estimate sector credit curves. After
an exhaustive analysis of the different model results, our main conclusions are the following:
It is thus clear that the model that best fits is Med_3LHM (2.5.3) in terms of the sum of absolute errors,
followed by Av_3LHM (2.5.3). The hierarchical regression models generally fit much better than the non-
hierarchical regression. In addition, the rank order of these models is not altered by the analysed period of
time. This means that these models rank almost in the same order independently of the analysed time window.
However, it is obvious that during the denominated “crisis” period, these errors are much higher than in the rest
of the periods. In case of not being able to adjust a three-level hierarchical regression, given the lack of data,
we find that RatSec_Med_2LHR_Reg (2.5.3), RatSec_Med_2LHR_RegRat (2.5.3), and RatSec_Med_2LHR_Cty
(2.5.3) are good proxy alternatives [for an example, see Subsection 2.5.6.6]. It can also be observed that, as
we expected, based on the economic theory, the RatSec_Med_2LHR (2.5.3) produces a better fit than the Rat-
Geo_Med_2LHR (2.5.3), indicating that the sector is more relevant than the region as an explanatory risk vari-
able in the corporate world. Analysing the results of the non-hierarchical models, we prefer Exp_OLS (2.5.3)
because this model produces an outcome similar to Lin_MedReg (2.5.3) and Exp_MedReg, but with lower volat-
ility. Undoubtedly, the worst model is Lin_OLS (2.5.3). Furthermore, in general, we prefer the median estimate
to the mean estimate due to its robustness when assigning the price of an new credit asset without a credit
spread, minimizing the “inversion problem” presented in Subsection 1.4 in the first chapter. Finally, the other
fundamental reason for using the median is the right-skewed distribution of the CDS spread, also presented in
Subsection 1.4.
It is worth mentioning that the estimation error as the difference between the sum of the absolute errors
using Med_3LHM (2.5.3) and the rest of the models divided by the sum of the absolute error of Med_3LHM is
much higher when we use the 95th or the 99th percentile instead of the average error for 2006-2012. This means
that the pricing error of a portfolio could be very high during some specific days. However, the model rank is
the same as in Subsection 2.5.6.2 (Daily Models Performance from 2006 to 2012), meaning that there are no
order changes among the models when we use the error maximum instead of the average error of a particular
mode, and also with independence of the sample criteria.
In terms of volatility, we have observed that the exponential models smooth the changes due to the rating,
sector or regional factors, by estimating a less volatile series spread than the linear models. It is important to
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note that with respect to the sample criteria and related to series volatility, we observe that the estimates series
are less volatile when we use the “non-filter” criteria. Our explanation for this is that the lowest quality rating
data are less volatile than the rest of the data. This could be because the lower quality rating data always has
the same value due to their illiquidity; therefore, if we include those data in the sample, we reduce the overall
series volatility. In addition to this, related to the series volatility issue, we observe that if we use a 10-day
period instead of just the data of the previous day to estimate credit curves, we avoid market noise. This is thus
a much more adequate method of pricing credit financial assets in the banking book, such as loans or financial
guarantees, as we use the credit market trend reducing the valuation volatility (see Subsection 2.5.6.4).
Regarding the sample criteria, we observe that all the results are rescaled in terms of the sum of the abso-
lute errors and series volatility. This means that all of the econometric models presented in this chapter show
the same trend independently of the selected sample. It is relevant because the selected sample criteria do not
introduce additional model risk and because these criteria do not affect the model ranking. However, under
some circumstances, the estimates series could be conditioned by the selected criteria as we showed in Sub-
section 2.5.6.5. We propose, therefore, the “BB Markit rating” as the best criteria because it allows us to use the
quantitative and qualitative quality factor of the data, and at the same time, all the “good” price information
available daily in the market, such as the sample changes to estimate credit curves.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that, from an implementation point of view, all the presented mod-
els in this chapter should have a similar level of difficulty; and therefore, the different models have a similar
implementation cost.
However, there are still some open questions to answer, as for example: What is the minimum number
of observations for estimating a three-level hierarchical model instead of a two-level hierarchical model as
RatSec_Med_2LHR_Reg (2.5.3), RatSec_Med_2LHR_RegRat (2.5.3)? On the other hand, what financial variables
could anticipate possible fluctuations in the risk premium? Which sectors are the most volatile? How related
are the different sectors? These last questions and other pertinent ones will be answered in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Sectorial Asset Allocation
3.1 Introduction
Systemic risk can be defined as the possibility that the financial system as a whole might become unstable, as
opposed to the failure of a single institution. The default of an individual entity could translate into a systemic
risk crisis because its contractual and economic relationships with other economic agents might extend the
shock to the rest of the economy, with dramatic effects in terms of GDP and unemployment. A firm with a
large idiosyncratic component of risk could default with a minor impact on its sector, while the contrary will
happen for a firm which is systemic in its sector. It is therefore important to estimate the relevance of each firm
in a given sector, as well as the relevance of each sector in the global economy, which are the two goals of this
paper. When applied to the financial sector, this is an especially relevant analysis that might help to identify
the systemic financial institutions. The most widely used measures of systemic risk use information on CDS
spreads, which are forward-looking and reflect the market perception of the credit risk of the issuer. Hence, we
are interested in characterizing how the CDS spreads in different sectors relate to each other, as well as in how
the CDS spreads of different firms operating in a given sector correlate among them.
We start by analysing the commonality of credit risk across all different sectors, regions and entities. That
will provide us with a global risk factor that captures elements common to all sectors. The sensitivity of each
sector to the global risk factor will inform us of how systemic each credit sector is and in which sectors risk has
a more specific nature. We also want to characterize the determinants of the global risk factor, analysing which
financial indicators contain more information on credit risk globally, as well as at the sectorial level. That will
suggest to us how to estimate a factor model for credit risk. Such analysis should enable us to characterize the
nature of correlated defaults, an essential input when trying to hedge or to pre-empt a future financial crisis.
Coming down to the level of the firm, we will use the information provided by these indicators to decompose
the credit risk of each firm into a systemic component, a sectorial component and an idiosyncratic component.
The key lesson learned from this crisis is that financial institutions need to have a comprehensive risk ap-
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petite framework in place that helps them better understand and manage their risks by translating risk met-
rics and methods into strategic decisions, reporting, and day-to-day business decisions [FBS (2013) and EBA
(2014)]. Our analysis provides an element for such risk appetite framework. By providing an estimate of the
global risk factor, analysing its determinants and using that factor to evaluate the systemic and the idiosyn-
cratic components of risk, we describe an empirical framework that can be used by financial institutions to
manage their risk. Indeed, the numerical estimates of risk components we propose for individual firms can
easily be used by financial institutions to maintain their risk limits when taking their asset allocation decisions.
It should also be a central input in the design of appropriate hedging strategies. Furthermore, by evaluating
the firms and sectors with the most potential to produce systemic risk problems, our analysis should also be
considered to be crucial for supervisors and regulators.
Even though we restrict our analysis to CDS issuers, further research should relate our estimated risk com-
ponents to firms’ characteristics such as size of assets and liabilities, profit and loss results, equity and bond
prices, and market share. That would allow us to extend the risk evaluation results obtained for CDS issuers to
any other firm.
The first part of our sample period includes the recent financial crisis, with intense monetary interventions
taking place in the second part of the sample. Strong credit expansion at the beginning of the sample period
was followed by acute stress in the global credit markets. Our analysis will allow us to address the following
specific issues: What were the most systemic sectors during the 2006-2012 period? Which sectors allow for
a more diversified credit portfolio? What are the most influential financial variables explaining credit spread
movements? What is the decomposition of CDS spreads among systemic risk, sector risk and idiosyncratic
risk? Can the use of credit indices provide an acceptable hedge for a diversified CDS portfolio? Is there a strong
geographical factor in the intra-sector analysis of the different corporate sectors?
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we review the most relevant literature on this topic. In
Section 3.3 we comment on some characteristics of the Markit database, the standard source for CDS market
data. In Section 3.4 we analyse the commonality of credit risk across sectors and we estimate a global risk
factor, characterizing some of its determinants in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we use the global risk factor to
estimate systemic and idiosyncratic components of sectorial credit indices. In Section 3.7 we estimate the
sensitivity of sectorial credit indices to financial indicators, in an attempt to advance factor models for sectorial
risk. In Section 3.8 we decompose credit risk at the level of the firm among systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic
components. In Section 3.9 we address some issues justifying our strategy for the decomposition of credit risk.
Finally, we conclude with a summary of the main findings.
3.2 Literature review
Given the importance of the topic for researchers and for market regulators after the financial crisis, the recent
literature on measuring systemic risk has been quite extensive. We briefly review in this section the papers we
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consider most relevant for our work.
Using CDX and iTraxx Index data for the period 2005-2007, Bhansali et al. (2008) used a simple linearised
version of a three-jump model of Longstaff and Rajan (2008), calibrated to the traded spreads of tranches and
indices, to find that the credit loss distribution embedded in index tranche prices includes a component for the
risk of idiosyncratic or firm-specific defaults, a component for the risk of broader sector-wide or industry-wide
defaults, and a component for the risk of a massive economy-wide default scenario. They conclude that the
nature of systemic credit risk increased dramatically over their sample period, having started as just a small
percentage of total credit risk during the auto-downgrade credit crisis of May 2005. At a fundamental differ-
ence from previous credit crises, the systemic component of credit risk acquired an importance similar to the
idiosyncratic component of credit spreads.
Using a sample of 150 European firms from January 2003 to July 2007, Berndt and Obreja (2010) showed that
the first principal component of CDS returns explained less than 30% of the variation in weekly CDS returns,
although such a fraction surged to 50% during the crisis from August 2007 to December 2008. The shift in
the correlation structure of European equity returns was more modest when compared to CDS returns, their
first principal component explaining about 33% of the total variation prior to August 2007, and 44% during the
crisis. Using daily data from fifteen financial institutions from Europe and the US from January 2004 to June
2010, Giglio (2010) showed that the upturn in bond yields and CDS spreads of financial institutions during the
crisis reflected increases in idiosyncratic default risk rather than systemic risk. This was the case for the months
before the Bear Stearns episode in March 15, 2008, and also after Lehman’s default. Chen and Härdle (2012)
studied the 5-year and 10-year credit indices for investment grade and high-yield ratings between October 2004
and June 2011, to find that the market prices of risk factors estimated by the GMM method suggest that a four-
factor model could provide a good fit when explaining changes in CDS indices. They also found that the first
principal component for CDS indices explained 58.7% of the variance in the pre-crisis period, increasing up to
72.3% of the variance in the crisis period, but only 47% in the post-crisis period.
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) analysed two groups of systemic risk measures when searching for the
best systemic indicator over the January 2004-November 2009 sample period. A first group contained indicat-
ors related to the overall tension in the market, while a second group was made up by indicators related to the
contributions of individual institutions to systemic risk. In a sample of twenty European banks and thirteen US
banks they found that the first principal component of CDS spreads performed better than measures of market
stress. Hammoudeh et al. (2013) examined the behaviour of the US 5-year sector CDS spread indices for bank-
ing, the financial services and the insurance sector over the period January 2004 to March 2009. The Insurance
Sector Index had the largest long run adjustment of the three sectorial CDS indices. In the short run, the three
CDS indices display significant and positive bidirectional relationships, implying that they feed on each other
after changes in credit conditions. Finally, Puzanova and Düllmann (2013) present an approach for measuring
systemic risk and decomposing it into the contributions of individual institutions. To assess the system-wide
loss they modelled a banking sector as a portfolio comprising banks’ net of capital liabilities, using a widely
used credit risk model to assess the tail risk of such portfolio. The model inputs were the banks’ individual
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probabilities of default, the size of their net of capital liabilities and the banks’ sensitivity to systemic factors,
which capture correlations between banks’ asset returns.
This literature deals with some of the specific questions that we proposed in the introduction. For instance,
Berndt and Obreja (2010) and Chen and Härdle (2012) try to characterize the most influential financial variables
that explain credit spread movements by analysing the impact of some financial variables on individual CDS
spreads or CDS indices, respectively. Our objective is somewhat different, as we use a large set of different
financial variables in a more recent period of time to explain the corporate sector CDS indices according to the
Industry Classification Benchmark. Bhansali et al. (2008) carried out a decomposition of CDS spreads among
systemic risk, sector risk and idiosyncratic risk as we attempt to do in this paper, although their methodological
approach is quite different: we use the principal component analysis instead of a three-jump model, with
a different dataset to extract our conclusions. We are not aware that the rest of the questions raised in the
introduction have been examined in detail before by other authors.
In addition to this review of recent literature, we also summarize in Section 3.5 the results of recent studies
that have examined the determinants of CDS spreads.
3.3 Markit database
The database that we have used for this essay is provided by Markit, the main supplier of CDS prices [Markit
(2008) and Markit (2012)]. The various fields that we have selected are ticker, tier, spread, sector and region.
The ticker gives information on the key name of the issuer. Tier contains the type of debt that is to be delivered
in the event of a default. This might be SEDCOM Secured Debt (Corporate/Financial), SNRFOR Senior Un-
secured Debt (Corporate/Financial), SOVEREIGN Debt (Government), SUBLT2 Subordinated or Lower Tier 2
Debt (Banks), JRSUBUT2 Junior Subordinated or Upper Tier 2 Debt (Banks), and PREFT1 Preference Shares, or
Tier 1 Capital (Banks).
Markit provides us with the information on the different CDS spreads with different tenors: 6M, 1Y, 2Y, 3Y,
4Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 15Y, 20Y, and 30Y. The most liquid CDS is the 5-year contract. All these prices are composite,
that is, for a given restructuring event, issuer and currency, they are the average of prices provided by different
financial institutions. Sector is based on the ICB classification, (Industry Classification Benchmark), which
distinguishes four levels: Industry, supra-sector, sector, and subsector. We work with Markit industry level,
which considers eleven industries: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, energy, financials,
health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication services, utilities, and government.1 Finally, Markit
considers thirteen different regions: Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Europe, India, Latin America,
Middle East, North America, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supranational.
We select the set of 5-year CDS trading as senior unsecured debt, SNRFOR, with 1825 daily observations
on approximately 2500 issuers from the eleven mentioned industries and the thirteen geographical areas, with
1Government is another category considered by Markit but not included in the Industry Classification Benchmark.
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the disaggregation shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in the first chapter. These figures display the distribution of
CDS by ratings, sectors, and regions for a particular day, 31 January 2012. It can be seen that most of the issuers
have ratings “BBB” or “A”. The better represented sectors are financials, consumer services and industrials,
while the main regions are North America, Europe, and Asia. Although we show the CDS distribution by rating,
sector, and region for a particular day, these distributions are relatively stable through time. We consider the
eleven sectors and thirteen geographical regions defined above. After that, we construct CDS indices for each
sector by taking the median CDS spread traded each day in that sector across all regions. Then, we construct
weekly sectorial data by taking the average of the daily observations over each week. Finally, weekly returns are
obtained as logarithmic returns of weekly CDS spreads, obtaining a total of 365 weekly observations over the
2006-2012 period.
3.4 Inter-sector risk analysis
The first part of our analysis evaluates the systemic nature of risk at the level of global sector indices. We do
so by searching for a global risk factor using the set of CDS trading in the different sectors in all regions, and
estimating the degree of dependence of each sector on that global factor.
Figure 3.1: Sectorial CDS spreads
Note: Sectorial CDS indices. Weekly data
BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government,
HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
The origin of the financial crisis may be placed on August 9, 2007, with BNP Paribas announcing that it
was ceasing activity in three hedge funds that specialized in US mortgage debt. The announcement acted as a
signal that there were tens of trillions of US dollar worth of derivatives which were worth much less than pre-
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viously estimated. Since nobody knew the exposure of individual banks to these toxic assets, trust evaporated
overnight and banks stopped doing business with each other. The perception of risk spread over all sectors,
which explains the simultaneous increase shown in Figure 3.1 in CDS spreads in all sectors after July 2007.
They reached a local maximum on March 2008 and decreased for a while to start an even sharper increase in
the summer of 2008 that would take them to maximum values during the first quarter of 2009. Spreads rapidly
decreased after that, although they did not go back to the low levels prior to the 2007 crisis.
The rise in financial CDS spreads towards the end of 2010 is also clearly visible in the graph. CDS spreads are
clearly non-stationary over the whole sample, while their weekly changes are stationary, as it can be confirmed
from the application of Dickey-Fuller tests. There is a clear difference in the mean between the pre-2008 and
the post-2009 periods, with an intermediate period of turmoil in 2008-2009. CDS returns experience different
fluctuations across sectors. The higher volatility is achieved by spreads from the financials, telecommunication
services and the government sectors [see Table 3.1].2 Interestingly enough, all sectors display right skewness,
while kurtosis is particularly high in the financials, health care and government sectors. As a consequence, the
assumption of normality is clearly rejected as the distribution of CDS spreads in all sectors.
Table 3.1: Sectorial returns. Main statistics
Returns BM CG CS EN FIN GOV HC IND TEC TEL UTI
Maximum 0.196 0.185 0.178 0.240 0.298 0.342 0.228 0.185 0.164 0.203 0.195
Minimum -0.142 -0.162 -0.150 -0.180 -0.164 -0.218 -0.206 -0.151 -0.113 -0.192 -0.110
Range 0.338 0.347 0.329 0.420 0.462 0.559 0.434 0.336 0.277 0.395 0.305
Standard Deviation 0.047 0.044 0.044 0.046 0.053 0.060 0.043 0.046 0.044 0.058 0.039
Volatility 33.7% 31.7% 31.5% 33.5% 38.1% 43.6% 31.2% 33.3% 31.9% 42.0% 28.3%
Skewness 0.636 0.593 0.353 0.790 1.422 1.118 0.600 0.669 0.218 0.596 1.211
Excess kurtosis 1.596 2.543 1.392 3.455 6.318 5.240 6.079 2.162 0.594 1.449 4.533
Beta-Jarque Statistic 63.2 119.4 37.0 218.8 728.2 492.3 582.4 98.1 8.2 53.4 400.6
Note: Returns main statistics for each sector. BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials,
GOV = Government, HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
2Volatility might seem lower than it is usually associated to credit returns. That is because we deal with log-returns on indices that have
been constructed as the weekly average of the median of daily traded CDS spreads.
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Table 3.2: Sectorial correlation matrix
Sector BM CG CS EN FIN GOV HC IND TEC TEL UTI
BM 100% 76% 69% 70% 69% 64% 50% 78% 57% 64% 66%
CG 76% 100% 74% 72% 78% 68% 52% 82% 58% 69% 73%
CS 69% 74% 100% 68% 66% 59% 47% 74% 48% 69% 65%
EN 70% 72% 68% 100% 76% 65% 50% 73% 54% 67% 74%
FIN 69% 78% 66% 76% 100% 75% 52% 78% 55% 68% 77%
GOV 64% 68% 59% 65% 75% 100% 40% 69% 49% 58% 68%
HC 50% 52% 47% 50% 52% 40% 100% 54% 38% 46% 51%
IND 78% 82% 74% 73% 78% 69% 54% 100% 56% 69% 73%
TEC 57% 58% 48% 54% 55% 49% 38% 56% 100% 53% 51%
TEL 64% 69% 69% 67% 68% 58% 46% 69% 53% 100% 68%
UTI 66% 73% 65% 74% 77% 68% 51% 73% 51% 68% 100%
Median 69% 73% 68% 70% 75% 65% 50% 73% 54% 68% 68%
Note: Pairwise correlation matrix between sectorial index returns. BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services,
EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government, HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology,
TEL = Telecommunication services, UTI = Utilities, and MCS = Median intra correlation for each sector.
Table 3.2 displays linear correlation coefficients among weekly changes in CDS spreads, showing significant
correlations across all sectors. Median correlations for each sector are around 0.70, except for health care and
technology [the last row in the table]. These are the sectors with lower correlations with the rest of the sectors,
with a median correlation around 0.50 and hence, they should be expected to be the less systemic sectors. The
high overall correlations reflect the existence of at least a common factor, while the existence of specific factors
explaining fluctuations in CDS prices in health care and technology sectors may explain the lower association
between these two sectors and all the others. To explain CDS spreads in these sectors, more than one risk factor
may be needed.
We characterize common risk factors among CDS spreads from the different sectors using the principal
component methodology.3 The first principal component, by itself, explains 68% of the fluctuations in the
set of eleven sectorial indices, indicating that there is strong commonality among the sectors. This is a higher
percentage than the one estimated by Berndt and Obreja (2010) for European firms during the 2003 to 2008
period, but it is very close to the average explanatory power estimated by Chen and Härdle (2012) for the pre-
(58.7%) and post-crisis periods (72.3%).
Since the first principal component explains more than two thirds of the fluctuations in the whole set of
CDS issues from all sectors and geographical areas, it can naturally be interpreted as representing a global risk
factor. On the other hand, there seems to be enough specific fluctuation in some sectors that we would need a
relatively large number of components to explain a percentage of variance of the order of 90% or 95%.4
3We apply this methodology to the covariance matrix of weekly returns on CDS. Characterizing principal components to the correlation
matrix of CDS returns would produce somewhat different results. As is well known, using the covariance matrix will tend to suggest a more
relevant role to those sectors with higher volatility.
4Cumulative percentage of total variance explained by the principal components is 67.9% for the first one, 74.3% for the first two, 79.3%
for the first three principal components, and 83.9% for the first four.
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An examination of the principal component loadings shows that the first principal component is, approx-
imately, an average of CDS returns over all the sectors, although with a slightly weaker presence of the health
care and technology sectors. These two sectors dominate the third and fourth principal components, respect-
ively, while the second component is dominated by the government and telecommunication services sectors.
Hence, those sectors with a lower representation in the first principal component, health care and technology,
can be unquestionably associated with two other principal components. It is interesting to note that the gov-
ernment sector seems to have a strong specific behaviour that explains its association with the second principal
component in spite of having a loading in the first component in line with that of the other sectors. Principal
components after the first four are much harder to interpret.
These four principal components we have just described, taken together, contain high explanatory power
for most sectors, as shown in Table 3.3, which displays R-squared statistics from regressions s on an increasing
number of the first six principal components. However, specific additional factors seem to still be needed to ex-
plain the fluctuations in CDS spreads from utilities and energy. As expected, adding the second component to
the regression increases the fit for the government sector, while adding the third one produces a large improve-
ment in the fit of the health care sector and adding the fourth component increases the fit of the technology
sector.
Table 3.3: R-squared coefficients in regressions as principal components are added as explanatory variables
PC1 PC12 PC123 PC1234 PC12345 PC123456
BM 71.2% 71.7% 72.2% 73.7% 84.4% 85.9%
CG 79.0% 79.1% 79.2% 79.3% 82.6% 82.6%
CS 66.5% 69.2% 69.9% 71.4% 79.1% 81.5%
EN 72.8% 72.9% 72.9% 73.1% 73.1% 85.1%
FIN 80.0% 82.0% 82.3% 82.8% 83.3% 89.3%
GOV 67.8% 94.5% 94.6% 94.6% 96.1% 99.4%
HC 37.3% 46.1% 87.4% 89.3% 97.0% 99.8%
IND 79.9% 80.0% 80.5% 80.5% 84.7% 84.7%
TEC 44.9% 46.4% 46.4% 96.1% 98.8% 98.8%
TEL 68.7% 78.4% 91.9% 93.6% 98.3% 99.2%
UTI 71.3% 71.4% 71.4% 72.6% 73.0% 77.2%
Note: The first column shows R-squared of a regression on the first principal component as the single regressor (other than
a constant). The second column shows the R-squared from a regression on the first two principal components, and so on.
BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government,
HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
But how did the crisis affect the different sectors? In so far as the effects were felt over the whole eco-
nomy, we should expect to see the common factors increasing their relevance in that period of time, dominat-
ing sector-specific risk elements. To check that hypothesis, we follow Eichengreen et al. (2012) to use annual
windows to estimate the percentage of total variance in the set of CDS returns for the eleven sectors which is
explained by the first principal component. Estimates start the first week of January 2007, running to the end
of December 2012, each estimation in Figure 3.2 being obtained with the sample made up by the 52 previous
weekly data.5
5Note that the trend of this figure is very similar to Figure 5.7 in the last chapter.
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative information content in the first four principal components of sectorial returns.
Note: Weekly data: January 2007-December 2012. The figure shows the percent variance
of the set of sectorial credit returns that is explained by the first k principal components
of sectorial credit indices, k=1,2,3,4.
At the beginning of 2007, the first common factor explained almost 40% of the total variation in sectorial
CDS indices, with the first four factors explaining 75% of total variance. The explanatory power of the first prin-
cipal component jumps from 32% in July 13, 2007, to 62% in August 20, 2007 at the outbreak of the subprime
crisis after the failure of three hedge funds at BNP Paribas. The increase in explanatory power did not stop
there: the Bear Sterns rescue on March 2008 produced a sharp increase in the perception of risk across the
economy, as reflected in CDS spreads for all sectors of activity. Consequently, the explanatory power of the first
common factor continued on a gradual increasing trend to a local maximum of 77% on the week of May 9, 2008,
well before Lehman’s failure. The continuous increase in the commonality of risk from May 2008 could have
been taking as an indication of potential future problems well in advance of the Lehman crisis. These results
are comparable to those obtained by Berndt and Obreja (2010) and Chen and Härdle (2012), among others.
A sharp decrease was again observed from March 2011. On March 11, the EU decided to allow the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to buy debt in primary markets up to a 440 billion euros ceiling. It also re-
solved to cut the rates and extend the maturities of the emergency loans to Greece. On the 21th, the EU sum-
mit agreed on a permanent bailout mechanism for the region to lend up to 50 billion euros starting on May
2013.The commonality in sectorial CDS indices declined from their peaks but remained at the post-Bear Ste-
arns elevated levels, indicating that risk was widespread across the sectors. The explanatory power of the first
common factor fell drastically to 43% on August 5, 2011. The bail out of Portugal on May 5 and the rating cut for
Greece on June 13 did not have a visible effect on the explanatory power of the common factors. On the other
hand, the downgrade of US debt on August 5, the deterioration of the economic situation in the US, the alarm
on a potentially catastrophic credit crisis in Europe and the downgrade of sovereign debt in southern European
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countries explain the increase in the commonality of risk observed in the second part of the year to levels of
75% by the end of 2011. From that point on, the explanatory power gradually decreased to levels of 60% at the
end of our sample one year later.
3.5 Factors underlying the global risk factor in CDS spreads
Motivated in part by the financial crisis, the study of the possible determinants of CDS spreads has been very
popular over recent years, and many papers have been devoted to this issue from different perspectives.
Ericsson et al. (2009) used CDS data on senior debt for 1999-2002 to confirm the relevance of some theoret-
ical determinants of default risk, such as the firms’ leverage, market volatility, the level of the risk-free interest
rate, and the actual market premium. They found that these variables explained approximately 60% of the
variation in the levels of CDS premia, with an R-squared for changes in default swap premia of approximately
23%. Using transactions data from 2002-2009 covering 861 North American corporates, Tang and Yan (2013)
found that CDS spreads were mostly driven by fundamental variables such as firms’ volatility and leverage,
market conditions as the VIX Index, the swap rate, the term structure slope, stock prices and CDS liquidity,
as indicated by the bid-ask spread, and investor risk aversion, with excess demand for CDS contracts playing
a secondary role. Even if the level of default risk stays the same, CDS spreads may increase when investors
become more pessimistic and more risk averse. Indeed, a 1% increase in the VIX Index, the so-called “fear
factor” often used to measure market sentiment or average investor risk aversion, is associated with about a
1% increase in CDS spreads. With R-squared estimates around 30%, changes in volatility for the firms’ stock
seem to be one of the main determinants of the level of CDS spreads, with a one standard deviation increase in
stock volatility leading to a 12.5% increase in CDS spreads. This result is consistent with those of Campbell and
Taksler (2003), Ericsson et al. (2009), and Zhang et al. (2009).
Pires et al. (2013) use a quantile regression approach to analyse the explanatory power in variables such as
implied volatility, the put skew, historical stock returns, leverage, profitability, and ratings. These authors find
that illiquidity costs, measured by absolute bid-ask spreads are an important determinant of CDS spreads, with
spreads for high-risk firms being more sensitive to these factors than those from low-risk firms. They also find
that the explanatory power of the set of factors increases with CDS premiums, in consistency with the credit
spread puzzle. Finally, Hull et al. (2004) analysed a large panel of US and European corporate issuers to find
that there is an anticipation of rating announcements by the credit default swap market.
Our approach is somewhat different, since we work in this section with aggregate CDS spreads at the level
of sectors. The reason for that aggregation is to eliminate some of the noise that appears in individual firm
data. This way, we lose information on individual CDS, which precludes from examining interesting issues like
the relationship between CDS spreads and equity prices [see Blanco et al. (2005)] or the relevance of a firm’s
fundamentals and accounting data to explain variations in CDS spreads. To cover our goal of estimating the re-
lative size of the systemic and idiosyncratic components of CDS risk, we have already advanced how the global
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risk factor, estimated in the previous section as the first principal component for the set of eleven sectorial in-
dices, is clearly an element of systemic risk in CDS spreads that captures the main aspects of fluctuations in
CDS spreads across sectors. We now want to explore what underlies the behaviour of this global risk factor by
looking at its correlations with financial indicators, which might suggest possibilities of anticipating changes
in CDS spreads.
To derive a fundamental interpretation of the estimated global risk factor, we use a list of financial factors
from Bloomberg.6 These are 1) 3-month EURIBOR interest rate (EUR3m), 2) 3-month EONIA Index, 3) EUR
liquidity premium, measured by the absolute difference between 3-month EURIBOR and 3-month EONIA,
both in euros (Liq_EUR), 4) 1-year EUR Swap Rate (EUR1y), 5) 5-year EUR Swap Rate (EUR5y), 6) 10-year
EUR Swap Rate (EUR10y), 7) 3-month/ 5-year ATM EUR Swaption (3m5yEUSwap), 8) VSTOXX Index (EUR)
(VSTOXX) 9) 5-year German Government Yield (GDBR5), 10) 3-month USD LIBOR Interest Rate (Lib3m), 11)
3-month USD Overnight Index (3-month USD ONIA), 12) USD liquidity premium, measured by the absolute
difference between 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month USD Overnight Index (Liq_USD), 13) 1-year USD Swap
Rate (USD1y), 14) 5-year USD Swap Rate (USD5y), 15) 10-year USD Swap Rate, 16) 3-month/5-year ATM USD
Swaption (3m5yUSwap), 17) VIX Index (USD) (VIX), 18) 5-year US Treasury Rate (UST5), 19) EUR/USD FX
Spot Rate (EUR/USD), 20) EUR/USD 3-month ATM option (FXImVol), 21) Markit iTraxx Europe Index (iTraxx),
22) Markit iTraxx Europe HiVol Index (HiVoliTraxx), 23) Markit CDX North American Investment Grade Index
(CDX), 24) Markit CDX North American Investment Grade Index High Yield (CDXHY), 25) 3-month ATM iTraxx
Europe Index Option (iTraxxImVol), 26) 3-month ATM CDX North American Investment Grade Index Option
(CDXImVol), 27) iTraxx Japan IG (iTraxxJP), 28) 5-year JPY Swap (JP5y) and the ten MSCI stock market sector
indices.7
The global risk factor, measured as the first principal component across sectors, displays high and positive
correlations with all credit indices: iTraxx, CDX, iTraxxJP, HiVoliTraxx, and CDXHY, in consistency with the
interpretation we have given to this component as summarizing the global characteristics of the credit market.
It also has positive correlation with volatility indicators: VIX, VSTOXX, CDXImVol, iTraxxImVol, and a somewhat
lower correlation with the volatility of the euro-dollar exchange rate. It again displays positive but weaker
correlations with the euro and US swaption rates, as well as with the two illiquidity indicators we consider
(spreads to EONIA rates of EURIBOR and LIBOR rates). Finally, the first principal component is negatively
correlated with interest rates, swap rates and US and German government rates. A negative correlation between
CDS premia and some interest rates was also documented for bond yield spreads by Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995) and also by Ericsson et al. (2009), while the positive correlation with stock market volatility has also been
documented when working with single CDS spreads in some of the references mentioned above. Furthermore,
all estimated correlations display the expected signs.
We will now structure these correlations in a regression model that might help us understand the factors
6The 3-month ATM iTraxx Europe Index Option and the 3-month ATM CDX North American Investment Grade Index Option are
provided by JP Morgan.
7These are: MSCI World/Basic materials, MSCI World/Consumer goods, MSCI World/Consumer services, MSCI World/Energy, MSCI
World/Financials, MSCI World/Health care, MSCI World/Industrials, MSCI World/Technology, MSCI World/Telecommunication services
and MSCI World/Utility.
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that influence the evolution of global credit risk. A simple regression to explain the time evolution of the global
risk factor, with iTraxx as the only explanatory variable attains an R-squared of 0.604 [first column in Table 3.4].8
With the CDX Index as the only explanatory variable, the R-squared is somewhat lower, of 0.544 (not shown in
the table). However, the information content in credit indices on the global risk factor is almost tautological,
since both are sort of an average of CDS spreads across all sectors.
The second regression also shows a relatively high adjusted R-squared statistic without using any credit
index. The global risk factor increases with implicit credit market volatility, with stock market volatility, as
measured by VIX, and with exchange rate volatility. It also responds positively to the 5-year US swaption rate.
On the other hand, the global risk factor moves contrary to the 5-year yield on US Treasury bonds, the overnight
rate, the spread between 3-month EURIBOR and EONIA rates, and the euro-dollar exchange rate. It also shows
an interesting response to changes in the term structure, decreasing when the spread between 10- and 5-year
US swap rates increases or when the spread between 5- and 1-year swap rates decreases.
Figure 3.3 shows the global risk factor and its adjusted values from this regression. We can see that the
regression model does a good job in explaining the wide fluctuations in the risk factor during the crisis, which
is precisely when such a model is needed, while in quiet periods, the explanatory power is relatively minor.
Hence, the global risk factor we have estimated basically reflects events affecting credit market volatility,
and it is associated with changes in interest rates, as well as with rates of return and volatility indicators from
some financial assets, as shown in the regression in Table 3.4. From the point of view of the hedging possibilities
for credit positions, the second regression in the table is quite interesting, since it suggests that a credit portfolio
might be hedged in part by taking appropriate positions in interest rate and volatility derivatives. To that end,
it is worthwhile to emphasize that the global risk factor increases with stock market or credit market volatility,
and it decreases when interest rates increase.
Another interesting fact is that the set of financial indicators described above does not have a significant
explanatory power for the remaining principal components. For instance, all of them together explain just 12%
of the fluctuation in the second principal component and 5% of the third and the fourth components. In partic-
ular, this result means that whichever specific component there may be in CDS returns from the government,
the technology or the health care sectors, is not of a financial nature. They might be related to macroeconomic
factors or to firm characteristics that we have not taken into account in our analysis.
8A constant term is always included in all the estimated regressions.
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Table 3.4: Regressions explaining the global risk factor
Variable Full Sample Full Sample Jan. 2006 - Dec. 2008 Jan 2009 - Dec. 2012
iTraxx 0.0132 (23.48)
CDXImVol 0.448 (3.15) 0.355 (1.77) 0.613 (3.24)
iTraxxImVol 0.138 (1.12) 0.277 (1.52) -0.228 (1.57)
VIX 0.007 (3.14) 0.008 (2.28) 0.009 (2.86)
FXImVol 0.015 (1.82) 0.021 (1.80) 0.004 (0.31)
USD1y -0.279 (2.05) -0.199 (0.96) 0.110 (0.52)
USD5y 1.321 (4.94) 1.239 (2.89) 1.246 (3.96)
USD10y -0.761 (4.90) -0.706 (2.74) -0.734 (4.37)
3-month USD ONIA -0.261 (1.82) -0.251 (1.32) -1.205 (1.67)
3m5yUSwap 0.003 (3.93) 0.003 (2.74) 0.001 (1.09)
UST5 -0.838 (5.15) -0.900 (3.97) -0.628 (2.53)
EUR/USD -0.858 (2.62) -0.921 (1.71) -1.128 (2.96)
Liq_EUR -0.201 (1.87) -0.272 (1.79) 0.015 (0.10)
AdjR-Squared 0.604 0.510 0.468 0.653
Note: The global risk factor is estimated as the first principal component over the set of sectorial index returns.
A constant term is included in each regression. t-values are shown in parenthesis.
Figure 3.3: Global risk factor: observed data and fitted values.
Note:The figure shows global risk factor data together with the fitted values from
regression in column 3, Table 3.4. Weekly data: January 2006 - December 2012.
The last two columns in the table show that the full sample estimates of the indicators regression is essen-
tially determined by the relationship between the global risk factor and the set of financial indicators during the
crisis (2006-2009). The relationship after 2010 is somewhat different, with a similar role for credit volatility (the
sum of coefficients on ivolCDX and ivoliTraxx) a weaker relationship with exchange rate volatility, the swaption
rate and the liquidity in the Eurozone. However, the structure of the relationship is quite stable and the Chow
test does not detect a structural change between the two subsamples.
112 CHAPTER 3. SECTORIAL ASSET ALLOCATION
3.6 Systemic and idiosyncratic risk at the level of sectors
For asset allocation purposes, it is central to have some knowledge of the nature of risk involved in a given
credit position. In this section we advance in such analysis at the level of sectors, by decomposing the risk of
a sectorial credit portfolio into systemic and idiosyncratic risk components. Such decomposition will directly
give us an indication of the possibilities for diversifying risk in that portfolio by taking positions in other sectors,
thereby being a crucial element in any risk appetite framework.
Our approach to decompose risk is based on the use of the set of financial indicators described in the
previous section. Our suggestion is to split the set of indicators into a block of 6 indicators from credit markets
(iTraxx, HiVoliTraxx, CDX, CDXHY, CDXImVol, iTraxxImVol), and a second block of 30 indicators from financial
markets other than credit: the 3-month EURIBOR Rate, 3-month EONIA Index, the Euro liquidity premium,
the 1-, 5- and 10-year EUR Swap Rates, the 3-month/5-year ATM Euro Swaption Rate, the VSTOXX Index, the
5-year German Government Yield, 3-month USD LIBOR Interest Rate, 3-month USD Overnight Index, the USD
liquidity premium, the 1-, 5- and 10-year USD Swap Rates, 3-month/5-year ATM USD Swaption Rate, the VIX
Index, 5-year US Treasury Rate, EUR/USD FX Spot Rate, the EUR/USD 3-month ATM option, and the ten MSCI
stock market sector indices. Then, we estimate principal components for each group of indicators. Two of
these components in the subset of credit market variables and three principal components in the subset of
other financial indicators explain more than 98% of the fluctuations in their respective groups.
The R-squared in a linear projection (regression) of each sectorial CDS index on the two principal compon-
ents for credit market indicators could be taken as an approximation to the relevance of the credit element of
risk for that sector. Similarly, a regression of CDS indices on the three principal components for the remaining
indicators would give us an upper bound on the relevance of financial non-credit sources of risk.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 3.5 present the relevance of credit risk and financial risk, while column 4 presents
their joint explanatory power. We can see that credit risk indicators have twice as much explanatory power
as non-credit financial indicators. Column 5 (‘GRF’) displays the information content in the global risk factor
estimated in Section 3.4, showing that this factor has significantly higher explanatory power than the set of
financial indicators, a result in line with Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013). Column 6 (‘Systemic’) displays
R-squared values for regressions on credit, non-credit indicators, and the global risk factor used together as
explanatory variables. We take this linear projection as an estimate of the systemic component of risk in each
sector. Finally, column 7 is equal to 1.0 minus the adjusted R-squared statistics in column 6, and it can be inter-
preted as the relevance of the idiosyncratic component of sectorial risk, since we have excluded all the systemic
indicators captured by the global risk factor and the financial credit and non-credit financial indicators.
A comparison of columns 5 and 6 shows that the set of financial indicators does not add explanatory power
to the global risk factor. This is a striking result showing that the global risk factor estimated in Section 3.4
captures different types of information, and it can act as a sufficient statistic for a wide set of credit and non-
credit financial indicators when characterizing the nature of sectorial risk. In fact, a projection on the global
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risk factor alone could also be said to provide an estimate of the systemic component of risk, with practic-
ally the same decomposition as that shown in the table. There is also an important difference between both
regressions: fitted values in column 5 refer to a component of global risk that might possibly be hedged by us-
ing appropriate derivative instruments defined over the set of indicators used in that regression. On the other
hand, fitted values in column 6 could not possible hedged, since the global risk factor does not trade in any
market.
Since each sector index has the nature of a relatively diversified credit portfolio, it is not surprising that
idiosyncratic risk amounts to less than one third of total risk in all sectors except for health care and technology,
in which we already detected in Section 3.4 the existence of an strong idiosyncratic element. Health care and
technology are the two sectors that would be in less need for a hedge, while for all other sectorial investments
the systemic component is large enough to suggest a strong need for hedging portfolios. To that end, it is
convenient to know the sensitivities of sectorial CDS returns to different sources of risk, as captured by a variety
of financial indicators. That is the object of next section.
Table 3.5: Decomposition of sectorial risk in systemic and idiosyncratic components
Sector Credit Financial Joint GRF Systemic Idiosyncratic
BM 42% 18% 43% 71% 71% 29%
CG 50% 19% 50% 79% 79% 21%
CS 48% 21% 48% 66% 67% 33%
EN 47% 24% 48% 73% 73% 27%
FIN 52% 29% 54% 80% 80% 20%
GOV 34% 17% 34% 68% 69% 31%
HC 27% 7% 27% 37% 38% 62%
IND 47% 17% 47% 80% 80% 20%
TEC 27% 13% 28% 45% 44% 56%
TEL 51% 26% 52% 69% 70% 30%
UTI 43% 20% 44% 71% 72% 28%
Note: Columns 2 and 3 show adjusted R-squared statistics for regressions of sectorial CDS indices on two and three
first principal components of credit and non-credit financial indicators, respectively. Column 4 shows the adjusted R-squared
of a regression on the five principal components together. Column 5 shows adjusted R-squared of a regression on the global risk factor,
while column 6 shows the adjusted R-squared on a regression that includes the global risk factor and the five principal
components as explanatory variables. Column 7 is equal to 1.0 minus the adjusted R-squared in column 6.
BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government,
HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
3.7 Sectorial sensitivity of CDS returns to risk factors
In this section we come down to the level of the sector, and study which specific factors, among the set of
financial indicators we consider, explain CDS spreads in each sector. This is a very relevant issue to characterize
the level and the type of risk in a sectorial position in CDS, and it is of utmost importance for trying to design
a hedge on such a position. It would also be pertinent for a dynamic management of credit value adjustment
(CVA) in any financial institution. Once we characterize the relevant factors for each sector, any anticipation of
an increase or decrease in them might suggest an adjustment in the credit position or a change in the hedge for
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that position. In fact, we could think of designing a hedge on a sectorial CDS position by taking an adequate
position in a relevant risk factor, whenever possible.
To evaluate the characteristics of the type of risk involved in a sectorial credit position we start by show-
ing, in the second column in Table 3.6 estimates of beta-coefficients with respect to the iTraxx Index, a natural
choice as a risk factor. As we can see, estimated betas lie in the (0.30; 0.50) interval, with R-squared values
(column 6 ‘iTraxx’) between 0.25, approximately, for health care and technology, the two sectors with a more
important specific component, and up to 0.50 or even higher for the consumer goods sector, telecommunic-
ation services and the financial sector. Since our sample includes European and North American issuers, it is
not surprising that the CDX IG Index also has a noticeable explanatory power (not shown in the table). Besides,
it is well known that both indices are very highly correlated.
An obviously important question for risk management relates to the performance of a delta-hedging strategy
for a CDS position in a given sector, based on taking a contrary position in the iTraxx Index, using the least-
squares estimate of beta for that sector. Under that hedging strategy, the residuals from these regressions would
be the returns of the hedged portfolio. Hence, the relationship between the residual variance and the variance
of the sectorial index itself provides an indication of the efficiency of the hedge.9 Columns 3 and 4 in Table
3.6 show the standard deviations of weekly changes in CDS for each sector, as well as the standard deviation
of the residuals from regressions of the sectorial index on iTraxx. We can see that except for health care and
technology sectors, hedging efficiency would lead to a reduction of about 70% or higher in return variance, a
substantial decrease that shows an interesting potential for hedging credit portfolios when they are sufficiently
diversified in a given sector.
Table 3.6: Regressions explaining sectorial credit indices
Sector Beta SD Returns SD Residuals Hedging Efficiency
Adjusted R-squared coefficients
iTraxx GRF Indicators
BM 0.360 0.047 0.025 72% 0.354 0.712 0.314
CG 0.399 0.044 0.020 79% 0.493 0.789 0.374
CS 0.359 0.044 0.025 68% 0.404 0.664 0.337
EN 0.380 0.046 0.024 73% 0.399 0.727 0.356
FIN 0.504 0.053 0.024 79% 0.546 0.800 0.539
GOV 0.456 0.061 0.034 69% 0.339 0.677 0.345
HC 0.281 0.043 0.034 37% 0.251 0.372 0.139
IND 0.404 0.046 0.021 79% 0.458 0.798 0.375
TEC 0.291 0.044 0.033 44% 0.258 0.447 0.237
TEL 0.533 0.058 0.033 68% 0.500 0.686 0.395
UTI 0.342 0.039 0.021 71% 0.456 0.712 0.396
Note: Column 2 shows the beta coefficient in regressions from sectorial index returns on weekly changes in iTraxx. Columns 3 and 4
display the standard deviations of sector index returns and the residuals from regressions on iTraxx, respectively.
Hedging Efficiency in Column 5 is equal to one minus the ratio of residual variance to variance of index returns.
Columns 6 and 7 show adjusted R-squared from regressions of sectorial index returns on iTraxx and the global risk factor, respectively.
Column 8 shows the adjusted R-squared from a regression on a set of indicators mentioned in the text.
BM = Basic materials, CG = Consumer goods, CS = Consumer services, EN = Energy, FIN = Financials, GOV = Government,
HC = Health care, IND = Industrials, TEC = Technology, TEL = Telecommunication services, and UTI = Utilities.
9Even though this would be an in-sample evaluation, obtained as if the hedge could have been computed at each point in time having
the information in the full sample, which is clearly unrealistic. Alternatively, this analysis could be performed using a bivariate GARCH
methodology for each CDS index and iTraxx that would allow for time variation in variances and correlations.
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The second regression explains sectorial credit indices with the global risk factor from Section 3.4 as the
single explanatory variable (column ‘GRF‘ in Table 3.6). We have already argued in the previous section that
this latent variable captures risk elements from the credit market but also from other financial markets and
possibly even from the real economy. The fact that the global risk factor contains a good deal of information
on fluctuations in sectorial CDS returns is to be expected, but it is surprising that it contains so much more
explanatory power than credit market indices. Its high information content may arise because by averaging
CDS spreads over the sectors, the first principal component incorporates some aspects of the credit market
that might be sector-specific and not incorporated in standard credit indices. Furthermore, the iTraxx may
contain some idiosyncratic component unrelated to any specific sector, as reflected in the fact that it often
presents deviations from the theoretical price that could be estimated from prices for its constituents, and that
might weaken its correlation with sectorial credit indices.
The regressions we estimated in the previous section to explain the global risk factor suggest the possibility
of constructing some relatively simple factor models for sector indices as well. To that end, we consider a
regression model for weekly changes in each sectorial credit index using the same set of explanatory variables
in the second regression in Table 3.4, which is now estimated for each individual sector under label ‘Indicators’
in Table 3.6. Adjusted R-squared statistics increase relative to the simple regression on the iTraxx Index, but they
fall short of the level of R-squared statistics obtained when using the global risk factor as the single explanatory
variable.10 In fact, the global risk factor contains more information on sectorial credit indices than the whole set
of explanatory variables we consider, which include credit indices together with a variety of financial indicators.
Even using all of them together in a single regression we would not achieve an adjusted R-squared as high as
those in column GRF.
Another interesting fact is the inability of the MSCI stock market indices to capture a significant amount of
fluctuation in sectorial CDS spreads. When their weekly changes or their weekly returns are used by themselves
to explain weekly changes in CDS spreads, R-squared values fall between 10% for the health care sector and
37% for the financial sector. Therefore, they have significant explanatory power. However, when added as
explanatory variable to a regression of sectorial CDS indices on iTraxx, they barely add any improvement in fit.
From these results, an investor in the credit market would like to be able to hedge a credit portfolio using a
contrary position on the global risk factor, given its high correlation with each sectorial index. Unfortunately,
that factor, obtained as the first principal component of sectorial credit indices, is not linked to any specific
asset, so it would not be possible to design a hedging strategy that would exploit its high correlation with most
sectorial CDS indices. Our analysis just suggests the convenience of having good forecasting models for the
global risk factor or for the set of explanatory variables in the regressions in the previous table, to infer from
their predictions the expected change in CDS spreads ahead of time. Whether or not that is possible is left for
further research.
10However, it is also conceivable that alternative combinations of the set of financial indicators we consider could be found having a
similar explanatory power to the last regression in the table.
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3.8 Decomposition of risk in specific sectors: systemic, sectorial and idio-
syncratic risks
In previous sections we have analysed the nature of credit risk in sectorial portfolios. Such information is
needed for a rigorous asset allocation of credit among sectors. We now come down to the analysis of the char-
acteristics of risk in some specific sectors, which should be the guide for asset allocation decisions inside a
given sector. We want to measure to what extent firms in the sector are subject to systemic risk as well as to
sectorial risk and what the relevance of idiosyncratic risk is. We count as systemic risk events that have influ-
ence across the global credit markets. By sectorial risk we understand events that affect all firms in the sector,
with no essential effect elsewhere. The idiosyncratic component of risk is obtained as the residual of each firm
CDS return after extracting the systemic and sectorial components of risk. Such evaluation of the relevance of
risk components has obvious implications on the asset allocation strategy by a given financial institution that
wants to diversify its credit portfolio in that sector. In designing their credit policy, financial institutions should
avoid firms with a large systemic risk component in favour of those with larger idiosyncratic risk compon-
ents, always trying to form sufficiently diversified portfolios. As a byproduct, we also want to analyse whether
the risk structure is common to a given sector in different geographical areas, such as the financial sectors of
Europe and North America. That might suggest that sectorial characteristics are possibly more important than
geographical characteristics in determining CDS spreads.
To estimate the systemic component of risk we will use the same approach as with the sectorial indices,
based on principal component estimates for the credit and the non-credit financial indicators separately. Once
we have an estimate of the systemic risk component, we estimate a regression of CDS spreads on the systemic
component plus the first intra-sector principal component of CDS spreads. For each sector, this principal com-
ponent will contain some features common across firms in the sector, possibly together with some elements
of systemic risk. Subtracting from the joint explanatory power, measured by the adjusted R-squared, that of
the systemic component alone, we will have an estimate of the relevance of sector-specific risk. What is left to
100% is an estimate of the size of the idiosyncratic component of risk for each issuer. The residual in the last
regression can be taken as an estimate of the idiosyncratic risk component.
3.8.1 European industrial sector
In the European industrial sector, the sample is composed by the 30 issuers that had a quoted price every day
during the period 2006-2012.11 The first among the 30 principal components explains 64.4% of the fluctuation
in CDS prices, while the first six principal components explain above 80% of the joint volatility in CDS prices. As
usual, the first component is an approximate average of CDS prices across the sector, with all the firms entering
with a similar load in that first component. Firms like Rentokil Initial 1927 Plc, Heidelberg Cement AG, Invensys
plc, Alstom and Siemens AG have a significant presence in defining the successive principal components. This
11For example Banco Santander is not included in the European financial sample as Banco Santander changed its social denomination
from Banco Santander Central Hispano to Banco Santander on 13 August 2007, consequently changing its company ticker.
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intra-sector first principal component has a linear correlation coefficient with the iTraxx Index of 0.72, showing
that there are significant sectorial and idiosyncratic elements of risk in the sector.
Table 3.7 shows an estimation of the percentage of the fluctuation in CDS prices for each issuer that can be
attributed to systemic factors, to sectorial factors, or to firm-specific factors. The R-squared from regressions
on the credit markets risk factors oscillate between 0.21 and 0.57, while the R-squared from regressions on the
financial markets risk factors are lower, between 0.05 and 0.27.12 Taking together both sets of risk factors as
explanatory variables, the resulting R-squared provides us with an estimate of the size of systemic risk for each
firm, falling between 0.22 and 0.57 and being very close for each firm to those attained by the credit market
factors alone. This result shows the difficulty in separating the relevance of credit market factors from that of
other financial markets.13 Hence, we have opted for taking the combined explanatory power of both sets of risk
factors as being an estimate of the size of the systemic component of risk.
Column 3 shows the R-squared from a regression from CDS returns on the first principal component estim-
ated for this sector. As in the analysis of sectorial indices in the previous section, the intra-sector first principal
component has a higher explanatory power for individual firm CDS returns than the credit and financial risk
factors taken together, attaining R-squared values between 0.29 and 0.79. Moreover, when we put together all
these factors in column 4, the explanatory power is essentially the same as the one obtained by the principal
component alone. Obviously, the principal component combines firm-specific factors with sectorial elements,
besides capturing some influence from the global credit market and other financial markets. To distribute the
importance of each element, we take in column 5 the difference between the numerical R-squared values in
columns 4 and 2 as an estimate of the relevance of sectorial risk. Finally, what remains unexplained by the
regression on credit risk factors, financial factors and the sectorial factor (the first principal component for the
firms in the sector) can be naturally interpreted as the size of the idiosyncratic component of risk. This way, we
have a decomposition of CDS risk in systemic risk (column 2), sector-specific risk (column 5), and firm-specific
risk (column 6), adding up to +100%. Firms in Table 3.7, as well as those in the tables for the other sectors, are
sorted by the size of their systematic component of risk.
Sectorial risk oscillates between 8% and 28%, while the idiosyncratic component of risk amounts to a per-
centage between 20% and 69%. In most issuers (27 out of 30), the idiosyncratic component is below 50% of
total risk. Bold figures in the table denote the most important component for each single issuer. For 21 of the
30 issuers, credit and financial risk factors are the most important component of CDS risk, while firm-specific
factors are the most important component for the other nine issuers. In our estimates, sector-specific compon-
ents are never the most important source of fluctuations. Attending to median values, the systemic component
of risk for the European industrial sector is 44% of total risk, sectorial risk is 20%, and the idiosyncratic com-
ponent amounts to 35%.14 In fact, this percent decomposition among the three sources of risk (credit market,
sectorial risk and firm-specific risk) would be essentially the same if we just used the credit market risk factors
12For reasons of space, these regressions are not shown in the table
13If we project each financial risk factor on the set of credit risk factors, to take the residuals from those regressions as the ‘pure’ influence
of financial markets risk factors, their joint explanatory power turns out to minimum. Therefore, even though non-credit risk factors
contain information on credit risk for individual issuers, although such information is also contained in credit market risk factors.
14Being median values they may not add up exactly to 100%.
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as representative of systemic risk, leaving out the information on risk embedded in other financial indicat-
ors. We have however included additional credit and interest rate indicators in the estimation of the systemic
component of risk to avoid any possible underestimation.
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3.8.2 North American industrial sector
In the North American industrial sector, market power among the 40 issuers is more diluted. The sectorial
factor, estimated as the first principal component of CDS spreads across the sector, explains only 44% of the
total fluctuation in CDS spreads. This component is again an average of CDS spreads across the industrial
sector, excluding a few firms. To capture above 70% of the fluctuation in prices, we would need eight principal
components, so there seem to be many specific risk factors.
Simple combinations of the second and third components would single out Crown Holdings, Inc. and PHH
Corporation. These two are among the firms that are not represented in the sector average that produces the
first principal component. Hence, a linear combination of the second and third principal components would
select both firms separately as factors explaining the volatility in the sector. This would be consistent with
the possibility that CDS from these two issuers are subject to specific risk factors different from those of other
firms. The remaining principal components are again hard to interpret, being linear combinations of CDS
spreads with non-uniform weights.
Financial indicators have significant explanatory power for CDS prices by most firms in the sector, leading
to a significant estimate of the relevance of systemic risk in the 0.20 to 0.51 range for 31 out of 46 issuers. Some-
what striking is the fact that there are nine issuers for which the regression of CDS returns on the credit and
non-credit financial factors have an R-squared lower than 10%.15.16 A possible explanation might be the low
liquidity of these issuers, with repeated price quotes over time and hence a low correlation with market fluctu-
ations. In Table 3.8 we have added one column (7) with information on the gross CDS notional as the sum of
CDS contracts bought (or equivalently, sold) for all Warehouse contracts in aggregate for single reference entit-
ies. For example, a transaction of $10 million notional between the buyer and seller of protection is reported as
one contract and $10 million gross notional, as opposed to two contracts worth $20 million. This information is
provided on a weekly basis by DTCC.17 Figures in that column support the intuition about the lack of liquidity
in some issuers for which where there is not available data in the DTCC report, given that the report covers the
Top 1000 Reference Entities. Not surprisingly, the most important factor for these issuers without liquidity is
the firm-specific factor. A final column (8) reports figures for total assets.
The linear correlation coefficient between the first principal component regression (column 3) and total
assets (column 9) for each issuer on 28 December 2012, is 0.52, reflecting the idea that the largest companies
are the most systemic ones. This idea has been present in the literature [see, among others, Dietsch and Petey
(2002); Dullmann and Scheule (2003); Lopez (2004); and recently, Bams et al. (2012)].
As in the European industrial sector, risk factors from non-credit financial markets do not add explanat-
ory power to the credit market factors. On the contrary, the sectorial first principal component has significant
15These are Ball Corp, Briggs & Stratton Corp, Contl Airls Inc, Cooper Inds Ltd, Crown Holdings Inc, JetBlue Awys Corp, PHH Corporation,
Rock Tenn Co, and Sonoco Prods Co.
16Since our goal is to find a risk model with a reduced number of factors, we feel that just the first principal component should be used
as a single factor. If we are interested in explaining the behaviour of CDS prices for Crown Holdings, Inc. and PHH Corporation, then the
second and third principal components will also be needed.
17Visit http://www.dtcc.com/repository-otc-data.aspx for more details.
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explanatory power: except by six firms, R-squared from a simple regression on this principal component is
between 0.10 and 0.70. For these six firms for which the sectorial principal component lacks a significant ex-
planatory power, the credit and financial risk factors also produce R-squared values below 10% in column 2, so
their credit risk is almost fully idiosyncratic in nature. For 33 out of the 46 firms in the sector, the sectorial first
principal component, used by itself as explanatory variable in a regression, produces R-squared coefficients in
the 0.30 to 0.74 range. In fact, we have the same situation as in the European industrial sector, with the sec-
torial first principal component incorporating most of the information content that there is in the credit and
financial indicators regarding CDS prices by these issuers, thus the similarity between columns 3 and 4 in the
table.
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 reproduce a similar analysis to the one we have run above for the European industrial
sector, decomposing the volatility of CDS returns as explained by credit and financial risk factors (systemic
risk), sector factors, and firm-specific risk factors. In 15 out of the 46 issuers, the systemic risk factors sector is
the most important component of CDS risk. For the remaining 31 sectors, idiosyncratic factors are the most
important component of risk. Firm-specific factors are clearly more relevant in the market for CDS from US
industrial firms than in the European industrial sector. In thirteen firms, this component accounts for more
than 70% of fluctuations in CDS returns, and in 23 firms it accounts for more than 50% of total risk. This result
suggests the difficulty in finding a successful hedge for undiversified positions in credit portfolios from these
issuers. In terms of median R-squared values across issuers, the credit factor account for 35% of total CDS
return risk, the sector factor explains 17%, and firm-specific factors explain the larger amount, 50% of total
CDS risk.
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3.8.3 European financial sector
The BaselCommittee (2012a) identifies five broad categories of factors that influence global systemic import-
ance. The selected indicators reflect the size of banks, their interconnectedness, the lack of readily available
substitutes or financial institution infrastructure for the services they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional)
activity and their complexity. Tables 3.10 to 3.12 show an example of the interconnectedness in the European
financial sector with a similar decomposition of CDS risk for its issuers. Systemic credit risk factors account
for between 4% and 60% of total risk in the firms in this sector and the intra-sector first principal component
explains between 7% and 86% of CDS risk. Sectorial risk falls between 0% and 54% and idiosyncratic risk is
between 14% and 93%. In terms of median values, systemic risk accounts for 32% of total risk, sectorial risk is
33% and idiosyncratic risk 39% of total risk.
These figures are similar to those shown in the European industrial sector, although in the financial sector
the idiosyncratic component is more important. Indeed, in half of the firms (34 out of 70), the idiosyncratic
component is the most important. For 19 firms the systemic component is the most important while for 17
firms the sectorial component of risk prevails.18
The sectorial risk factor achieves its largest relevance for Dexia. It is clear that the firms more influenced by
the credit factors are the largest ones. Lack of liquidity again can be the main reason why so many firms are
highly influenced by firm-specific factors.
18The fact that the lower bound of the explanatory power of credit risk factors is lower than in the European industrial sector could be
explained by the lack of liquidity in some issuers because of the recent financial crisis. That is the case of Bancaja that finally merged into
Bankia along with “Caja de Ahorro y Monte de Piedad de Madrid”.
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3.8.4 North American financial sector
In terms of median R-squared values across North American financial issuers, the systemic factor accounts for
33% of total CDS return risk, sectorial factors explain 17%, and firm-specific factors explain the largest amount,
46% of total CDS risk [Tables 3.13 and 3.14]. These figures are very similar to those we obtained for the North
American industrial sector. In 41 out of the 61 issuers, firm-specific factors are the most important component
of risk, while systemic risk is the second component in importance, with credit and financial market factors
being the most important component of risk in 19 out of the 61 firms. In one firm, the sectorial component of
risk turned out to be the most important. This result once more suggests the difficulty in finding a successful
hedge for undiversified positions in CDS from these issuers, which might possibly be explained by the lack of
liquidity of the issuers.
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3.8.5 An alternative decomposition of risk
We argued in Section 3.4 that the global risk factor we constructed could also be thought of capturing the sys-
temic elements of risk as an alternative to using financial indicators for that purpose, as we have done in the
decompositions above. Hence, an alternative decomposition to the one we have used in the previous para-
graphs would estimate the relevance of systemic risk by the adjusted R-squared of CDS spreads for each firm
on the global risk factor. The first intra-sector principal component adds some sector-specific information to
the global risk factor, and we take the difference between their joint explanatory power and that of the global
risk factor alone as an estimate of the relevance of sectorial risk. The residual in that joint regression is an es-
timate of the idiosyncratic component of risk, its relevance being estimated as 1.0 minus the R-squared in such
regression.
Surprisingly enough, estimates of risk components by both procedures are quite similar. With the exception
of the sectorial component of risk in North American industrials, correlation coefficients between the estimates
obtained by both approaches are very high.
Table 3.15: Linear correlation coefficients between components of risk by both procedures
Sector Systemic Sectorial Idiosyncratic
European industrial 93% 78% 99%
North American industrial 86% 34% 99%
European financial 92% 94% 99%
North American financial 92% 84% 93%
Note: Linear correlation between systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic components of risk
obtained by both procedures. The first procedure uses principal components for financial
indicators to characterize systemic risk, as in Tables 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14.
The alternative procedure uses the global risk factor to characterize systemic risk.
Median values are also quite similar, with systemic risk being somewhat higher and sectorial risk lower
when the global risk factor is used to estimate systemic risk. The fact that the sectorial component of risk is
higher for the European financial sector may be due to the depth of the crisis experienced by this sector. The
decompositions of risk for the four sectors analysed above can be found in the Appendix 3.11.
Table 3.16: Median values of risk components estimated by two alternative decomposition procedures
Sector Systemic Sectorial Idiosyncratic
European industrial
Indicators 35% 17% 50%
Global risk factor 38% 11% 51%
North American industrial
Indicators 44% 20% 35%
Global risk factor 55% 10% 35%
European financial
Indicators 32% 33% 39%
Global risk factor 41% 20% 44%
North American financial
Indicators 33% 17% 46%
Global risk factor 38% 11% 44%
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3.8.6 An effective separation of the sectorial and idiosyncratic components of risk
The estimated idiosyncratic component of CDS risk turns out to be quite large in many firms, especially in the
US market. Another interpretation might be that the large size of our estimated idiosyncratic component might
be due to still containing some systemic risk elements. To check on the effectiveness of our methodology to
identify the idiosyncratic component of credit risk we discuss now two related issues.
The first issue is whether our estimated sectorial component of risk to see whether it is free from idio-
syncratic features. CDS spreads for North American financial issuers have a median pairwise linear correlation
coefficient of 0.45, while the median correlation between each firm in the sector and the Financial Sector Credit
Index in Section 3.4 is 0.67, with a highest correlation of 0.79. Thus, North American financial firms share im-
portant elements of risk and they bear a relatively close association with the Sectorial Credit Index, showing
that there exists a well-defined sectorial component of risk.
The intra-sector first principal component for these firms has a still higher correlation, of 0.90, with the
Credit Index for the financial sector. Such correlation is unexpectedly high. The Financial Sector Credit Index
defined in Section 3.4 is made up by the median spread negotiated each day in CDS by all issuers in the finan-
cial sector from all the different geographical regions. Therefore, each daily observation on the Financial Sector
Credit Index may come from a different financial firm, and even from a different country. On the other hand,
the principal component for the North American financial sector is a linear combination of spreads from all
CDS traded each day by North American issuers. It is, hence, some sort of average of these specific CDS, all
of them from the same geographical area. The two measures are different enough so that such a high correl-
ation between them is far from obvious. Such high correlation shows that the average of CDS spreads that is
embedded into the intra-sector principal component is successful at filtering out idiosyncratic components,
essentially capturing the same sectorial features as the Credit Index for the global financial sector.
Strikingly enough, the European financial sector shares these characteristics: the correlation between our
estimate of the sectorial component of risk and the Financial Credit Index from Section 3.4 is again 0.90.19
Individual CDS spreads have moderately high correlations between them, with a median value of 0.54, and
a median correlation of 0.71 with the Financial Credit Index, with a maximum of 0.84. Again, the estimated
sectorial component of risk is much closer to the sectorial credit index than CDS spreads for individual firms,
showing that the former is quite free from idiosyncratic features.
Results for industrial sectors are also similar. The estimated sectorial component of risk from industrial
firms’ CDS data is highly correlated with the Industrial Sector Credit Index from Section 3.4. That correlation
is 0.78 for North American firms and 0.85 for European issuers. Correlations between firms in these sectors are
again relatively high, with median values of 0.41 and 0.62. As to correlations between individual firms and the
sectorial risk factor, median values are 0.56 and 0.71, respectively, with maximum levels of 0.67 and 0.77. Again,
the sectorial component of risk of the two industrial sectors has a closer co-movement with the Industrial Credit
Index than individual firms in the sector, with the same interpretation as in the case of the financial sectors.
19Incidentally, remember that the Financial Sector Credit Index is the same for European and North American firms.
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The bottom line of this analysis is that we can indeed use the principal component methodology with data
from a given geographical region to extract a sectorial component of risk that turns out to be very similar to
the sectorial credit index that can be obtained from all CDS trading in all regions. Our construction of the
global sector factor is not directly responsible for this result. In fact, choosing the median of all CDS spreads
traded each day over the world does not seem to be the more direct way to generate a high correlation with
an average of sector spreads in a specific region. The implications are important. They suggest that the first
intra-sector principal component across firms is essentially free of firm idiosyncratic characteristics, thereby
justifying our estimates of sectorial components of risk. It also suggests that the sectorial component of risk is
more important than its geographical component, as we will examine in the next section.
The second issue relates to whether our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk have the appro-
priate features. First of all, our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk turn out to be essentially
uncorrelated across firms, which is a necessary condition for the interpretation we give to this component.
There are 30 issuers in the European industrial sector, 46 in the North American industrial sector, 70 in the
European financial sector, and 61 issuers in the North American financial sector. That amounts to 435 and
1035 correlations between pairs of idiosyncratic components in the European and North American industrial
sectors and 2415 and 1830 correlations in the European and North American financial sectors. Median correl-
ations are very low: -0.05, -0.02, -0.02 and -0.02. Ninety per cent of them are in absolute value below 0.23, 0.19,
0.24 and 0.27, respectively. These are all low levels that justify an interpretation of our estimated idiosyncratic
components as being firm-specific in nature.
A further check on the nature of our estimated idiosyncratic components consists of examining the pos-
sibility of diversification. If idiosyncratic components are relatively important, then a well-diversified portfolio
should be much easier to hedge than positions on individual assets. In the European industrial sector, hedging
positions on CDS from an individual firm using a contrary position on iTraxx leads to a reduction in variance, as
obtained by comparing the variance of residuals from a regression of single firm issuer CDS returns on weekly
changes in iTraxx. The estimated slope coefficient would determine the size of the position to be taken in
iTraxx. Table 3.17 shows the reduction in variance achieved by hedging individual CDS with a contrary position
in the iTraxx Index. Median and maximum values for variance reduction in each sector are shown. Column 4
shows the reduction in variance from hedging the equally weighted portfolio. In the four sectors, hedging the
equally weighted portfolio is much more successful than hedging a position in any single firm in the sector,
suggesting that we have sensible estimates of idiosyncratic components of risk.
Furthermore, the hedging possibilities change with the size of the idiosyncratic component of risk, as it
should be expected. The lower panel in Table 3.17 displays the reduction in variance from hedging the port-
folios made up by the five or ten firms with the higher (first column) or lower (second column) idiosyncratic
components of risk. Hedging efficiency is clearly higher for portfolios made up by firms with high idiosyncratic
risk. Among portfolios with low idiosyncratic risk, it seems easier to hedge portfolios including a larger number
of firms.
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Table 3.17: The idiosyncratic component of risk as a guide for hedging
Sector Single CDS
Equally weighted portfolio
Median Maximum
European industrial 14.1% 23.6% 30.0%
North American industrial 24.7% 33.5% 41.0%
European financial 20.0% 35.0% 36.2%
North American financial 15.6% 27.4% 33.3%
Sector Higher idiosyncratic component Lower idiosyncratic component
European industrial
5-firm 62% 43%
10-firm 65% 54%
North American industrial
5-firm 48% 3%
10-firm 50% 13%
European financial
5-firm 56% 24%
10-firm 59% 35%
North American financial
5-firm 49% 7%
10-firm 50% 21%
Note: The upper panel (columns 2 and 3) shows the reduction in variance achieved by hedging individual CDS with a contrary position
in the iTraxx Index. Median and maximum values for variance reduction in each sector are shown. Column 4 shows the reduction
in variance from hedging the equally weighted portfolio. The lower panel displays the reduction in variance from hedging the
portfolios made up by the five or ten firms with the higher (column 3) or lower (column 4) idiosyncratic components of risk.
The low correlation among them and the good possibilities for hedging risk of a well-diversified sectorial
portfolio suggest that our estimates of the idiosyncratic components of risk are appropriate.
But then, what is behind the large idiosyncratic component of risk? A possible conjecture for the large size
of idiosyncratic components of risk might be, again, that they are just a reflection of the low liquidity in some
issues. To check on this assumption, we could try to relate the size of the estimated idiosyncratic risk with
either the number of contributors giving price to the 5-year CDS (Composite depth 5yr.), the quality rating of
the data provided by Markit, or the volatility of CDS returns. In the latter case, the argument would be that
illiquid CDS would often repeat price in the Markit Quotes, with the time series of CDS spreads then having
a relatively low variance. Hence, we would expect a negative correlation between the size of the idiosyncratic
component of risk and the volatility of CDS spreads. The correlation between the size of the idiosyncratic risk
component and the annual volatility of CDS returns among European industrial issuers is equal to -0.30, being
equal to -0.03 for North American industrial issuers. That correlation is equal to -0.60 for European financial
issuers, and -0.46 for North American financial issuers. Hence, there seems to be, in fact, some evidence on the
fact that the large size of the idiosyncratic risk component for some issuers is in part due to the low liquidity of
their CDS.
3.9. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT CDS RISK PREMIA 135
3.9 Some considerations about CDS risk premia
We formulated in the Introduction several questions related to the implications of our main goal of estimating
the decomposition of risk we have just described. We answer them in this section using the results we have
obtained in the preceding sections.
• What were the most systemic sectors during 2006-2012?
Throughout the paper, we have interpreted the first principal component calculated over the sectorial credit
indices as a global risk factor. This is justified by the results we have presented as well as by the analysis in
Peña and Rodriguez-Moreno. Then Table 3.3 shows that the most systemic sector was the financial sector. The
first principal component has an R-squared above 80% when explaining the variation of the Financial Sector
Index for the whole period 2006-2012. These results are consistent with Moody’s [Munves (2008)] and the Basel
Committee (2011), where the Basel Committee proposed an specific increase in the estimated value of asset
correlation for the financial sector when calculating the level of regulatory capital required. That correlation
was set at 30%, up from the previous value of 24%, while the 24% correlation was kept for the rest of corpor-
ate sectors. According to our methodology, the industrial sector was the second most systemic sector during
this period of time, possibly reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis in the real economy, since the
industrial sector is distinctively dependent on financing and capital for their long-run investments, as well as
reflecting the impact of the increased deterioration in the global housing market.
• What were the sectors with the largest idiosyncratic component of risk during 2006-2012?
Along the same line of reasoning, the two sectors that are less correlated with the rest of the sectors have been
the health care sector and the technology sector. That would make harder to hedge credit portfolios in these
sectors by taking contrary positions in some others. This outcome is not surprising, taking into account the
robust growth that the health care sector is experiencing around the world. This is especially the case in the
developed countries (which represent the major part of our data sample) as the population of these countries
is getting older, with more economic resources and a greater demand for health care services so as to achieve
a better quality of life. As a consequence, the health care sector has been less influenced by the recent crisis.
On the other hand, CDS returns in the technology sector have also shown low correlations with the rest of
the market, possibly because of the specific nature of innovation in this industry, which has a life cycle very
different from the other sectors of the economy.
• What are the most influential financial variables explaining credit spread fluctuations?
There are alternative sets of explanatory factors that can be used to explain a very significant percentage of the
time fluctuations in our estimated global risk factor. This is interesting because, as we have repeatedly pointed
out, such factor represents the general evolution in the CDS spreads market. Interest rates, like the overnight
LIBOR rate or its spread with the EONIA rate, the 3-month EURIBOR rate, the US Treasury 5-year rate, the slope
and curvature of the term structure of US swap rates, are correlated negatively with CDS spreads. In particular,
the negative correlation between CDS premia and the risk-free rate rate is similar to the result documented
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for bond yield spreads by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and also by Ericsson et al. (2009) when analysing the
single-name CDS. This is an important result for the estimation of wrong-way risk, since a standard assumption
is to consider independence between interest rates and CDS when searching for indicators of the risk expos-
ure of derivatives, which might lead to an underestimation of the level of risk. Another interesting empirical
result is the observed positive correlation between volatility indicators like VIX, the implied volatility of the
euro/dollar exchange rate, US swaption rates, and the global risk factor for the CDS market, which could be
used for hedging purposes.20 This represents an interesting open question that would require further research.
• How is the risk of CDS spreads decomposed among systemic risk, sector risk and idiosyncratic risk?
We have analysed industrial and financial sectors in Europe and North America to find that, in terms of median
R-squared values across issuers:
(SEE TABLE 3.16)
These results suggest the high risk involved in undiversified positions in CDS from issuers in these sectors,
especially in the illiquid CDS market circumstances that arose with the financial crisis, which still exist today.
They are also interesting for pricing reasons, since we could use this information to infer the credit premium of
a new issuer. On the other hand, to the extent that the idiosyncratic components of risk could be uncorrelated,
they might allow for interesting hedging strategies, which we comment next.
• Can the use of credit indices hedge a diversified CDS portfolio appropriately?
The answer is yes. In the light of the results of our analysis, the global risk factor displays high and positive
correlations with the iTraxx, in consistency with the interpretation we have given to the factor. A simple regres-
sion of CDS sectorial indices with iTraxx as the only explanatory variable, other than a constant term, leads to
beta estimates between 0.35 and 0.50, and R-squared coefficients between 0.20 and 0.50. An ex-post analysis of
a delta-hedging strategy for a sectorial credit portfolio based on using the estimated beta to define a contrary
position in the iTraxx Index, shows a substantial reduction of about 70% or higher in return variance, except for
the health care and technology sectors.
Furthermore, we have also shown in previous sections that the low correlation of idiosyncratic components
allows for a diversified credit portfolio in either one of the four sectors considered, that can be hedged following
a delta-hedge strategy with the iTraxx Index. In fact, portfolios made up by firms with higher idiosyncratic
component allow for quite an efficient hedge through contrary positions on the iTraxx Index, while portfolios
made up by firms with lower idiosyncratic component are much harder to hedge, as expected.
These results reinforce the appropriateness of our estimates of idiosyncratic risk. They also suggest the
interest of running a more detailed, ex-ante examination of the efficiency of a hedge strategy designed with the
conditional second order moments estimated from a GARCH specification, possibly with some asymmetric
(leverage) effects on volatility, which we leave as an issue for future research.
20The global risk factor shows also a natural positive association with credit indices and implicit volatility indicators for credit markets.
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• Is there a strong geographical factor in the intra-sector analysis of the different corporate sectors?
A further implication from the result in the previous paragraph is that the first principal components for a
given sector, estimated in different geographical regions, display similar fluctuations over time, since they are
all highly correlated with the sectorial factor from Section 3.4. This suggests that the sectorial factor is more im-
portant to determine CDS spreads than the geographical region. It also implies that it might be more promising
to hedge a credit position taking contrary positions in the same sector in other regions than in different sectors
from the same region. In fact, the sectorial risk factors for the industrial sectors in the US and Europe display
a high correlation of 0.85, suggesting that sector-specific risk factors have a strong global nature, capturing
elements of risk that are common to different geographical areas.
A similar observation emerges from the comparison between estimates of the sectorial components of risk
for the financial sectors in Europe and North America, which are again closely related. The implication is that
the sectorial factor may be much more important than the geographical factor, suggesting that firms should be
thought of as members of a global sector instead of members of a particular region, there not being a noticeable
diversification across the geographies in the corporate sectors. This kind of result should be interesting for
financial institutions when establishing an adequate asset allocation policy for the corporate market. It seems
that sectorial factors are more determinant than the geographical factors in the corporate market under normal
market circumstances (for example, during a specific crisis in a country, the geographical factor is going to be
decisive in the CDS of those issuers within that country). However, we should not forget that the geographical
factors are more decisive for small/medium enterprises and for retail banking.
3.10 Conclusions
Whether or not the failure of a single firm evolves into a systemic crisis depends on the relevance of each firm in
a given sector, as well as on the relevance of each sector in the global economy. In this paper we have advanced
a decomposition of credit risk at the level of individual firms among systemic, sectorial and idiosyncratic com-
ponents. At the level of sectors we have decomposed risk into a systemic and an idiosyncratic component.
We have started by estimating a global risk factor, and analysing its relationship with a wide array of credit
and non-credit financial indicators. The information provided by this analysis has helped us to implement
the risk decompositions mentioned above. We have identified the financial sector as being the more systemic,
followed by the industrial sector. Health care and technology are the sectors displaying a higher idiosyncratic
component of risk and hence, a lower correlation with all the others. We have shown that well-diversified
credit portfolios with CDS from a given sector have good possibilities for hedging by taking a contrary position
in iTraxx or CDX Indices or their derivatives. Our decomposition of risk for the industrial and financial sec-
tors points to relatively large idiosyncratic components of risk that are still larger in North American than in
European firms, and we have shown some evidence that it is in part due to lack of liquidity. Finally, we have
shown clear evidence suggesting that the sectorial component of risk is more important than its geographical
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component.
Our analysis provides an element for a risk appetite framework at financial institutions, since they could
easily use the numerical estimates of risk components we propose to maintain their risk limits when taking
their asset allocation decisions. Indeed, we have shown evidence suggesting that portfolios made up by firms
with higher idiosyncratic components are easier to hedge, contrary to what happens with portfolios made up
by firms with lower idiosyncratic risk components. This is observed uniformly over the four sectors considered.
Furthermore, by evaluating the firms and sectors with the most potential to produce systemic risk problems,
our analysis should also be considered to be crucial for supervisors and regulators. Even though we restrict
our analysis to CDS issuers, further research should attempt to relate our estimated risk components to firms’
characteristics such as size of assets and liabilities, profit and loss results, equity and bond prices and market
share. That would allow for extending the evaluation of credit risk components for CDS issuers to any other
firm, even if it is not a CDS issuer.
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Chapter 4
Basis risk in hedging a CDS portfolio with
credit indices
4.1 Introduction
The Basel Committee (2011) issued the document “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient
banks and banking systems” in which it establishes the methodology for the computation of the capital charge
for CVA risk. CVA is the adjustment by credit valuation of the derivative portfolio. The determination of the
credit spread is crucial for the quantification of the CVA. The document is very prescriptive, with each entity
using the CDS issuer spread if possible, and if not, then, using a proxy spread based on the rating, industry
and region of each counterparty. In a later document, “Basel III counterparty credit risk and exposures to
central counterparties - Frequently asked questions”, the Basel Committee (2012b) reaffirms this idea, requiring
financial entities to estimate the credit spread curves taking into account the same factors of rating, sector and
region of each counterparty.
On the other hand, a recent article, “CDS de-correlation a threat to CVA hedging, traders warn” on 3 Septem-
ber 2014 [see Devasaba (2014)], directly sourced from Risk, highlights the climate of fear prevalent throughout
the industry.
“The ongoing slump in traded volumes of single-name credit default swaps (CDSs) is a "nasty side effect" of
international regulatory reforms, a senior banker has claimed, raising fears that credit valuation adjustment
(CVA) hedging will become increasingly difficult should the long-standing correlation between single-name and
index CDS products break down. “
“As single-name volumes wither, notional outstanding in index CDS products is growing, raising fears that
the long-standing correlation between CDS indexes and single-name contracts is in danger of breaking down –
a consequence of tougher margin regimes and trading restrictions that have forced many credit arbitrage players
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out of the market.”
"There is more basis noise in the indexes. The credit indexes can deviate – sometimes quite significantly – from
the CDS spreads of the constituent names at the first sign of volatility," says a credit trader at a hedge fund in New
York.”
“The main CDS indexes are fairly liquid and generally trade several hundred times a day, but many single
names can go for long periods without a single transaction. That means the indexes react quickly to any changes
in risk whereas single names often lag the indexes and can see quite dramatic price moves.”
There are other recent articles on Risk.net which deal with these implications in the CDS market as: “Cor-
porates fear CVA charge will make hedging too expensive” by Watt (2011) or “Proxy war: Shrinking CDS mar-
ket leaves CVA and DVA on shaky ground” by Carver (2013b) among others [see Carver (2013a) and Deventer
(2012)]. Finally, in another more recent Blomberg article on 9 September 2014, Cairn Capital Ltd. supported
the strategy on the options of European credit derivatives indices to hedge the risk that Scotland would vote
for independence from the U.K. “Given the uncertainty over the outcome, potential impact on markets and
the technicals in markets where short positions can be very painful, I prefer macro hedges through options to
anything single-name specific,” said Andrew Jackson, chief investment officer at Cairn Capital in London.
Therefore, in this chapter, we would like to have an estimation of the basis risk between the CDS portfo-
lio and the hedge with different indices [see Gregory (2012)], and we will answer, among others, the following
questions: Is the basis risk higher in North America than in Europe? Does the effectiveness of the hedge in-
crease when we consider more than one to hedge the portfolio? Could we improve the results using a different
estimation technique from OLS? Could we really hedge the Jump-to-Default risk?
This chapter is divided into seven sections: In Section 4.2 we introduce the different indices that we have
used. In Section 4.3 we detail the dataset that we have used. In Section 4.4 we present the framework for the
hedge, and the different employed hypothesis. In Section 4.5 we focus on the results of these methodologies.
In Section 4.6 we look up the concept of Jump-to-Default risk. And finally we present the main conclusions in
Section 4.7.
4.2 CDS index products
A credit index can usually be thought of as an equally weighted combination of single-name CDS and hence the
fair premium on the index will be close to the average (weighted by each issuer dollar value of a one basis point
change, DV01) CDS premium within that index. A credit index is normally used to hedge credit risk or to take a
position on a basket of credit entities (a CDS index is a portfolio of actively traded liquid names in a particular
sector of the market). A credit default swap index is standardized, therefore highly liquid and trades on a very
small bid-offer spread. This makes it is a primary market vehicle for gaining diversified credit exposure. Credit
indices are easy and efficient to trade: investors can express their bullish or bearish sentiments on credit as an
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asset class, and portfolio managers can manage their credit exposures actively.
The two most common and liquid credit indices are the iTraxx Europe and CDX North American Investment
Grade, CDX NA IG (the difference between them is shown in Figure 4.1). The benchmark Markit iTraxx Europe
Index comprises 125 equally-weighted European names. A HiVol Index consisting of the 30 widest spread non-
financial names and three sector indices are also published. The Markit iTraxx Crossover Index comprises
the 45 most liquid sub-investment grade entities. The Markit iTraxx Europe indices trade 3, 5, 7 and 10-year
maturities and a new series is determined by a dealer liquidity poll every six months. The Markit CDX indices
are a family of indices covering multiple sectors in North America. The main indices are: Markit CDX North
American Investment Grade (125 names), Markit CDX North American Investment Grade High Volatility (30
names from CDX IG), Markit CDX North American High Yield (100 names). Buying CDS protection on $125m of
the CDX NA IG Index is almost equivalent to buying $1m of CDS protection on each of the underlying reference
entities within the index. The Markit CDX indices roll semi-annually in March and September. The other
indices exist for different underlying reference entities and regions but they are less liquid.
Furthermore, the spread (in basis points) represents the annual compensation the protection seller receives
for agreeing to pay any losses due to the default of any of the firms in the index in the following 5-years. As-
suming a 100 basis points spread, for instance, for iTraxx Europe and a contract notional of 100 million euros,
the protection seller will receive 1,000,000 euros per year as long as there is no default in the index companies.
Since iTraxx is an equally weighted portfolio, the exposure to each company is 0.8% (=1/125) of the contracted
notional, i.e. 800,000 euros. If a company in iTraxx were to default with a 50% loss, the protection seller would
pay 400,000 euros to the protection buyer at the time of the default assuming cash settlement. From then on,
the new index would only have 124 companies, the contracted notional would be reduced by 800,000 euros to
99.2 million and the protection seller would keep receiving 100 basis points per year on the new notional.
Credit indices have expanded dramatically in recent years, with volumes rising, trading costs decreasing,
and a growing visibility across financial markets. We show a summary for the different existing credit indices
in Figure 4.2. The benefits of using CDS indices include the following:
Tradability: Credit indices can be traded and priced more easily than a basket of cash bond indices or single-
name CDS
Liquidity: Significant liquidity is available in indices and has also driven more liquidity in the single-name
market
Operational Efficiency: Standardized terms, legal documentation, electronic straight-through processing
Transaction Costs: Cost efficient means to trade portions of the market
Industry Support: Credit indices are supported by all major dealer banks, buy-side investment firms, and third
parties (for example, Markit offers transaction processing and valuations services)
Transparency: Rules, constituents, fixed coupon, and daily prices are all available publicly
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Figure 4.1: Differences between iTraxx and CDX
Source: Markit (2009c)
An important feature of credit indices is that they “roll” every six months, involving:
1. Adjustment of maturity. Typical traded maturities are 5, 7 and 10 years. Fixed maturity dates will be used
such that the initial maturities are 5.25, 7.25 and 10.25 years. After six months, the maturities will have
become 4.75, 6.75 and 9.75 and these will be re-set to their original values.
2. Adjustment of portfolio. Names will be removed from a credit index according to predefined criteria in
relation to credit events, ratings downgrades and increases in individual CDS premiums beyond a certain
threshold. The overall aim is to replace defaulted names and maintain a homogeneous credit quality.
Names removed from the index will be replaced with other names meeting the required criteria.
3. Premium. In the 6-month period before a roll, the index premium is fixed at a given level of either 100
or 500 bps and trades on the index will involve an upfront payment from one party to the other to com-
pensate for the difference between the fair premium and traded premium.
4.3 Input data
In this study, we use the daily senior 5-year CDS contract with the standard currency and restructuring clause
for each issuer of the sample. We use this particular criteria because of its liquidity and representativeness. The
analysed period is from 2006 to 2012 because we think that it is the most relevant period of time for the credit
market.
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Figure 4.2: Markit credit and loan indices overview
Source: Markit (2009c)
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Table 4.1: Issuer distribution by industry region
Industry/Region Europe Japan N.Amer Total
Basic materials 17 13 33 63
Consumer goods 33 23 54 110
Consumer services 35 16 52 103
Energy 6 3 33 42
Financials 69 17 61 147
Health care 4 24 28
Industrials 30 24 46 100
Technology 5 8 16 29
Telecommunication services 20 3 14 37
Utilities 27 9 27 63
Total 246 116 360 722
Our sector classification is based on the ICB criteria, (Industry Classification Benchmark), which distin-
guishes four levels: Industry, supra-sector, sector and subsector. In this case, Markit works with the industry
level, differentiating eleven industries: financials, health care, energy, telecommunication services, basic ma-
terials, utilities, industrials, technology, consumer goods, and consumer services.
The criteria to be in the sample are summarized here: In this case we have just considered those issuers that
have priced every day in the senior 5-year CDS contract. According to these criteria, we have used a sample of
722 issuers. The different geographies contained in the Markit database are: Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern
Europe, Europe, India, Latin America, Middle East, North America, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra. How-
ever, most of these 722 issuers are located in Europe, North America and Asia. Table 4.1 summarises the issuer
distribution by industry and region.
Finally, we use the iTraxx Europe Index, the HiVol iTraxx Europe Index, the iTraxx Europe Crossover Index,
the CDX NA IG Index, the CDX Index, the CDX North American High Yield Index and the iTraxx Japan Main
Index as hedges in the different analysed exercises.
4.4 A framework for the hedge
In this section we explain all the details that we have used in order to calculate the mark-to-market of the CDS
portfolio for the different analysed regions: Europe, North America, and Japan. 1 We suppose that we have one
monetary unit in each issuer of the sample during all the analysed periods of time. We are therefore long in the
credit market as it is natural for a financial institution. In this case, our loss in the portfolio will be the result
of an increase in the CDS of each issuer. Thus, the natural hedge of this portfolio will be to take the opposite
contract in their credit index (depending on the issuer’s region). Then we carry out the following steps for the
analysis:
1. Firstly, we average weekly the spread of each issuer in order to avoid the excessive daily market noise of
1We use the ’plyr’, Wickham (2014), and ’TTR’,Ulrich (2014), R packages for these exercises
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the analysed period. Therefore, we have now 365 weekly CDS for each issuer.2
2. We do the same, with the six credit indices that we use for the the hedge in the different exercises: the
iTraxx Europe, iTraxx Europe Crossover and HiVol iTraxx Indices to hedge the European issuers, the CDX
NA IG and High Yield CDX Indices to hedge the North American issuers, and the Japan Main Index for
Japanese issuers.
3. We approximate the difference of the mark-to-market of each CDS weekly of the firm i in time t as (being
long in the CDS)3:
∆M t M it =−(C DSit −C DSit−1)RD it−1 (4.1)
RD it is the risky duration of the issuer i at the time t , and is computed as:
RD it =
n∑
t=1
S tτt−1,t F D t (4.2)
where St is the survival probability at the time t , τ is the time in years between two consecutive payment
dates, F D t is the discount factor at time t , and n is the total number of payments in a CDS contract.
On the other hand, we can express the discount factor over the time interval [x, x+t ] as F D t = e−
´ t
0 r (s)d s =
e−r t , where r is the instantaneous spot risk-free rate, assuming a constant spot rate over that time in-
terval. In addition, as we have shown in equation (2.12) the survival probability over the time interval
[x, x+ t ] can be expressed as St = e−
´ t
0 h(s)d s = e−ht , where h is the hazard rate, assumed to be constant. 4
We get
RD it =
ˆ T
0
exp
[(
−C DSit /(1−R it )+ rt
)]
d t = 1−exp
[(−C DSit /(1−R it )+ rt )T ]
C DSit /(1−R it )+ rt
(4.3)
Thus, if we assume that the payment of the premium leg takes place in continuous time, we can approx-
imate the risky duration as in the equation (4.3), where R it is the recovery of the issuer i in time t , r is the
instantaneous spot risk-free rate interest rate at time t of the currency of the CDS contract, and T is the
tenor of the contract, in our case five years.
4. We do the same calculus than in 3 for the credit indices obtaining the difference of the mark-to-market
of each credit index j ,
∆MT M
Index j
t =−(Spr ead
Index j
t −Spr ead
Index j
t−1 )RD
Index j
t−1 (4.4)
2As explained later, we also use daily data for comparison.
3We are also assuming in order to simplify that we can roll over the CDS contracts of the issuers and the credit indices every week.
4Therefore, by applying the standard market CDS recovery for each issuer, we can extract the hazard rate from CDS prices; the hazard
rate, h, is approximated by h = C DS
5y
i
(1−Ri ) . This approximation is standard among practitioners and is known as the credit triangle that relates
the spreads, default probabilities, and recovery rates as we detail in Section 5.3 in the next chapter, [see for more details White (2013)].
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5. We calculate a weekly beta for each issuer i with respect to their credit index j as
Bet ait =Cov(∆M t M it ,∆MT M
i ndex j
t )/V ar (∆MT M
i ndex j
t ) (4.5)
We use a time window of 52 observations, a year to estimate Bet ai using a rolling window. Therefore, we
have finally 313 weekly observations.
6. We get the difference of the mark-to-market in t time of each unheeded regional j portfolio as
∆M t M(U H)t
Reg i on j =
n j∑
i=1
∆MT M it /n j (4.6)
where n j is the total number of the issuers in that region in the analysed sample.
7. We get the difference of the mark-to-market in t time of the hedged regional j portfolio as
∆M t M(H)t
Reg i on j =
n∑
i=1
∆MT M it /n−
n∑
i=1
Bet ait−1∆MT M
i ndex j
t /n (4.7)
where n is the total number of the issuers in that region in the analysed sample.
8. For the global portfolio we aggregate5 the results of each one of the three regions, Europe, North America
and Japan in time t . Then we get:
∆Gl obal M t M(U H)t =
3∑
j=1
∆M t M(U H)t
Reg i on j (4.8)
and
∆Gl obal M t M(H)t =
3∑
j=1
∆M t M(H)
Reg i on j
t (4.9)
9. Finally, we can calculate the accumulated of the mark-to-market of the portfolio in time T as:
Ac∆Gl obal M t M(U H)T =
T∑
t=1
∆Gl obal M t M(U H)t (4.10)
and
Ac∆Gl obal M t M(H)T =
T∑
t=1
∆Gl obal M t M(H)t (4.11)
5It is implicit that we are assuming a constant exchange rate equal to 1 between the Euro, USD, and the Yen.
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Figure 4.3: Sectorial median beta estimates for the European CDS portfolio. 2007-2012
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Beta analysis
In this first section, we explore the beta coefficients of the different sectors. These estimated beta coefficients
represent a measure of the systemic risk of each sector. This means that when the beta is higher than 1, we
need to hedge each unit of the notional of that sector, with a greater than 1 unit of the credit index notional.
A beta greater than 1 can be explained mainly by the volatility CDS in that sector is higher than the observed
volatility spread in the credit index.
The results for the median beta sector estimates for the European Portfolio are represented in Figure 4.3. We
can see that the sectors with the lowest median beta during the crisis were energy and health care and the one
with the highest was the basic material sector. The evolution of the financial beta estimate is also significant,
being very small before the crisis and then even greater than 1 during 2010, reflecting that this global crisis was
overall a financial global crisis. These results are also interesting for asset allocation proposals, as they give a
clear sign of the systemic risk of the different industries.
Moreover, the financial industry has a growing fear as single-name volumes wither, and notional outstand-
ing in index CDS products grows, that the correlation between CDS indices and single-name contracts is in
danger of breaking down. We show the median sector R-squared in Figure 4.4, using Europe iTraxx as a credit
index, for the European portfolio during 2007-2012. It is clear that at least during the analysed period (2007-
2012) the R-squared between the different European sectors and the credit index was even higher, during the
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Figure 4.4: Sectorial median R-squared for the European CDS portfolio. 2007-2012
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worst period of the crisis (2008-2009), reflecting what we normally observe normally during crises, a general-
ised increase in the correlation level. Therefore the market sentiment of the financial industry [see Devasaba
(2014)] cannot be justified with this dataset, but it would be interesting to follow the evolution of this type of
graph in coming years.
Finally, we show the results for the North American portfolio. In this case, the sector with the highest beta is
usually the financial sector, and the smallest one is the health care sector as in the European case (Figure 4.5).
In terms of the R-squared (Figure 4.6) the trend is the same as in Europe in general, but the level of R-squared
is lower, which implies that the CDX Index is not as good as iTraxx for hedging this portfolio. This point will be
analysed in-depth in the next section.
4.5.2 Hedge results
4.5.2.1 European CDS portfolio analysis
In this subsection, we firstly show the weekly profit and loss (P&L) for the European CDS portfolio and the
P&L, considering the weekly hedge for the period 2007-2012. Figure 4.7 is a scatterplot of the returns of the
unhedged portfolio versus the returns of the hedge portfolio. We clearly observe the huge deterioration of the
credit market during the crisis, the losses for some weeks being higher than 100 basis points for the whole
European portfolio. If we direct our attention to the hedge portfolio, it is clear that the Markit iTraxx Europe
Index normally works quite well, reducing the market movements. However, there is a basis risk that cannot be
ignored, and this basis risk obviously increases with the volatility of the market. It is also interesting to observe
4.5. RESULTS 157
Figure 4.5: Sectorial median beta estimates for the North American CDS portfolio. 2007-2012
Figure 4.6: Sectorial median R-squared sector for the North American CDS portfolio. 2007-2012
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Figure 4.7: Weekly profits and losses for the European CDS and hedge portfolios. (246 issuers) in basis points.
2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
that the hedge portfolio worked better during the pre- and post-crisis periods, with an R-squared higher than
85% for each of the two periods in contrast to an R-squared of 77% during the crisis period. Without any doubt,
the main problems of this hedge are shown by the points that are a loss for the CDS portfolio and a profit for
the index hedge portfolio, representing a “double” loss, as we have the opposite contract in the hedge portfolio.
In those points, we have a negative correlation between the CDS portfolio and its hedge.
In Figure 4.8 we have just added the weekly P&L in order to get the accumulated P&L during the period 2006-
2012 for the European credit portfolio, ignoring the discount factor to aggregate the P&L. Again, the devastating
effect of the recent crisis in terms of market losses is clear. It is also noteworthy that after some weeks of very
high losses, we normally observe an opposite market reaction. This fact could be explained by some active
measures from regulators and governments, as we detail in the next chapter. In addition, this graph reflects
the general increase in the credit spread market in the period 2006-2012. In terms of the hedged portfolio, we
observe that we can reduce losses hedging with iTraxx, but in no case we can totally immunize the value of the
portfolio.
Finally, we show the weekly VaR (right axis), and the empirical density function of the weekly P&L for the
European portfolio (left axis), Figure 4.9. If we look at either the red line or the blue, we get the historic prob-
ability of having a loss higher than the value in the X axis. For example, the probability of having a weekly loss
higher than 70 basis points is 4.81% for the non-hedged portfolio and just 0.96% for the hedged portfolio. These
results are very interesting in order to establish a VaR limit or a stop loss on the basis risk. On the other hand, if
we observe the density function projected over the right axis, it is very clear that most of the time, almost 65%,
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Figure 4.8: Accumulated profits and losses in basis points for the European CDS portfolio.(246 issuers). 2007-
2012
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the effectiveness of the hedge is quite good, the mark-to-market of the hedged portfolio being very close to zero
(represented by the probability that the mark-to-market of the hedged portfolio is between zero and ten basis
points).
4.5.2.2 North American CDS portfolio analysis
In the North American case, consisting of a portfolio of 360 issuers, the results of the hedge show a pattern
similar to the European portfolio. Figure 4.10 is a scatterplot of the returns of the unhedged portfolio versus
the returns of the hedge portfolio. It is important to mention that even though the North American portfolio
is more diversified than the European portfolio in terms of the numbers of issuers, the results of the hedge are
worse. On the other hand, we see the same pattern as before in terms of the R-squared, meaning that the ef-
fectiveness of the hedge is higher during the non-crisis periods than during the crisis period, as reflected by the
R-squared of the graph. In Figure 4.11, it can be observed that this was a global crisis, as the most devastating
consequences occurred after the Lehman Brothers default, with the widest increasing level of spread in North
America, in the epicentre of the problem at that moment.
Finally, the empirical probability of having a weekly loss higher than 70 basis points is 8.97% for the non-
hedged portfolio (Figure 4.12), in contrast to the 4.81% of the European case. This probability is 3.21% for
the North American hedged portfolio, and just 0.96% for the European hedged portfolio. In terms of the ef-
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Figure 4.9: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the European CDS portfolio.
(246 issuers). 2007-2012
Figure 4.10: Weekly profits and losses for the North American CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points. (360
issuers). 2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
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Figure 4.11: Accumulated profits and losses in basis points for the North American CDS portfolio. (360 issuers).
2007-2012
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
Ja
n
-
07
Ap
r-
07
Ju
l-0
7
O
ct
-
07
Ja
n
-
08
Ap
r-
08
Ju
l-0
8
O
ct
-
08
Ja
n
-
09
Ap
r-
09
Ju
l-0
9
O
ct
-
09
Ja
n
-
10
Ap
r-
10
Ju
l-1
0
O
ct
-
10
Ja
n
-
11
Ap
r-
11
Ju
l-1
1
O
ct
-
11
Ja
n
-
12
Ap
r-
12
Ju
l-1
2
O
ct
-
12
Portfolio 'WITH Hedge'
Portfolio 'WITHOUT Hedge'
fectiveness of the hedge (right axis) and represented by the probability that the mark-to-market of the hedged
portfolio is between zero and ten basis points, this number is 44.45%. Again, it is lower than in the European
case, but it represents a ratio of almost 2 in relative terms of the effectiveness of the non-hedged portfolio (25%),
quite similar to the European case.
4.5.2.3 Japanese CDS portfolio analysis
In the Japanese case, Figure 4.13 is a scatterplot of the returns of the unhedged portfolio versus the returns of
the hedge portfolio. It consists of a portfolio of 116 issuers, and the results are similar to the previous cases,
reflecting the importance of this global credit crisis. In terms of the weekly losses, we can observe that the
non-hedged portfolio normally has a loss smaller than 100 basis points, which is lower than in the previous
cases. This can be explained by the fact that the level of Japanese spreads is lower than in the rest of the world.
In terms of the effectiveness of the hedge, we see that the R-squared is very close to 60% during the three
analysed periods of time, in contrast to the European and North American cases. Figure 4.14 reflects the same
as in the rest of the world, the general increase of the credit spread taking place in 2006-2012. In terms of
the hedged portfolio, we observe that we can reduce the losses by hedging with Japan iTraxx, but in no case
can we immunize completely the value of the portfolio. Finally, the empirical probability of having a weekly
loss higher than 70 basis points is 5.00% for the non-hedged portfolio (Figure 4.15), in contrast to the 4.81%
of the European case. This probability is 1.28% for the Japanese hedged portfolio, and similar to 0.96% for the
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Figure 4.12: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the North American CDS
portfolio. (360 Issuers). 2007-2012
European hedged portfolio, showing that the hedge worked quite well.
4.5.2.4 Global CDS portfolio analysis
In this last exercise, we show the results of the aggregated global portfolio (European, North American and
Japanese cases), considering an equal exposure in each issuer, and ignoring the effect of the foreign exchange
rates, as we would like to focus on just the credit market and the hedge of the credit market. The most relevant
fact is that in this case we are considering a portfolio of 722 issuers. Therefore, it may be thought that the results
of the hedge will be better than in the previous case, as in the law of large numbers. However, in general terms,
the results are a little worse than in the European case, due to the influence of the North American issuers6
in the global portfolio and the high correlation among the weekly worst individual issuer hedges at the end of
2008 (Lehman default). Consequently, the benefits from the diversification decreased, and the basis risk could
not be fully eliminated, as shown in Figures 4.16 and 4.17. Once again, we observe that the R-squared in terms
of the effectiveness of the hedge is higher during the non-crisis period than during the crisis period. Finally, the
probability of having a weekly loss higher than 70 basis points was 7.04% for the non-global hedged portfolio
(Figure 4.18). This probability is 2.24% for the global hedged portfolio, higher than 0.96% for the European
hedge portfolio. Again, the results are influenced by the performance of the North American portfolio, where
the increase of the level of the credit spread was higher.
6In the previous chapter, we have also shown that the decomposition risk of the North American industrial and financial sectors are
more influenced by the specific firm risk than in the European case.
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Figure 4.13: Weekly profits and losses for the Japanese CDS and hedge portfolios. (116 issuers) in basis points.
2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
Figure 4.14: Accumulated profits and losses in basis points for the Japanese CDS portfolio. (116 Issuers). 2007-
2012
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Figure 4.15: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the Japanese CDS portfolio.
(116 issuers). 2007-2012
Figure 4.16: Weekly profits and losses for the global CDS and hedge portfolios. (722 issuers) in basis points.
2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
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Figure 4.17: Accumulated profits and losses in basis points for the global CDS portfolio. (722 issuers). 2007-
2012
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Figure 4.18: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L for the global CDS portfolio. (722 issuers). 2007-2012
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Figure 4.19: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the European CDS portfolio
(iTraxx and HiVol iTraxx as hedges). (246 issuers). 2007-2012
4.5.3 The results of an alternative hedge
Is it possible to increase the effectiveness of the hedge using more credit index to hedge the portfolio?
We are going to try to answer this question using for the European credit portfolio, the iTraxx and the HiVol
iTraxx, instead of using just the iTraxx. Again we assume that the liquidity of the two indices is enough to
balance our hedge weekly without any entry and removal cost. In this case, the strategy that we are going to use
is quite clear, in case that the issuer is an investment grade issuer in a particular week, we use the iTraxx hedge;
otherwise we use the HiVol iTraxx. In the case of the North American portfolio, we do the same, but in this case
we use as an alternative hedge for the Non-Investment Grade issuers, the High Yield CDX.
If we compare these results with the European case (Figure 4.9) previously analysed, we observe that we
slightly improve the result of the hedge effectiveness. For instance, the probability of having a weekly loss
higher than 70 basis points is now 0.32% from the previous 0.96% for the hedged portfolio, reducing the extreme
losses that occurred before. On the other hand, if we focus on the density function projected over the right axis,
the effectiveness of the hedge (represented by the probability that the mark-to-market of the hedged portfolio
is now between zero and ten basis points), is very similar to the previous case of around 65%. Thus, we can
conclude that this alternative hedge improves the results, especially the extreme losses occurring for some
weeks, but the difference between these two alternative hedges in terms of R-squared is just around 4% in the
European portfolio, as shown in Figures 4.19 and 4.20. Finally, we propose the same exercise for the European
CDS portfolio again, but using this time the Markit iTraxx Europe Crossover instead of the the HiVol iTraxx, as
the first one is more liquid than the second one. The results are practically the same as before, Figure 4.21.
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Figure 4.20: Weekly profits and losses for the European CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points. (iTraxx and
HiVol iTraxx as hedges).(246 issuers). 2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
Figure 4.21: Weekly profits and losses for the European CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points. (iTraxx and
iTraxx Europe Crossover as hedges). (246 issuers). 2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
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Figure 4.22: Weekly profits and losses for the North American CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points. (CDX
and High Yield CDX as hedges). (360 issuers). 2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
In this last case, we compare the results for the North American portfolio (Figures 4.22 and 4.23). The
probability of having a weekly loss higher than 70 basis points is now 2.88% instead of the previous 3.21% (4.12)
for the hedged portfolio, slightly reducing again the frequency of the extreme losses that took place in some
weeks. In general terms, we observe the same pattern as in the European case. With this alternative strategy,
we improve the outcome of the hedge a little, especially the extreme losses in some weeks. In addition, in terms
of R-squared, there is also a considerable increase providing a better effectiveness of the hedge with this last
hedge alternative. Finally, with these results, it seems clear that it is quite difficult to immunize completely the
value of the portfolio.
4.5.4 Daily hedge results
Could we improve the results of the hedge using a daily basis for the hedge?
In this subsection, we analyse the possibility of balancing the hedge daily assuming again that the cost of
entry in the market is zero. In this case, we calculate the beta for each issuer with respect to their credit index
(without the HiVol iTraxx or High Yield CDX) using a window of 252 daily data. We show the main results for
the global portfolio in Figures 4.24, 4.25 and 4.26, which as we initially thought, are poorer in terms of the
effectiveness of the hedge compared with the previous cases (see Figures 4.17 and 4.18). In terms of the R-
squared, we see an average decrease higher than 10% compared with the previous weekly cases. It seems that
the high noise of the credit market during the crisis discouraged the use of daily data, and, even more, when
4.5. RESULTS 169
Figure 4.23: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the North American CDS
portfolio (CDX and High Yield CDX as hedges). (360 issuers). 2007-2012
being aware of the illiquidity of this market. Thus, it is clear that the hedge is less adequate than in the weekly
hedge case.
4.5.5 Dynamic conditional correlation beta estimation
Alternatively, we could use an exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) model to estimate the variance of
the individual issuer returns, or we can alternatively estimate univariate GARCH models, Novales (2013). In our
case, we estimate an EWMA model to estimate volatilities and a DCC GARCH model to estimate the conditional
correlation, in order to see see if we improve the results of the hedge that we calculate previously using OLS. In
this case to estimate the different beta issuers, we use
µi = T−1
T∑
t=1
ri t , i = 1,2, ...n (4.12)
σ2i t =λσ2i t−1+ (1−λ)(ri t−1−µi )2, i = 1,2, ...n (4.13)
where ri t is the return on the CDS contract of the issuer i in time t as shown in (3), σ2i t is the variance of the
CDS contract of the issuer i in time t , and n is the number of issuers in the sample.
The Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model uses the standardized returns: zi t = (ri t−µi )/σi t , z j t =
(r j t −µ j )/σ j t to generate the auxiliary variables:
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Figure 4.24: Accumulated daily profits and losses in basis points for the global CDS portfolio. (722 issuers).
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Figure 4.25: Daily empirical density function for the weekly P&L for the global CDS portfolio. (722 issuers).
2007-2012
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Figure 4.26: Daily profits and losses for the global CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points. (722 issuers).
2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
qi j ,t+1 = (1−λ)zi t z j t +λqi j ,t , ∀i , j (4.14)
It means that in the case of two variables:
q11,t+1 = (1−λ)z21t +λq11,t (4.15)
q12,t+1 = (1−λ)z1t z2t +λq12,t (4.16)
q22,t+1 = (1−λ)z22t +λq22,t (4.17)
Thus, the conditional correlation can be estimated as:
ρi j ,t+1 =
qi j ,t+1p
qi i ,t+1
p
q j j ,t+1
(4.18)
Finally, we get the covariance and the beta in respect to the market index as:
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Figure 4.27: Weekly profits and losses for the European CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points (DCC estima-
tion). (246 issuers). 2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
Covi j ,t+1 = ρi j ,t+1
√
σ21,t+1σ
2
2,t+1 (4.19)
Bet ai ,i ndex,t+1 =
Covi ,i ndex,t+1
σ2i ndex,t+1
(4.20)
In this exercise we use again average weekly data, and the Europe iTraxx as market index for the European
portfolio, the CDX as market index for the North American portfolio, and the Japanese iTraxx as market index
for the Japanese portfolio. We assume qi 0 = 1∀i , and in the case of qi j , we calculate the average of the product
zi ,t zi ndex,t of the first 52 observations as the initial value of qi ,i ndex,0. We establish the parameter λ = 0.94
based on RiskMetrics, JP Morgan (1996), as we are working with a daily sample that we average weekly. Finally,
we also take the standard deviation of the first 52 observations as initial value ofσi 0. Therefore, our estimations
cover the period from 2007 to 2012 as in the OLS cases.
These results for the European portfolio in Figures 4.27 and 4.28 are quite similar to those estimated by
the OLS shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. As a matter of fact, these results are slightly better than
those estimated by OLS, as they actually provide a better hedge during the highest volatility period, reducing
the probability of getting a higher loss if we compare these graphs with the base case 4.8 and 4.9. There are
no considerable differences between these two methods when analysing the result during the whole period of
time. In terms of R-squared, the results are very similar with these two alternatives, with an average increase of
1% in favour of the DCC estimation.
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Figure 4.28: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the European CDS portfolio
(DCC estimation). (246 issuers). 2007-2012
Finally, we show the results for the global portfolio. These results in Figures 4.29 and 4.30 should be com-
pared with the results shown in Figures 4.17 and 4.18. As in the European case, there are no significant dif-
ferences between one method and the other, with the exception of some days of extreme volatility where the
results provided by the DCC estimation are better than the OLS results. This is logical, as the DCC model estim-
ates an instantaneous variance in time t, weighting more the recent observations, so it is a model that reacts
before the OLS model, as the latter weights the entire sample equally to estimate the variance and covariance.
This fact is observed very clearly in Figure 4.31, with the median beta sector estimated by the DCC model in
contrast with those estimated by OLS, as shown in Figure 4.3.
4.6 Jump-to-Default risk
Can we hedge the Jump-to-Default risk from an issuer using a credit index as a hedge? We try to answer this
issue.
To introduce this topic we are going to use a report by Bloomberg on 7 December 2011 that highlights the
increasing aversion by investors to the lowest rated issuers who had the most exposure to Jump-to-Default
(JTD) risk in the recent financial crisis.
“AMR Corp.’s bankruptcy is taking the corporate debt market by surprise, with investors losing 25 percent on
bets in junk-bond derivatives that there wouldn’t be a jump in defaults this year.”
“The failures of AMR, and those of Dynegy Inc. and PMI Group Inc., are driving investors to recalibrate their
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Figure 4.29: Weekly profits and losses for the global CDS and hedge portfolios in basis points (DCC estimation).
(722 issuers). 2007-2012
Note: Rsq. = R-squared
Figure 4.30: Empirical density function for the weekly P&L and the weekly VaR for the global CDS portfolio
(DCC estimation). (722 issuers). 2007-2012
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Figure 4.31: Median sector beta DCC estimates for the European CDS portfolio. 2007-2012
expectations for when borrowers may miss debt payments as companies that aren’t considered immediate can-
didates abruptly fail. That’s a scenario known among debt traders as Jump-to-Default risk.”
“Five-year credit-default swaps on AMR traded at 57 percent upfront on Oct. 26 before soaring to 83 percent
the day of the bankruptcy filing, two weeks after talks between the airline and its pilots union stalled, according
to broker Phoenix Partners Group.”
Jump-to-Default risk could be defined as the risk that an issuer defaults without first showing deterioration
in the credit spread. For example let us imagine a default process in which p, the one-day probability of default,
follows a random walk (with absorbing barriers at zero and one). Every day, a draw is taken from a uniform (0,1)
distribution and if it is less than p, the firm defaults. Now we have a clear separation between spread risk (p
moving up or down) and Jump-to-Default (getting a draw that results in default).
From a market point of view, suppose we are long $16.6 million of 3-year single-name CDS protection on
a single name and short $10 million of 5-year. If this issuer defaults , we make a profit of $6.6 million, times
the loss given default, as the difference between the two contracts. But if the issuer CDS ticks up or down in a
parallel shift, the value of our position is unchanged (to a first approximation, anyway, as the DV01 (how much
money positions will gain or lose for a 0.01% parallel movement in the yield curve) multiplied by the notional is
the same in both contracts. Thus, this position is a pure Jump-to-Default bet. On the other hand, as a possible
example, if we would like to make a pure spread bet, we could go long $10 million of the 3-year and short $10
million of the 5-year. Now we make a profit if the probability of default goes down, as the risky duration of the
5-year tenor is higher, but in a default scenario we do not have any profits or losses.
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Therefore, in our case, using a credit index as a hedge, matching the tenor and the notional, we are partially
covering the spread shift in light of the results presented above, but we are still exposed to the Jump-to-Default
risk. In case the issuer is part of the credit index, this Jump-to-Default risk will be reduced in proportion to the
relative weight of the issuer in the index; otherwise it will be exposed fully to the Jump-to-Default risk without
any hedge. This is a concern because delta hedging is partial hedging and its effectiveness is predicated on
continually adjusting the hedge ratio, as we did in this chapter. As the issuers worsen their credit quality, we
have to adjust the delta hedge ratios, and we have to buy more protection against the deteriorating credit. The
goal is to fully hedge against the issuer by the time he defaults. If the credit jumps to default, we will not have
adjusted the hedge ratio appropriately, and the defaulted credit exposure will not be fully covered, resulting in
a loss.
Finally, there is a second effect that is very difficult to measure: how the jump in the credit index follows a
default in a firm which is not included in the index. If we could calibrate a jump model using the information
about this hypothetical jump in the credit index, we would be partially covering these jumps to default from
issuers that are not in the index, as there is a contagious effect in the credit index spread after a default. Once
again, this an open question to analyse in the future.
4.7 Conclusions and open questions
In this chapter we have analysed the empirical basis risk in a CDS portfolio, defining the basis risk as the risk
induced by the imperfect correlation between the underlying single CDS contract to be replicated and the credit
index contract involved in the dynamic replication strategy (e.g., iTraxx Index). Because of the presence of
higher liquidity and lower frictions, financial institutions prefer to hedge their CDSs or CVA by trading in credit
indices. If changes in the price of the CDS and the credit index contracts were perfectly correlated, no further
risk would be introduced, and one could perfectly offset any gain or loss in the position by dynamically trading
in the related index contract. We have shown that even in the case of a large diversified portfolio with more
than seven hundred, the basis risk exists, meaning that we cannot fully immunize the value of the portfolio
with a hedge based on credit index contracts, assuming implicitly that the idiosyncratic risk is offset among the
different issuers in the portfolio.
We evaluate the hedging error of a historical delta-hedging regression strategy, based on weekly observa-
tions with different assumptions. Since the regression-based strategy is free of parametric model assumptions
about the securities, it is robust to misspecification of models and their parameters. This strategy is adapted to
discrete observations of CDS and credit index in the sense that it intends to keep up with the latest information
contained in the data, except for some time lag to collect data and to make a reasonable estimate. These results
are expected to serve as a benchmark, a lower bound, for evaluating more complex strategies as is normally the
case, where we have problems related to maturity mismatch, stochastic exposure or not knowing of the credit
spread of the issuer, etc...
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We have shown that among the different strategies that we have applied, having accounted for the illiquidity
of the market, the best strategy could be the delta hedge weekly estimate by OLS using just the three main credit
indices: Europe Main iTraxx, CDX, and Japanese iTraxx. The other alternative strategies just improve these
results slightly and they use other indices which are more illiquid, implying normally higher transaction costs.
In the case of the DCC estimate, it is a more volatile estimate, with higher entrance and exit costs to adjust the
hedge more continuously. However, the DCC estimate could be optimal in a situation with very high volatility,
performing almost equally to OLS over the course of an economic cycle.
Another important topic that we see in this chapter is that the Jump-to-Default cannot be ignored as the use
of delta hedging is partial hedging and its effectiveness is predicated on continually adjusting the hedge ratio.
Therefore, if a single issuer jumped to default, we would not be able to adjust the hedge ratio appropriately,
and the defaulted credit exposure would not be fully covered, resulting in a loss. The possibility of calibrating
a jump model to evaluate the credit index hedge effectiveness, in case of a Jump-to-Default of an issuer that is
not included in that credit index, is an open question.
On the other hand, based on Rama Cont (2006), we should always be aware that the econometric models
specify a probability measure P in an attempt to model the historical evolution of market prices, while pricing
models use a risk-neutral probability measure Q to specify a pricing rule to relate prices of various instruments
in an arbitrage-free manner. If P corresponds to a complete market model, then the pricing rule Q is uniquely
defined by P. However, if P corresponds to the more realistic case of an incomplete market model, a multi-factor
diffusion model with more factors than tradable assets, as in our case due to the single-name CDS illiquidity,
then the knowledge of P does not determine the pricing rule Q in a unique way. Therefore, even if P is known
with certainty we still face uncertainty in the choice of the pricing model Q. Thus, the concept of model un-
certainty in the context of pricing goes beyond the traditional uncertainty of the evolution of the underlying
asset. This is the uncertainty of pricing rules. Finally, it is interesting to comment on the difference between
the liquid traded assets and the illiquid asset. In the first ones as the credit indices or main stocks, the price is
determined by supply and demand in the market,7 pricing models are therefore not used to price those assets.
However, the price of an illiquid asset is normally computed using a pricing model that should be consistent
with the observed market prices of the traded assets in order to avoid arbitrage.
Hence, it seems clear in the price of derivatives that we should charge some basis points in terms of un-
hedgeable risk, as in this case. For instance, a good place to start would be to measure the loss in basis points to
include as an extra charge in the price of derivatives depending on the proxy portfolio and adjusted by matur-
ity. From the point of view of the regulators, we could think about using a historical percentile to have a lower
bound of the basis risk that should be added in terms of capital, and monitor this risk among the financial
institutions in order to prevent future problems.
As an open question, it would be interesting to carry out this study with other assumptions as with a trans-
action cost different from 0, with stochastic exposure, or using an alternative strategy involving more credit
7See also Derman (2013)
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indices. Finally, it would be interesting to try to hedge the credit portfolio with credit and equity indices since
the latter are highly liquid assets and, consequently, this strategy could reduce the hedge error shown in this
study.
Chapter 5
Forward-looking asset correlations in the
estimation of capital for a loan portfolio
5.1 Motivation
In this chapter we intend to answer the following questions:
Has the credit market anticipated the crisis before the regulators? Was there any information in the market
showing signs of the current credit crisis? Did the financial system ignore them? Is the loan portfolio of the
financial entities insensitive to the CDS market?
The correlation among a firm’s assets is one of the most important factors when calculating the capital
needed to face the unexpected losses of a credit portfolio under the Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB) in
Basel II [see Basel Committee (2006)] and for many of the credit models in the financial industry. Unfortunately,
asset correlation is not directly observable in the market; thus, we are forced to use different methods in order
to estimate asset correlation, McGinty et al. (2004).
The approach most often used to determine economic capital is the Merton model (also known as “struc-
tural model”). The principal advantage of this method is the strong economic rationale that explains the firm’s
default. This default occurs when the asset value is below the debt value. This approach has been widely used
by the financial community to estimate the economic capital of a loan portfolio. Nowadays, this approach is
the base for the current Basel II IRB model to calculate the loan portfolio capital needs for those entities that
use advanced models. As we mentioned before, asset correlation is vital for the estimation of the economic
capital. In Basel II, the regulator establishes the correlation as a deterministic function of the probability of
default.
In 2007, Dullmann et al. (2007) with a dataset for 1998-2004 conducted some hypothesis tests against the
179
180CHAPTER5. FORWARD-LOOKINGASSETCORRELATIONS INTHEESTIMATIONOFCAPITALFORALOANPORTFOLIO
Figure 5.1: Bond and CDS notional outstanding
Sources: IOSCO (2014)
regulator’s results. Instead of using a function for asset correlation depending on the probability of default,
he used various assumptions for asset correlation. Those results show that the different proposed models and
the Basel II IRB approach produce a similar outcome. The main reason for this is that the results from Basel II
IRB model were previously calibrated, and both use the same KMV database and a very similar time frame [see
Crosbie (1999) and Crosbie (2003) for more details]. However, since the year 2000, we have experienced a big
increase in the CDS market (Figure IOSCO (2012)) becoming one of the prime credit markets during the last
decade. Figure 5.1 represents the volume of the bond market (Figure IOSCO (2014)) for each subcategory, and
Figure 5.2 shows the different notional outstanding for each CDS subcategory.
The economic capital estimated by CDS spreads might be a very useful alternative for portfolio managers.
These estimates could provide us with relevant information about future systemic adverse shocks as well as an
alternative tool for risk management and asset allocation. Therefore, we propose a similar Dullmann study but
using CDS data, with more industries, eleven industries instead of the six used by Dullmann, and for a more
recent period, 2006-2012, where we could distinguish among the pre-crisis period, the global crisis period, and
the post-crisis period. Finally, we could compare these estimations against Basel II to put these figures in the
context of the regulatory requirement capital.
This chapter is divided into eight sections: In Section 5.2 we introduce the default correlations, and then in
Section 5.3 we present the proposed methodology. In the Section 5.4 we detail the dataset that we have used,
and the different hypotheses employed. In Section 5.5 we detail the framework for the analysis. In Section 5.6
we focus on the results of these methodologies, continuing with some critical issues in Basel II in Section 5.7.
And finally we present the main conclusions and open questions in Section 5.8.
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Figure 5.2: CDS notional outstanding by single-name and multi-name
Sources: Basel Committee (2014).
5.2 Introduction default correlations
In this section, we explain why the use of structural theoretical models is indispensable for the evaluation of
the risk of default correlation. Firstly, there are several sources for assessing of default correlation, although
none is perfect:
• Actual rating and defaults events
In theory, this is the most obvious source of the relationship between default for modelling purposes, though
it is not generally used in practice. The problem with this approach is that the defaults are very rare events, so
in order to obtain a statistically significant sample of data points, a very long history is required. Therefore, the
economic circumstances of a very remote past may not be relevant today.
• Credit spreads
Credit spreads contain continuous information about the default risk of traded bonds, for instance, the bond
price may be influenced by illiquidity factors. Another important limitation is that there is not theoretical justi-
fication for the direct link between credit spread correlation and default correlation. For example, two obligors
could have a low credit spread correlation up to defaults, but they still have very high default correlation. (In
our approach we will use structural models but using the available credit spread information).
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• Equity correlations
It is not unusual to suggest that credit and equity are related. Robert Merton first published his framework mod-
elling the relationship, later known as the structural models, in 1974. These structural models aim to provide an
explicit relationship among default risk and the capital structure. Equity returns are generally used as a proxy
for asset returns for the structural models. Therefore the advantage of using equity data is that there is a good
history of company prices. The main limitation of this approach is that the link between equity, debt, and asset
(leverage) is not constant, and difficult to measure and judge. For example, two firms can be highly correlated
from the point of view of the equity returns, and at the same time, they can exhibit a low asset correlation.
The most important reason for the use of structural models is the fact that the specifications of full joint
probabilities is simply too complex. There are 2N joint default event for N obligors. For a loan portfolio with
twenty counterparties or more it is impossible to enumerate these probabilities.
5.3 Methodology
In this section, we present the different models (Basel II IRB model, market model, sector model, individual
sector model, and sector market model) that we are going to use to determine the value at risk (VaR) under
different assumptions. In the last part, we detail how we estimate the asset correlation for the different models
from the CDS market.
To model the possibility of default, we propose the use of the Merton Model using the information from the
CDS market. We consider that each firm receives a single loan (Vasicek, 2002). The loan defaults at maturity
T , if the borrower’s asset falls below the contractual value of its debts Di . Let us assume that the value of firm’s
assets follow a geometric Brownian motion as:
dVi (t )=µi Vi (t )d t +σi Vi (t )dWi ,t , i = 1,2, ...n (5.1)
Where µi represents the expected growth rate of the assets for the firm i , σi is the volatility of asset value,
Wi ,t is a variable following a Wiener process, and n is the number of firms. We assume µi and σi are constant.
Applying Ito’s lemma to the logarithmic transformation, we have:
dl nVi (t )=
(
µi −
σ2i
2
)
d t +σi dWi ,t (5.2)
And hence, starting from Vi (0), the value of firm’s i assets at each point in time is:
lnVi (t )= lnVi (0)+
(
µi −
σ2i
2
)
t +σi
p
tdWi ,t (5.3)
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We denote the current time as t = 0, and we define the Modified Distance to Default of firm i [following
Hull et al. (2010)] at the current time period as:
MDDi ,0 = lnVi (0)− lnDi
σi
(5.4)
Similarly, the Modified Distance to Default can be defined at any point in time t as:
MDDi ,t = lnVi (t )− lnDi
σi
(5.5)
Where Di denotes the contractual value of its debt. As the formula suggests, MDDi ,0 is the logarithm of the
leverage ratio, which by definition is equal to the value of the assets of firm i , divided by the contractual value
of its debts (Vi (0)/Di ), and scaled by the volatility σi . Since MDD i ,t = f (V (i (t )), with f (x)= lnx−lnDiσi , so that:
f
′
(x)= 1σi
1
Vi (t )
, f
′′
(x)=− 1σi
1
Vi (t )2
. Therefore, applying Ito’s Lemma, we have:
d MDDi ,t =
(
σi ,t f
′
(Vi (t ))
)
dWi ,t +
(
µi ,t f
′
(Vi (t ))+ 12σ2i ,t f
′′
(Vi (t ))
)
d t =
=σi Vi (t ) 1σi
1
Vi (t )
dWi ,t +
(
µi Vi (t )
1
σi
1
Vi (t )
− 12σ2i Vi (t )2 1σi
1
Vi (t )2
)
d t =
dWi ,t +
(
µi
1
σi
− 12σi
)
d t
(5.6)
Hence d MDDi ,t has a drift γi = (µi−σ
2
i /2)
σi
and a unit variance.
Firm i defaults at time t in the future if MDDi ,t < 0, so the probability of default at time T is:
PDi ,T = P (MDDi ,T < 0)= P
(
MDDi ,0+
´ T
0 d MDDi ,t d t < 0
)
=
= P
(
MDDi ,0+ (µi−σ
2
i /2)
σi
T +pT dWi ,T < 0
)
= P
(
dWi ,T <− 1pT MDDi ,0−
(µi−σ2i /2)
σi
p
T
T
)
=
= P
(
dWi ,T <− 1pT MDDi ,0−γi
p
T
) (5.7)
And if we assume that the return on firm’s assets has zero mean and consider T = 1 year, we have:
PDi ,1 = P
(
dWi ,1 <−MDDi ,0
)
(5.8)
so that, firm i defaults if dWi ,1 <−MDDi ,0, that is, whenever:
dWi ,1 <N−1(PDi ,1) (5.9)
Which is the condition we will use below when we estimate VaR by Monte Carlo simulations.
Where N−1 denotes the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of a N (0,1) random variable.
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Since dWi ,1 has a N (0,1) distribution, then the previous argument provides us with a way to estimate
MDDi ,0 from PDi ,1 estimates. Indeed, from ecuation (5.9) we have:
MDDi ,0 =−N−1(PDi ,1)⇔MDDi ,0 = 1−N−1(PDi ,1) (5.10)
Which is the condition we will use below to estimate correlation parameters.
Default can equivalently be defined in terms of the value of firm i assets. Firm i defaults whenever the value
of its assets is below the value of its debt, so that the probability of default at time T can be written:
PDi ,T = P (ln(Vi (T )< lnDi )= P (ln(Vi (0)+ (µi −σ2i /2)T +σi
p
T dWi < lnDi )=
= P
(
dWi ,T <− 1pT MDDi ,0−
(µi−σ2i /2)
σi
p
T
T
) (5.11)
the same condition we obtained above. It is easy to show that the same default condition as ecaution (5.9)
can be obtained by using ecuation (5.2) to substitute for lnVi (1):
PDi ,1 = P (l n(Vi (1)< lnDi )= P (∆ln(Vi (1)<−MDDi ,0σi )
= P
[(
(µi−σ2i /2)
σi
)
+σi dWi ,1 <−MDDi ,0σi
]
=
= P
(
dWi ,1 <−MDDi ,0− (µi−σ
2
i /2)
σi
) (5.12)
so that under the assumption γi = 0 [based on Tarashev and Zhu (2008)] default arises when ∆lnVi (1)σi <
−MDDi ,0 , that is whenever:
∆l nVi (1)
σi
<N−1(PDi ,1) (5.13)
So that we can simulate values for either dWi ,T or a standardized version of∆lnVi (T ), to be compared with
N−1(PDi ,T ).
To compute this estimate of MDDi ,0, we first need to estimate default probabilities, PDi ,1, from CDS data,
as: PDi ,1 ≈ 1−e
−C DS5y
i
1−Ri where Ri is the recovery. The term e
−C DS5y
i
1−Ri is equivalent to e−h·1 that appears in equation
(2.12) in Chapter 2. Note the hazard rate, h, is approximated by h = C DS
5y
i
(1−Ri ) . This approximation is stand-
ard among practitioners and is known as the credit triangle that relates the spreads, default probabilities,
and recovery rates. This approximation assumes independence between the exogenous default process and
the risk-free rates. In addition to this, if the premium leg were paid continuously, the present value of the
premium leg of a CDS would be, PVPr emi um,conti nuous = NC DS
´ T
0 P (t )Q(t )d t where N , C DS, P (t ), Q(t ) are
the notional, the CDS spread, the discount factor and the probability of survival at time t, respectively. On the
other hand, the present value of the protection leg of a CDS is PVPr oteci onLeg = −N (1−R)
´ T
0 P (t )
dQ(t )
d t d t =
−N (1−R)´ T0 P (t )dQ(t ), where P (t ), dQ(t ) are the discount factor and the infinitesimal probability of a default
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at time t, and R is the recovery. Therefore, the par (“fair”) CDS spread C DSp ignoring any accrued interest
would be given by: C DSp = −1(1−R)
´ T
0 P (t )Q(t )d t´ T
0 P (t )dQ(t )
. Under the further assumption that the hazard rate is con-
stant at a level, h, this becomes the credit triangle relationship: C DSp = (1−R)h
´ T
0 P (t )e
−ht d t´ T
0 P (t )e
−ht d t
↔ h = C DSp1−R [see
for more details White (2013)]. Note also that we use the 5-year CDS spread instead of the 1-year CDS spread
because of their representativeness.
Once we have PDi ,1, estimates, Modified Distance to default is estimated as in equation (5.10). Then, we
estimate sector (Xs ) and global risk factors (X ) as the average of MDDi ,0 estimates over the appropriate set of
firms (the set of firms in a given sector, or the whole set of firms in the sample).
Let us define a market index, M I for all the companies contained in this study, which will play the role of
the common factor X in equation (5.20), which was a global index for the whole economy, as:
M I =
n∑
i=1
MDDi
n
(5.14)
where n is the number of issuers in the market.
Thus we estimate equation (5.20) as:
ri =Cor r (MDDi , M I ) (5.15)
Equally, we establish the sector index,MSIs , for the sector s as:
MSIs =
ns∑
i=1
MDDi
ns
∀i ∈ s (5.16)
where ns is the number of issuers in the sector s. And we proceed to estimate the other models similarly.
For instance, ωsz is estimated by Cor r (MSIs , MSIz ).
Finally, we get the intra-sector correlation, ris , for each issuer i in sector s as:
ris =Cor r (MDDi , MSIs ) (5.17)
In other words, we start by defining a global index for a particular sector as the sectorial factor, and then we
estimate the asset correlation of each issuer j in that sector with the credit sector index in its factor.
To estimate these indices, we follow the next steps:
1. We average MDDi weekly in order to avoid the excessive daily market noise of the analysed period.
Therefore, we now have 365 weekly MDDi for each issuer.
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2. We calculate the sector index,MSIs , for each sector s as in (5.16) on a weekly basis.
3. We obtain the market index, M I , applying equation (5.14) on a weekly basis.
4. In the next step, we get the time series of weekly log returns for the individual firms, sector indices, and
the market index.
5. We calculate the correlation, ri , between each firm i and the market as in (5.15) , using a time window of
52 observations, a year. Therefore, we finally have 313 weekly correlation observations for the portfolio
composed by 881 issuers. Thus the results cover the period from 2007 to 2012.1
6. We calculate the intra-sector correlation, ris , for each issuer i in sector s as in (5.17), using a time window
of 52 observations, using a weekly logarithmic return.
7. In addition to this, we get the inter-sector correlation ωs j estimated by the sample correlation of index
returns for the s and j sector with the same time window.
Finally, the Figure 5.3 shows the median intra-sector asset correlation with the different sectors. Finally, Figures
5.4 and 5.5 display the inter-sector correlation for the financial sector, and for the utilities sector.
Figure 5.3: Median intra-sector asset correlation. (2006-2012)
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1In order to increase the period analysed, we really work with the dataset from mid-2005 to 2012. During the six months between mid-
2005 to 2006, we have an 840-issuer portfolio instead of the 881 issuers. In that case to estimate the correlation of these assets for these six
months we use the proxy of the median sector correlation.
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Figure 5.4: Inter-sector correlation with the financial sector. (2006-2012)
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Figure 5.5: Inter-sector correlation with the utilities sector. (2006-2012)
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5.3.1 Basel II IRB model (one-factor model)
As we have mentioned above the default happens when a continuous variable dWi falls below the contractual
value of its debts, thus, the default barrier for borrower is given by N−1(PDi ) where N−1(·) is the inverse of the
cumulative normal distribution function.
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To capture the interactions among firms dWi is decomposed into two factors, a common systematic factor,
X , and a specific factor, ξi , resulting:
dWi = ri X +
√
1− r 2i ξi (5.18)
where X , ξ1,ξ2......,ξn are mutually independent standard normal variables. Equations (5.3) and (5.18) rep-
resent the standard one-factor model. The ri parameters are related to the correlations among firms’ assets.
Indeed, asset correlations are generated by the dependence of the value of assets of each borrower on the gen-
eral state of the economy. All borrowers are linked to each other by the single risk factor X . This factor X can
be interpreted as a common factor for the assets in the portfolio, such as a global economic index over the time
period (0,T ). On the other hand, the
√
1− r 2i ξi represents the company specific risk. This model is the essence
of Basel II, establishing r 2i as a function of the probability of default, PD , of the firm i through the function:
r 2PDi = 0.24−0.12 · (1−exp
−50·PDi ) (5.19)
5.3.2 Market model (one-factor model)
The market model is specified by (5.3) with X being again the same for all the issuers, since it is also a one-
factor model. The decomposition of the standardised asset returns is also as in equation (5.18). The difference
between this model and the Basel II IRB model is that the coefficient ri is specific for each issuer i instead of
being as a function of the probability of default as in equation (5.19). This parameter ri is estimated by the
sample correlation between the value of firm’s asset returns and the market index returns. This makes sense as:
Cov (dWi , X )=Cov(ri X +
√
1− r 2i ξi , X )= ri V ar (X )= ri =Cor r (dWi , X ) (5.20)
where the last equality is based on the unit variance of the two variables. Note that we are assuming that
Cov(ξi , X )= 0∀i , a standard assumption.
5.3.3 Sector market model (one-factor model)
In the market model factor X is the same for all the issuers, as it is a one-factor model, but the ri parameter is
specific of each issuer i . This parameter ri is estimated in that model by the correlation between the firm and
the market index returns. However, an alternative possibility would be the use of the market model factor with
the next assumption :
rs =medi [Cor r (dWi , X )] (5.21)
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In this case, we use the same correlation rs for all the issuers placed in the sector s, instead of using indi-
vidual correlation ri for each i issuer. r s parameter is estimated by the (positive) square root of the median of
all intra-sector asset correlations in the sample. We refer to this alternative as the sector market model in this
study.
5.3.4 Sector model (multi-factor model)
In the sector model, we consider a different factor for each sector, with the number of sectors and factors are
equal to N , and we assign each firm to a given sector,therefore borrower i ´s standardised asset return is driven
by the sector systemic factor Xs according to the next equation:
dWi = r s Xs +
√
1− r 2sξi (5.22)
Therefore, the parameter rs measures borrower i ´s sensitivity to its own sector systemic risk. The ξi terms
are assumed independent and normally distributed, representing the idiosyncratic shock. They are independ-
ent across firms. {Xs }s=1,2......N denote sectorial factor returns Xs with zero mean, unit-variance, and a matrix
correlation:
V ar (X1, X2, X3, ....., XN )=

1 ω12 ω13 ...... ω1N
ω21 1 ω23 ...... ω2N
ω31 ω32 1 ...... ω3N
..... ... ... 1 ...
ωN 1 ωN 2 ωN 3 .... 1

(5.23)
Let us consider a firm i in sector s:
V ar (dWi )= r 2s V ar (Xs )+ (1− r 2s )V ar (ξi )= 1 (5.24)
Now, consider two firms,i , j in sectors s, z:
Cov (dWi ,dWi )= r s r zωsz =Cor r
(
dWi ,dW j
)
(5.25)
With Cor r
(
dWi ,dW j
)
being the asset correlation between firm i and firm j . In the sector model, the r s
parameter is the same for all the issuers in the s sector, and it is estimated by the (positive) square root of the
median of all intra-sector asset correlations with the sectorial factor medi
[
Cor r
(
dWi ,dW j
)]
.
This is natural, as if firm i and firm j belong to the same sector s, then :
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Cor r
(
dWi ,dW j
)= r s r sωss = r 2s (5.26)
The inter-sector correlation ωsz is estimated by the sample correlation of sectorial factor returns for the
s and z sectors. Therefore, the difference between sector model and market model is that the first one is a
multi-factor model using the inter-sector correlations among the sectorial systemic factors, and the second
one consider just one systemic factor for all the sectors.
5.3.5 Individual sector model (Multi-factor model)
In the individual sector model, we estimate the individual intra-sector correlation ris for each issuer i in the
sector s, instead of the median of all intra-sector asset correlation in the sample r s for each issuer i as in the
sector model. Therefore, borrower i ´s standardised asset return is driven by the sector systemic factor Xs .
according to the next equation:
dWi = ris Xs +
√
1− r 2isξi (5.27)
where
{{
ris
}
i=1,2......ns
}
s=1....N is estimated by the square root of the correlation between each issuer and
sectorial factor returns. The variable ns represents the number of issuers in the sector s and sectorial factor
returns {Xs }s=1....N have zero mean and unit-variance, and a matrix correlation as it was defined above.
Finally, if firm i and firm j belong to the same sector s, then :
Cor r
(
dWi ,dW j
)= ris r jsωss = ris r js (5.28)
while for two firms i , j in different sectors s, z, we have:
Cor r
(
dWi ,dW j
)= ris r jzωsz (5.29)
5.4 Input Data
For our empirical analysis we use the daily senior 5-year CDS contract with the standard currency and re-
structuring clause for each issuer of the sample. We use this particular criterion because of its liquidity and
representativeness (for more detail see Chapter 1). The analysed period is from 2006 to 2012 as we think that it
is the most relevant period of time for the credit market, covering the recent global financial crisis.
The sector classification is based on the ICB criteria in the Markit database, (Industry Classification Bench-
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mark), which distinguishes four levels: industry, supra sector, sector, and subsector. In this case, Markit works
with the industry level, differentiating eleven industries: financials, health care, energy, telecommunication
services, basic materials, utilities, industrials, technology, consumer goods, consumer services and govern-
ment (Markit category).
Our filtering criterion is clear. In this case we have just considered those issuers that have a price every
day for the senior 5-year CDS contract. According to this criterion, we have used a sample of 881 issuers. The
different geographies contained in the Markit database are Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Europe,
India, Latin America, Middle East, North America, Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supra. However, most of
these 881 issuers are located in Europe, North America and Asia.
The Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 summarise the issuers by industry, region, and industry region. Finally, we have
used Moody’s database in order to daily assign a rating to each different issuer contained in the sample for
the period 2006-2012. In this case we show the sector rating distribution on 30 June 2006, and 30 June 2012
(Tables 5.4 and 5.5). It can be observed that the rating distribution in almost all industries has shifted towards
worse ratings in the period 2006-2012 with the exceptions of the energy and health care industries as it seems
natural due to the analysed crisis period. It can be highlighted that the average probability of default in the
financial sector increased considerably during this period, reflecting that it was overall a global financial crisis
(see Chapter 3 for more detail about the relationship among the sectors), Figure 5.6. We show the average
probability of default of the different sector according to Table 5.6 to relate the rating with the probability of
default.
Table 5.1: Issuer distribution by industry (2006-2012)
Industry Issuers
Basic materials 69
Consumer goods 115
Consumer services 112
Energy 50
Financials 173
Government 73
Health care 29
Industrials 111
Technology 33
Telecommunication services 47
Utilities 69
Total 881
Each issuer always belongs to the same industry;
thus, this table is valid for the whole period 2006-2012
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Table 5.2: Issuer distribution by region (2006-2012)
Region Issuers
Africa 5
Asia 178
Caribbean 2
E.Eur 15
Europe 260
India 5
Lat.Amer 18
Middle East 7
N.Amer 361
Oceania 25
Offshore 3
Supra 2
Total 881
Each issuer always belongs to the same region;
thus, this table is valid for the whole period 2006-2012
Table 5.3: Issuer distribution by industry region (2006-2012)
Industry/Region AF AS CA E.E EU IN LA ME NA OC OS SU T
Basic materials 14 17 1 2 33 2 69
Consumer goods 26 33 54 2 115
Consumer services 1 20 35 1 52 3 112
Energy 7 1 6 2 33 1 50
Financials 30 1 69 1 1 61 10 173
Government 4 20 1 13 14 2 12 5 1 1 73
Health care 4 1 24 29
Industrials 28 30 1 46 4 1 1 111
Technology 11 5 16 1 33
Telecommunication services 9 1 20 14 3 47
Utilities 13 27 1 27 1 69
Total 5 178 2 15 260 5 18 7 361 25 3 2 881
Note: AF:Africa, AS: Asia, CA: Caribbean. E.E.: Eastern Europe, EU: Europe, IN: India, LA: Latin America, ME: Middle East, NA: North
America, OC: Oceania, OF: Offshore, SU:Supra and T: Total. Each issuer always belongs to the same industry; thus, this table is valid for
the whole period 2006-2012
Table 5.4: Industry rating distribution on 30 June 2006
Rating/Industry BM CG CS. EN F G HC I TH TL UT T
AAA 2 6 6 1 15
AA 6 6 6 44 6 5 1 2 3 13 92
A 21 27 21 12 74 30 5 32 9 20 22 273
BBB 30 53 54 22 42 7 11 54 8 17 24 322
BB 11 23 20 10 6 17 6 16 10 3 7 129
B 7 3 11 1 6 1 7 3 3 3 45
CCC 1 1 1 1 1 5
Total 69 115 112 50 173 73 29 111 33 47 69 881
Note: BM: Basic materials, CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy , F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I:
Industrials, TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities and T: Total.
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Table 5.5: Industry-rating distribution on 30 June 2012
Rating/Industry BM CG CS. EN F G HC I TH TL UT T
AAA 2 2
AA 5 8 5 18 7 3 2 3 9 60
A 18 27 13 12 84 22 10 30 7 18 18 259
BBB 31 48 57 28 57 25 7 50 13 18 34 368
BB 18 21 16 5 6 11 4 23 8 4 7 123
B 2 11 15 4 5 5 7 2 2 1 54
CCC 3 3 4 1 1 1 2 15
Total 69 115 112 50 173 73 29 111 33 47 69 881
Note: BM: Basic materials, CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy , F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I:
Industrials, TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities and T: Total.
Table 5.6: Probability of default for each rating grade
Rating PD
AAA 0.01%
AA 0.03%
A 0.08%
BBB 0.20%
BB 1%
B 4.4%
CCC 21%
D 100.00%
Figure 5.6: Average sector probability of default. 2006-2012
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Table 5.7: Main features of the models
-
Model name Factor Asset correlation Factor equation Asset correlation equation
Basel II IRB One-factor PD dependent dWi = rPDi X +
√
1− r 2PDi ξi r
2
PDi
= 0.24−0.12(1−e−50PDi )
Market One-factor Individual dWi = ri X +
√
1− r 2i ξi ri =Cor r (dWi , X )
Sector market One-factor Sector dependent dWi = rs X +
√
1− r 2s ξi rs =medi [Cor r (dWi , X )]
Sector Multi-factor Sector dependent dWi = rs Xs +
√
1− r 2s ξi rs =medi [Cor r (dWi , Xs )]
Individual sector Multi-factor Individual dWi = ris Xs +
√
1− r 2is ξi ris =Cor r (dWi , Xs )
5.5 A Framework for the simulation
To compute Monte Carlo Value at Risk estimates we need to simulate a large number of realizations of the
value of the assets of each firm. In that simulation exercise it is crucial to maintain the appropriate correlations
among the time evolution of the assets of the different firms. To estimate those correlations, we will follow
Dullmann et al. (2007) to consider the models considered in this chapter in Table 5.7.
1. Now, we use each of these models, alternatively, to simulate dWi to be compared with N (PDi ). Since
PDi ,1 = P (dWi < l nDi ) , then there is no default for firm i whenever dWi >N−1(PDi ,1).
2. To do that, we daily assign a physical probability of default at a one-year horizon, PD , to the different
issuer ratings according to Moody’s database following the equivalence shown in Table 5.6. Note that
in this case we are not using the probability of default inferred from the CDS market and that we are
using the same probability of default for each rating according to the Table 5.6. We use this assumption
for simplicity, as agency rating probability of default is empirical, and therefore they change every year.
These figures can be considered as a “through-the-cycle” probability of default.
3. For each issuer we evaluate the value of their assets to determine if default occurs or not in each simu-
lation, 1{dWi≤N−1(PDi )} with the four different models. When dWi >N−1(PDi ) there is no default for that
asset i , in that simulation in that week. As we have detailed above dWi is decomposed into two factors,
a common systematic factor, X , and a specific factor, ξi , depending on the model considered, we use
different weights between the systemic and idiosyncratic factors.
4. For each simulation we aggregate the individual losses to get the aggregated loss of the portfolio. We have
used the loss given default, LGDi , as LGDi = 1−Recover yi , where data for Recover yi is taken from the
CDS Markit database for each issuer. Thus the percentage aggregated loss of the portfolio is determined
by Loss(%)=
881∑
i=1
LGDi ·1Y i≤N−1(PDi )/881.
5. We generate 1,000,000 simulations as described above for each week , in order to calculate the 99.9th
percentile, q , and determine the V aR of the portfolio under each model.
6. Finally, for the sake of a comparison we take as a benchmark the V aR defined in the Basel II IRB model
for corporate exposures as:
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V aRB asel I I−I RB99.9% =
881∑
i=1
LGDi ·N
N−1(PDi )+
√
r 2PDi N
−1(1−q)√
1− r 2PDi
/881 (5.30)
r 2PDi = 0.24−0.12 · (1−exp
−50·PDi ) (5.31)
5.6 Results
In this section we show the VaR of the different models (market, sector market, sector and individual sector) in
Figure 5.7.2 In the first part, we would like to explain the different estimated results of the VaR contextualized
with the different economic events that occurred during the period 2006-2012. We can distinguish several
phases of the most serious crisis since the Great Depression:
Figure 5.7: VaR 2006-2012 with different models
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Note: VaR_BISII: The estimated VaR of the Basel II IRB model and Ind. Sector VaR: The estimated VaR of the
individual sector model explained above in the text .
Phases: (1),(2),(3),(4),(5),(6), and (7)
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Bloomberg and The
Guardian.
1. Subprime crisis phase - 2 April 2007: New Century Financial, largest U.S. subprime lender, filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. New Century Financial Corporation listed liabilities of more than $100 million.
New Century Financial Corporation also announced that the employment of about 3,200 people, more
than half the workforce, would be terminated. July, 2007: Bear Stearns’ BSC.N $850 million Asset-Backed
Securities Fund experienced declines in July, prompting some investors to seek redemption of their in-
2Note that the trend of this figure is very similar to Figure 3.2 in the Chapter 3.
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vestments. On 1 August 2007, Bear Steams halted redemptions in a third hedge fund after jittery investors
wanted to pull their money out. 9 August 2007 began with the seizure in the banking system precipitated
by BNP Paribas announcing that it was ceasing activity in three hedge funds that specialised in US mort-
gage debt. This was the moment it became clear that there were tens of trillions of dollars worth of dodgy
derivatives swilling round which were worth a lot less than the bankers had previously imagined. Nobody
knew how big the losses were, and banks stopped doing business with each other. During this first phase,
the estimation of the market VaR increased from 6.02% in March 2007 to 12.25% at the beginning of Au-
gust 2007, reflecting the current conditions of the economy at that time.
2. Lehman default phase - 17 February 2008: After the failure of two private takeover bids, Alistair Darling
nationalised Northern Rock in what he claimed would be a temporary measure. It would be nearly four
years before it returned to the private sector. 16 March 2008: Bear Stearns was acquired for $2 a share by
JP Morgan Chase in a fire sale avoiding bankruptcy. The deal was backed by the Federal Reserve, provid-
ing up to $30B to cover possible Bear Stearn losses. 19 June 2008: Cioffi and Tannin, managers of the
Bear Stearns CDO hedge funds that crashed in 2007, were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. They were accused of misrepresenting their funds’ true condition to investors; both were acquitted.
7 September 2008: The US government bailed out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – two huge firms that
had guaranteed thousands of sub-prime mortgages. 15 September 2008: the US government allowed the
investment bank Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt. Up to that point, it had been assumed that govern-
ments would always step in to bail out any bank that got into serious trouble: the US had done so by
finding a buyer for Bear Stearns while the UK had nationalised Northern Rock. During this period the
market VaR increased from 12.24% on 22 February 2008 to 14.57% on 10 October 2008, reaching one of
the maximum VaR levels.
3. US Stimulus Act phase: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) (Pub.L. 111–5),
commonly referred to as the Stimulus or Recovery Act, was an economic stimulus package enacted by
the 111th United States Congress in February 2009 and signed into law on 17 February 2009 by President
Barack Obama. 2 April 2009: At the London G20, world leaders committed themselves to a $5tn (£3tn)
fiscal expansion, an extra $1.1tn in resources to help the International Monetary Fund and other global
institutions boost jobs and growth, and to reform the banks. During this period of government stimulus
measures, we observe that the market VaR decreased from 13.14% on 23 January 2009 to 9.41% on 8
January 2010.
4. Eurozone crisis phase - 27 April 2010: Greek debt was downgraded to junk 2 May 2010. In a move that
signalled the start of the eurozone crisis, Greece was bailed out for the first time, after eurozone finance
ministers agreed loans worth €110bn. This intensified the austerity programme in the country, and sent
hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets. 28 November 2010: European ministers agreed a
bailout for Ireland worth €85bn. This marked the point at which the focus of concern switched from the
private to the public sector. In terms of market VaR, it started at 10.31% on 29 January 2010 and ended at
13.39% on 31 December 2010.
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5. EU measures phase - 11 March 2011: The EU summit agrees to expand powers of the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) to allow it to buy debt in primary markets and tap its full 440 billion euros in
firepower. The EU also reached preliminary agreement to cut the rates on emergency loans to Greece
by 100 basis points for first three years and extend maturities of the loans to 7.5 years. 21 March 2011:
EU finance ministers decided on mechanisms for allowing the region’s permanent bailout mechanism,
the ESM, to lend 500 billion euros from 2013. The ESM would draw on 80 billion euros of paid-in capital,
enabling it to lend a full 500 billion euros. 5 May 2011: The ECB bailed out Portugal. 13 June 2011: S&P cut
Greece to CCC, the lowest rating for any country it reviews in the world. During this period we observe
that the market VaR decreased from 13.08% on 14 January 2011 to 8.53% on 1 July 2011. Thus during this
period, the different measures of the European Union did not seem so bad as to contaminate the rest of
the global credit market.
6. US rating downgrade phase - 5 August 2011: S&P downgraded US sovereign debt. The move reflects the
deterioration in the global economic standing of the United States, which had had a AAA credit rating
from S&P since 1941, and it could had implications for the U.S. dollar’s reserve currency status. The S&P
500 Stock Index had fallen 10.8 percent in the past ten trading days on concerns that the U.S. economy
might have been heading into another recession and because the European debt crisis had worsened.
15 September 2011: ECB offers banks unlimited dollar loans for three months as the worsening debt
crisis sparked concern over some institutions struggling to access U.S. currency. 17 September 2011:
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner urged European officials to deal with the crisis and avoid
“catastrophic risks” after flying to a meeting of European Union finance chiefs in Poland. 19 September
2011: Standard & Poor’s cut Italy’s credit rating for the first time in almost five years, downgrading it
to A from A+. 7 October 2011: Fitch cut Spain to AA- and Italy to A+. 12 March 2012: The number
of unemployed Europeans reaches its highest ever level. 12 June 2012: The level of Spanish borrowing
reached a record high. During this period, after the downgrade of the US economy, the consequences
were very deep, meaning with the market VaR increasing from 8.52% on 5 August 2011 to 15.44% on 22
June 2012, the highest Market VaR during the period 2006-2012.
7. Draghi measures phase - 26 July 2012: ECB president Mario Draghi unexpectedly gave his strongest
defence yet of the euro, prompting markets to rally. Thus, the market VaR went down from 15.44% to
11.78% at the end of 2012.
Finally, in this first section, we would like to focus on the significant increase in the average R-squared of the
market based on the modified-distance-to-default (defined in the previous section) from 25% to 38%, during
the third week of July of 2007. This average R-squared is the square root of the coefficient of the systemic factor
(X ) from equation (5.18) for each issuer, and later these results are averaged to get this figure. This rise is
associated with an average increase in the CDS spread market of 23% in just that week. In the following week,
the downturn in the credit market was also quite pronounced, with another average increase of 13% in the CDS
spread market. In addition to this, the effect of these huge market movements on a particular issuer stands
out. For instance, if we observe the example of the issuer GAP (one of the most largest American multinational
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clothing and accessory retailers), we see that the 5-year CDS contract went up from 125 to 150 basis points
during the third week of July 2007. The following week, the 5-year CDS GAP spread reached 175 basis points.
It is interesting to observe the effect of these huge market movements on the calculation of the R-squared of
a particular issuer. As we have introduced two “outlier” observations, comparing them with the rest of the
sample (where the returns are much smaller), this caused the R-squared estimate to increase considerably,
thus enlarging the capital requirement, as the credit market was more correlated (see Figures 5.8 and 5.9).
Figure 5.8: Weekly GAP modified-distance-to-default (MDD) log returns versus weekly market MDD log returns
(7/20/06-7/20/07)
Figure 5.9: Weekly GAP modified-distance-to-default (MDD) log returns versus weekly market MDD log returns
(7/27/06-7/27/07)
On the other hand, in the second part of the results, we observe that the four models considered have the
same pattern. This is natural, as they are using the same market information. However, several relevant points
can be mentioned:
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1. The difference between the market VaR and the individual sector VaR series is very low. This means that
the inter-sector correlation has been very high during the period 2007-2012, being almost the same as
using a one-factor model, or a multi-factor model.
2. The difference between the market VaR and the sector market VaR is very high. This result is the same as
in the Dullmann study. Thus, if we use the mean correlation for an issuer instead of his “true” individual
correlation, the deviation of the VaR estimation can be considerable. The sector market VaR being above
the market VaR in the period June 2007-December 2012 could be explained by the fact that in average
terms the issuers who contributed most to market VaR have a correlation below the mean sector correla-
tion. Therefore, when we replace the individual market issuer correlation by the mean sector correlation,
we increase the VaR. However, before the first deep crisis (June 2006-May 2007), the situation was the
inverse.
3. In the case of the sector VaR and the individual sector VaR exactly the same thing occurs as before. Thus,
the sector VaR was higher than the individual sector VaR during June 2007-December 2012 and lower
during June 2006-May 2007. The explanation of this fact is the same as we have detailed above.
4. Finally, the difference between the market VaR and the sector VaR mixes two different components, the
results not being obvious. The first component is the fact than the sector VaR uses a multi-factor model,
which means a higher diversification than in the one-factor model. The second component is the use of
the mean intra correlation instead of the individual intra-sector correlation in the sector model. As we
explained above the use of this proxy increases VaR for the period (June 2007-December 2012). Then the
final difference between these two alternative models depends on these two components. In general, we
observe that the correlation effect has more importance than the use of a multi-factor model, market VaR
being lower than the sector VaR.
5. It is very clear that the Base II IRB model does not capture the market volatility which occurred during the
period 2006-2012. This is a very different conclusion from the Dullmann study, where they show that the
results of the different alternatives are very similar to the BIS II. In the pre-crisis period (June 2006-April
2007), we observe the results of the models are similar to the Basel II IRB, and similar to the Dullmann
study, which covers the period 1998-2004. However, during the crisis period (May 2007-December 2012),
the results of the Basel II IRB model are very far from the rest of the models. There are several reasons
for this: First, the BIS correlation is calibrated to KMV dataset, which is the standard of the industry and
based on the asset value of the different firms; thus, the asset value could be less volatile than the CDS
market. However, it would be very reasonable to think that we expect that the requirement of capital
during the crisis under Basel II IRB approach would have been higher than before the crisis due to the in-
creasing credit correlation. The second reason is because we are using forward-looking information with
the CDS market, and it can contain some extra premium by illiquidity, even more during the crisis. Even
with this being true, it seems very appropriate to use the implied market information in order to prevent
some future problem. If everyone participating in the credit market announced an extreme situation, we
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would hope that our internal risk model reflected this situation.
5.6.1 Estimating standard errors of quantile
As we have used the Monte Carlo method, it would be interesting to know the confidence interval for the es-
timated V aR of the different models at 99.9%. Based on Kendall and Stuart (1972) [see(GARP, 2013)] if we have
a parametric or empirical distributionz(x), with a density function f (x), if we have a sample size of n, and our
quantile estimator is q , then the variance of q , with p being level of probability used to estimate f (q), we have:
V ar (q)= p(1−p)
n
[
f (q)
]2 (5.32)
This gives us an approximate expression for the variance of the quantile estimator q .3 The most important
features of this approximation are the following:
1. The variance falls as the sample size n rises.
2. The more extreme the quantile q the less precise its estimator.
3. Finally, the quantile variance depends on the choice of the density function, which is essentially arbitrary.
The results are shown in Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13.
Figure 5.10: Sector VaR estimation of confidence interval at level 95%. (2006-2012)
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3We use the R package ’fBasics’ for this exercise, Wuertz (2014).
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Figure 5.11: Individual sector VaR estimation of confidence interval at level 95%. (2006-2012)
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Figure 5.12: Market VaR estimation of confidence interval at level 95%. (2006-2012)
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Figure 5.13: Sector Market VaR estimation of confidence interval at level 95%. (2006-2012)
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5.6.2 The contribution of asset correlation and probability of default in explaining the
VaR changes
Are the weekly observed VaR changes mainly due to correlation increases, increases in the probability of de-
fault, or both? To answer this question, we have used the weekly Market VaR data, the average weekly market
asset correlation, and the weekly average probability of default for the period 2007-2012 (see Figure 5.8).
Table 5.8: Weekly VaR, average correlation and average PD. (2007-2012)
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Table 5.10: Market VaR regression results using average correlation. (2006-2007)
Coefficients Estimate Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
β4 5.324e-06 1.036e-04 0.051 0.959
β5 3.016e-01 7.399e-03 40.758 <2e-16 ***
Residual standard error: 0.001828 on 310 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.8427, Adjusted R-squared:
0.8422 F-statistic: 1661 on 1 and 310 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
We start by estimating the regression
∆M ar ketV aRt =β0+β1 ·∆Aver ag eRhot +β2 ·∆Aver ag ePD t +εt (5.33)
Where∆M ar ketV aRt represents the weekly absolute variation of the Market VaR for the time t , and∆Aver ag eRhot
is the weekly absolute change in the simple average correlation between each issuer and the market, and
∆Aver ag ePD t represents the weekly absolute change in the simple average of the probability of default of
each issuer, the outcome is shown in the Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Market VaR regression results using average correlation and average PD. (2006-2007)
Coefficients Estimate Std.Error tvalue Pr(>|t|)
β0 -3.232e-05 1.033e-04 -0.313 0.75465
β1 2.996e-01 7.349e-03 40.774 <2e-16 ***
β2 4.525e+00 1.595e+00 2.837 0.00486 **
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Residual standard error: 0.001808 on 309 degrees of freedom Multiple R-squared: 0.8467, Adjusted R-squared:
0.8457 F-statistic: 853.5 on 2 and 309 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
The adjusted R-squared is 84.5% and the two estimated coefficients are statistically significant. However, if
we use only ∆Aver ag eRhot as a regressor of the ∆M ar ketV aRt , the results are shown in Table 5.10.
∆M ar ketV aRt =β4+β5 ·∆Aver ag eRhot +εt (5.34)
It can be highlighted that the adjusted R-squared in this case, 84.27%, is almost the same as before. In addi-
tion to that, the correlation between the residuals of the two regressions is 98.7%. Therefore, we can conclude
that all the change in the market VaR was mainly due to the increase in the market asset correlation.
Furthermore, we estimate an increase of the 0.030 in the market VaR by an increase of 0.1 in the average
correlation. On 27 July 2007 the market VaR increased from 6.95% to 10.62% (3.67%), and on 12 August 2011
the market VaR rose from 8.52% to 12.41% (3.89%). These are the biggest changes in the market VaR during
the period. In terms of correlation, the increase of first day was from 0.251 to 0.381 and from 0.289 to 0.398 the
second day. According to the estimation of the average correlation effect, β5, these correlation changes would
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explain an increase of the market VaR of 3.90% on 27 July 2007, and 3.27% on 12 August 2011, which are very
similar to the market VaR increase that occurred. Therefore, the changes in correlation explain substantially
the market VaR changes under normal market conditions, and even under extreme volatility. Finally, we show
Figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 to prove that the correlation factor was the most decisive factor for market VaR.
Table 5.11: Residuals with average correlation and average PD regressors versus residuals with average correla-
tion regressor
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Table 5.12: Weekly changes in VaR and average correlation (multiplied by 100). 2007-2012
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Table 5.13: Weekly changes in VaR and average PD (multiplied by 100). (2007-2012)
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5.7 Some critical issues in Basel II
Firstly, we refer in this section to Alan Greenspan’s statement, “The essential problem is that our models – both
risk models and econometric models – as complex as they have become, are still too simple to capture the full
array of governing variables that drive global economic reality.”, Greenspan (2008). Another good example is
provided by Derman (2011), “Whenever we make a model of something involving human beings, we are trying
to force the ugly stepsister’s foot into Cinderella’s pretty glass slipper. It doesn’t fit without cutting off some
essential parts. Models inevitably mask as well as expose risk. You must start with models and then overlay
them with common sense and experience.”4
It is known that risk modeling offers a very unstable foundation for capital adequacy. The main problems
are as follows:
1. “Stable laws of motion” hypothesis. One of the most obvious problems is to think that the processes gov-
erning financial markets (and more generally, any social system) are not immutable “laws” comparable,
say, to the laws of physics. In financial markets, time-invariant phenomena, if they exist at all, are the ex-
ception rather than the rule. The act of modeling a financial process over time, such as the movement of
a stock price, will often lead observers to react in ways that affect the process itself, for example, adopting
a particular risk-management strategy. If enough risk managers adopt the same strategy, however, then
that strategy will likely affect the dynamics of the stock price itself. One feature that one can confidently
identify in financial markets is the apparently random oscillation between “normal” periods, in which
markets are stable, and “crisis” periods, in which markets are volatile. Most of the time, markets are fairly
stable: volatilities and correlations are low, pricing relationships are steady, markets are liquid, credit is
4See also Derman (2013).
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both cheap and easily available, and returns are good. However, once in a while, a crisis emerges and
all the above phenomena disappear: volatilities rise, correlations radicalise, relationships break down,
credit and liquidity dry up, risk-management strategies that had previously worked well unravel, and fin-
ancial institutions suffer large losses. Our example in this study is a clear example of the extreme market
situation. We are not expecting the regulators to react in the same way as the financial markets, but at
least that their capital requirements reflect the market trend.
2. Parameter calibration. The biggest problem, by far, is that parameters are usually calibrated by estimates
based on historical samples. The problem for risk modelers is that they need to choose a sample period
that is believed to be relevant for the horizon over which they are trying to forecast. There are several
studies showing estimates of asset correlation prior to 2006 as we summarise in Table 5.14. The correl-
ation level is similar to our study prior to July 2007. But when the subprime crisis started we observed
a totally different pattern in the credit correlation in the market. The question arises: Is the forward-
looking information provided by the credit market a good proxy of the “real” credit market? The answer
is not obvious, but it is clear that these “red flags” provided by the market should be incorporated by
the regulators. One of the best papers that we read on this topic is “Basel II: Correlation Related Issues”
written by Das (2007). In it he mentions, “The Devil is in the Details. No, it’s in the Tails.” This state-
ment means that the financial system normally focuses on the accuracy of the models used to calculate
VaR, instead of doing a detailed assessment of the initial assumptions to calculate VaR. The main conclu-
sions of that study are, among others: Loss distributions for credit risk are more sensitive to correlation
assumptions than those for market risk; arbitrary, inaccurate correlation specifications can cause large
errors in capital requirements. Current regulations do not recognize that credit losses depend on four
distinct correlations, not just one and Tail risk comes from LGD correlations and non-Gaussian risks. Al-
though we have used the Gaussian distribution in this chapter as a standard, this Gaussian distribution
provides a very poor fit to the tails of the distributions in which risk modelers are (or should be) mainly
interested, and there is abundant evidence to indicate that financial returns are far from Gaussian.
3. Inaccuracy and data sources. If we estimated a daily volatility of 1.5 percent for a generic portfolio,
assuming a Gaussian, then we would estimate the VaR to be 3.48 percent of the value of the portfolio,
but using a Cauchy distribution, the VaR being 47.73%. Therefore, to be honest, we have no idea what it
is. If we translate this to our study, the main difference to other studies is that instead of using the KMV
database, we work with the credit market prices in order to estimate asset correlation. The difference of
the results is highly pronounced. We do not know exactly what the result is; thus we think that the true
VaR is somewhere among these results, but it is obviously different to the Basel II estimation during the
period 2006-2012.
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Table 5.14: Asset correlations from asset value data
Source study Data source Results
Dullmann (2006) KMV 10.1%
Fitch (2005) Equity Intra 24.09%, Inter 20.92%
Lopez (2002) KMV 11.25%
KMV (2001) Undisclosed 9.46%-19.8%
Source: Chernih et al. (2006)
Two other important problems that are not studied in this paper:
1. External ratings. (Agency problem). In the Basel II framework, the assessment of credit risk is delegated
to non-banking institutions such as rating agencies, subject to possible conflicts of interest; whereas
investors want honest ratings, the issuers want favourable ones, so this shift puts pressure on the agencies
to accommodate their clients. A ratings agency that is too strict will lose business to more agreeable rivals.
2. Regulatory arbitrage problem. During the last decade it has been very usual among the financial insti-
tutions to play with the existing rules to their own advantage, typically in the form of regulatory driven
securitizations leading to lower capital requirements. In addition to this, the “simple movement” of a
particular asset (for example, a bond) among the different portfolios (trading book, available for sale, or
hold to maturity) implies a different impact on the profit and loss account and also on the regulatory
capital requirement [see, for example, Collins et al. (2008)].
To summarize, regulation is not easy, but it is clear that we need to make a bigger effort to understand what is
happening in the market and how this should be incorporated into our regulatory model, knowing the limita-
tions of risk modeling.
5.8 Conclusions and open questions
In this chapter we have shown that the four models have the same pattern with some small differences ex-
plained. In our opinion, the use of a one-factor model can be a good representation of the problem on the
basis of the result of this examination. The main reason for that is due to the high inter-sector correlation dur-
ing 2006-2012. Otherwise, the results of the models would have been much more different. In addition to this,
the one-factor model is the easiest model to implement in any financial institution.
We have pointed out that the main reason for the increase in the Credit VaR has been the growing correlation
among the credit markets in terms of the intra-sector and inter-sector correlation. The increase of the average
probability of default of the issuers using the rating information can also be observed.
Overall, this is an interesting chapter, where we have shown that there were signs in the credit market that
the financial sector probably did not introduce them into their internal risk models in order to manage their
risk during the crisis. However, there are several open questions that we do not answer in this chapter:
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1. Would we have very different results if we used the implied market probability of default (from the CDS
market) instead of the agency rating probability of default? In our opinion we expect that the results
might be similar but maybe with some time lag; thus, the first change would occur in the implied prob-
ability of default and later in the agency rating probability of default.
2. The second question is how would the results be affected if the real exposure of the market were con-
sidered instead of the assumption of equal exposure for each issuer? Here we could use several proxies
such as the total debt, or the total assets, the bank debt, or the outstanding notional amount. None of
these proxies would be perfect, but this analysis could help financial institutions to detect and prevent
adverse scenarios derived from the concentration in a particular issuer.
3. The third question would be make this analysis considering the real volatility of the sectorial factors, and
also different volatilities for the idiosyncratic components of the different firms in order to see how this
assumption has an impact in our estimation or not.
4. Finally, it could be a good exercise to propose a new calibration for the Basel II function for the capital
requirement in the banking book that reflects the credit market expectation. It is true that the credit
derivative market has a strong speculative component and it is very illiquid. But this market has shown
that it reflects the economic circumstances of each moment very well . For that reason, it does not make
sense that if we use the forward-looking information of the credit market, our capital requirements would
be much higher than using a Basel II model. Perhaps we need an intermediate approach between these
two different approaches. It would be very interesting if we could replicate this exercise for a longer
period of time, in order to contextualise these results.
In summation, we have seen that in the credit market there was information giving signs of the credit situation,
which maybe may not have been used by the regulators. Although the CDS market has been heavily criticized
for its speculative component and its illiquidity, it is clear that this market is still a key component for the
future of the credit market. In order to have a robust credit market, we need to have the possibility of hedging
the credit exposure against any counterparty. In the absence of a market where we can buy protection for the
credit, this has immediate consequences, making credit more expensive than necessary.
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